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Abstract
My project is a systematic inquiry into the problem of relevance, which has been identified as an
enduring difficulty in, for example, informal logic and information science where it plays a fundamental
role in argument and information searches, respectively. My first task involves determining exactly what
the problem of relevance is. To achieve that, I collected problem statements from the literature but I also
analysed literature on relevance to discover further problems. The key problem that I investigate concerns
the question, ‘What is relevance?’, which I take to concern the meaning and occurrence of relevance.
Concerning the semantic question, I suggest that it demarcates a point of time prior to asking it.
Subsequently, I identified and evaluated approaches to elucidating the notion of relevance, rejected
intuitionism and stipulation as suitable approaches, and selected philosopher/physicist Mario Bunge’s
approach to scientific philosophy and his conceptual system to frame my study. I also assess potential
information sources; rejected constructed examples that prove to be contrived or are used to illustrate a
stipulated definition; and selected dictionary definitions, actual statements, and carefully constructed
examples as information sources to complement my review of the literature on relevance. To elucidate
relevance, I traced the concept back to its Greek roots, analysed statements, and concluded that the term
‘relevance’ since its inception in Scottish law in the early 1500's has been limited largely to relations of
significance. Understanding relevance in terms of both connection and significance is crucial to construct,
identify, or evaluate relevance statements and thereby develop a representative theory of relevanqe. It also
provides a solution to many controversies such as degree of relevance and it helps elucidate notions such
as strength and sufficiency of an argument. I suggest that as significance can vary in degree, so too can
relevance but a connection between objects is presupposed in both cases. Strength is a measure of
significance and sufficiency is the strength required to establish a conclusion. Finally, I offer a provisional
and partial theory of relevance where I summarize my prior analyses and integrate/comment on published
positions on relevance.
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1.0 Introduction
To set the stage for subsequent chapters I will provide a general overview of the nature of
my thesis, a sketch of each chapter, an initial outline of the meaning of ‘relevance’, a set of key
terms and definitions that underlie all subsequent sections, and a brief outline of the dynamics of
symbolic representation.
My thesis is a systematic inquiry into the problem of relevance. By ‘problem of relevance’
I mean a subject of inquiry that includes a set of unresolved issues concerning the term/concept
‘relevance’. I use the phrase also to indicate a primary emphasis on problem. As an inquiry, my
thesis follows a particular process and perspective and employs particular expressions.
Specifically, it begins with and is framed by a set of questions. These questions lead to the
identification, analysis, and evaluation of issues and related standpoints. Because analysis and
evaluation are essentially disassembly and sorting operations, they determine which pieces belong
or do not belong to a particular puzzle, so to speak. However, as pieces lying on a table, they do
not provide a clear, overall picture. For that, synthesis is needed to assemble the pieces into a
coherent whole. As a systematic inquiry, my thesis includes, as prominent elements, (i) the
identification, analysis, and evaluation of problems, approaches, and perspectives; (ii) the
application of a particular perspective and approach; and (iii) the presentation of a partial and
provisional account of relevance. Given that these elements form an integral whole, where problem
determines approach and both determine the account, I treat problem-solving as an iterative
process where approach is taken as a test of problem identification/assessment and the account is
taken as a test of its precursors. Also, my account is partial because it is based on a sample of the
literature. It is provisional because it is partial. As such, I recognize that other literature and future
work might require additions and/or revisions to the account.
A systematic inquiry differs from an argument that starts with and is framed by a thesis
statement. Such a statement expresses a stand taken on an issue and leads to a proof or
confirmation of the thesis. If counter-arguments are entertained, then the argument is framed more
broadly by the issue. Although I employ arguments, an inquiry results in a different overall
structure that includes assessment of problem and approach, implementation of approach, and
presentation of a proposed solution.
In Chapter 2 ,1 begin with a general analysis of the problem and I identify and assess
published statements concerning the problem of relevance. In Chapter 3 ,1 consider the inventory of

l
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problems identified in Chapter 2 and select ones to investigate. The next step involves identifying
the essential nature of the problem, which is crucial because it determines both approach and the
relevance of potential information sources. I then identify and evaluate approaches to the problem
and information sources, rule out those that I consider less preferable based on their potential to
solve problems, and select the approach and information sources that I prefer. Chapters 4 and 5 are
parallel, so to speak, in that they both concern the implementation of approach. Specifically, they
concern the problem of what ‘relevance’ means and both chapters contain analyses and evaluations
of semantic accounts of relevance. Chapter 4 focuses on historical and contemporary dictionary
definitions and usage of the concept of relevance, as revealed by the use of various terms. Chapter
5 concerns two generic accounts of relevance published in the philosophic literature. My intent for
both chapters is primarily to discover the basic concept of relevance as revealed by generic
definitions that contain different expressions aimed at identifying essential or prominent conditions
of the concept, as opposed to specific definitions that identify types of relevance relations or
judgments. Even so, I continue to search for and find obstacles that hinder, or potentially hinder,
the development of an account of relevance. I propose solutions to some of these problems in
Chapters 4 and 5 but a few require extended analysis and evaluation. I deal with these larger issues
in Chapter 6, which also involves analysis and evaluation. The issues include the relation between
the generic concept of relevance and the concepts of relation, degree of relevance, and strength and
sufficiency of an argumentln Chapter 7 ,1 outline a general theory of relevance that I offer as a
partial and provisional account. In doing so, I summarize the findings from Chapters 2 to 6
concerning problems and approaches. I also pick up the pieces of the puzzle from these chapters
that concern the question, ‘What is relevance?’ I take this question to concern the meaning of
‘relevance’ and occurrence of relevance. I focus on the semantic question and suggest that it
delimits a time frame prior to the point of time it is asked. However, to understand this question
and my approach to it, a basic understanding of the notion of relevance and a familiarity with the
terms I employ are required.
In providing a basic understanding of relevance, an initial obstacle is encountered because
the meaning of ‘relevance’ is one of the problems to be solved. Defining it now would present my
findings prematurely and could give the impression that I am arguing rather than inquiring. So, I
offer the following tentatively and with the proviso that it will be explained in greater detail
throughout the thesis. First, we need to recognize that relevance is an existing term constructed by

2
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humans to represent a corresponding mental object and both the term and mental object have a
further representational function in designating a referent. Currently, the general sense assigned to
the term ‘relevance’ is that it concerns an association between at least two objects. Determining
what those objects and associations are is one of the main tasks of my thesis.
The special terms employed throughout my thesis are taken largely from the work of
scientist/philosopher Mario Bunge. These terms represent a system of basic philosophic concepts
developed by Bunge through a scientific approach to philosophy, as I detail in Section 3.2.4. They
are unique to his particular philosophic view and ought not to be confused with other definitions of
the same terms. Because the system spans semantics, ontology, epistemology, technology, and
ethics, summarizing the system is not possible in a few paragraphs. However, I can provide a brief
outline of the basic terms/concepts that underlie my analyses, evaluations, and synthesis. But I
should warn that such a brief account is very sensitive to articulation and prone to
misinterpretation, particularly if the reader understands the concepts from other perspectives and
particularly since Bunge reforms those conceptions. Further, I have adopted the principles and
basic elements of Bunge’s semantic and ontologic system but I classify the elements and name
some of the classes differently. For example, Bunge limits the notion of construct to conceptual
objects, which are mental objects such as concepts, propositions, and theories. That is, he groups
these mental objects under the term ‘construct’. In contrast, I use the term ‘representational object’
and include conceptual objects within that category along with other mental and non-mental
representational objects. Hence, the difference is only one of how the elements are grouped. The
fundamental ontological and epistemic principles remain the same. To prevent confusion, I will
present definitions of the terms (in bold) as I articulate them and do so without comparing them to
Bunge’s definitions. In any case, I remain faithful to Bunge’s basic intent to provide a conceptual
system that is not factually incorrect.
The most basic term is object. It includes whatever can exist, be thought about, talked
about, or acted upon. All objects are concrete/material things like atoms, persons, and artifacts;
systems of things; properties and states of things; or changes to those properties. A system is
composed of at least two associated objects. For example, sodium and chloride ions combine to
form the molecular system that we call table salt. The class object is conceptually divided into two
sets of objects: representational and non-representational objects.
Representational objects are emergent properties of constructed or generated things or

3
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systems of things. They include the representational element of (i) sensations, which are
constructed for us; (ii) mental objects like percepts, which are also constructed for us; (iii) mental
objects like concepts and propositions, which are linguistic objects that we cognitively construct;
and (iii) artifacts like letters, terms, and sentences, which are first conceived and then constructed
with material objects. A constructed object (e.g., a thought or a hair) is produced through the
cognitive or non-cognitive acts of an organism, whereas a generated object is produced through
an abiotic event (e.g., combination of sodium and chloride ions, which are non-living entities). Two
types of representational objects are mental objects, which are emergent properties of a brain
(e.g., concepts), and non-mental objects, which occur outside the brain (e.g., physical letters). As
such, linguistic objects can be either mental (e.g., concepts) or non-mental (e.g., letters).
Concepts are linguistic, mental objects constructed through brain processes and are the
basic units that constitute a proposition, which is a conceptual system. In contrast, physical/non
mental letters are linguistic things that constitute (i) terms, which are letter systems, and (ii)
sentences, which are term systems. To be economical, I use the terms word and statement
ambiguously to designate a term/concept unit and a sentence/proposition unit, respectively. These
linguistic objects constitute part of a semiotic system, which also includes humans who use such
objects to think and communicate within a community of other humans. Both mental and non
mental linguistic objects are symbols in that they have a representational function. As such, their
counterpart is a referent, which can be either another conceptual object, non-conceptual
representational object, or a non-representational object. Because we can think without employing
concepts, another term is required to identify this category of mental object. To test this claim try
to find an object without thinking with words. Doing so might be difficult but for a person like
Grandin (1995), who is an autistic scientist/engineer, thinking primarily in pictures and having to
translate language to pictures comes naturally. I will use the terms idea and ideal to designate this
category, although they can be associated with a complex and problematic history, which I would
like to avoid. The need for the category also arises because various words and statements can be
employed to express the same idea. Words and statements do so because physical and mental
symbols afford such flexibility and variability. So, where various terms/concepts or
sentences/propositions can be reduced to the same idea, I call the expression a basic term/concept
and basic sentence/proposition, respectively.
Non-representational objects include all other properties of generated or constructed

4
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things as well as non-representational things. I also use fact to designate the same category. To
understand the essential difference between facts and representations is to understand the difference
between an imaginary rock that a ‘human’ can easily ‘cast’ across the ‘universe’ and a physical
rock that cannot. This difference is one of fundamentally different properties. Examples of facts
include (i) a post, which is a non-representational thing in a particular state at a given time and (ii)
a post with an octagonal shaped sheet of metal with the physical letters ‘STOP’ on it, which is a
representational thing. But ‘fact’ does not include the meaning of the letters ‘STOP’; i.e., its
representational dimension. Similarly, a brain process/state is a fact but the concept ‘stop’ that
emerges as a result of that process/state is the representational element of that fact/state.
In terms of cognitive dynamics, the constructive process of representation involves concept
formation, term construction, establishment of a mutual referential relation between concept and
term, and establishment of a referential relation between the concept/term unit and another
conceptual or non-conceptual object, which is based on a crucial evidential link to the referrent.
These relations are not matters of law but rather convention. Such processes may be described and
definitions may be constructed to articulate referential relations but doing so is not necessary for
the occurrence of the basic representational process. Such a process has occurred in relation to the
conception of relevance, although it initially occurred centuries ago. To illustrate the process, I will
present a biological example because it illustrates how a concept can be systemically situated.
Suppose I see an insect of a new species, conceive of the name Drosophilia canadensis to
represent it, construct and arrange letters to create a physical representation of the conceived name,
and decide to associate the name with the insect. Being in a community of other entomologists, I
want to communicate to others what I mean by D. canadensis. So, I place the term within an
existing hierarchy of terms that compose a biological classification system; i.e., the Phylum
Arthropoda, Superclass Hexapoda, Class Insecta, Subclass Pterygota, Order Diptera, Family
Drosophilidae, and Genus Drosophilia. Doing so, efficiently provides a great deal of information
about D. canadensis that leads to a greater understanding of it than a description would alone.
Nonetheless, specific information is needed to identify it so that it can be distinguished from others
in the same genus. That requires using conventional terms to describe the essential characteristics
of the insect, which creates a mutual referential relation between the definiendum, D. canadensis,
and its definiens, the description of its essential characteristics. If other entomologists read my
writing, establish the same set of referential relations that I have constructed, and accept my terms

5
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and their relations, the word becomes established by convention in the community of entomologists.
Three significant points ought to be emphasised. First, linguistic objects are
representational devices. In that sense, the representation depends on both the referent and evidence
we obtain from it. In terms of representation, this relation is similar to a copy that depends on its
original. This is not to say that symbols represent objects analogically or pictorially. Rather, they
are more like digital codes. The accuracy in matching representation to referent is a matter of truth.
Second, mental representations, unlike their physical counterparts, can be assembled through
combination or reasoning and disassembled through analysis and distinction in ways that their
physical counterparts cannot, as our imagination and falsities attest. Third, as constructions,
mental representations serve a purpose. Two are of importance to the problem of relevance. One is
the intent to symbolically represent objects as they exist which yields (i) an identification and
description of individuals and (ii) a classification of how things are naturally structured, which
concerns the identification of natural kinds and systemic levels. These constructions are evaluated
primarily on the basis of truth (the referent-representation relation) but, because expression is
always a concern, they are also evaluated on the basis o f how well they serve a cognitive goal. The
other is the intent to meet other cognitive goals (e.g., to understand) or pragmatic goals (e.g., to
find food). This yields a non-natural or conventional classification system. For example, plants can
be represented pictorially and these pictures can be organized by way of flower colour as opposed
to natural kinds based on their evolutionary/genetic relations. Such a system facilitates the
identification o f plants and subsequent activities such as removing a weed from a garden. As such,
a conventional system is evaluated on the basis of both truth and convenience.
With the preceding semantic/ontologic outline, we can move to the labourious task of
sorting out 25 centuries of various terms and expressions advanced in various languages to identify
and elucidate whatever we currently designate by ‘relevance’. Once we identify terms, examine the
variety of expressions that have resulted from usage and definitions, and identify referents, we can
reduce various definitions and statements to a basic concept or proposition. Thereafter, we can
readily identify relevance statements, determine why they are correct associations, describe when
they go wrong, and develop procedures to guide the construction, analysis, and evaluation of
relevance statements. In the end, we will have the rudiments for a general theory of relevance. But,
first, we need to be clear on why all this needs to be done. This takes us to researchers’
consideration of what the problem of relevance is.

6
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2.0 Problem Analysis
The topic of relevance has been explicitly addressed by researchers from a variety of
perspectives including argumentation theory, informal logic, formal logic/relevance logic, fallacy
theory, rhetoric, neuropsychology, cognition, communications, pragmatics, artificial intelligence,
knowledge/information systems, and law. Despite hundreds of articles on and definitions of
‘relevance’, many researchers maintain that relevance remains a difficult problem to solve, which
is paradoxical given that we make relevance judgments almost always and we likely do so correctly
the vast majority of times. That is, any time we construct physical and/or mental associations, we
create what is or what we take to be a relevance relation. If we were not successful in doing so, we
could not perceive correctly, think coherently, communicate effectively, or function in a world that
demands correct associations. To support this claim requires appeal only to common experience
and the idea of correct association. Think of deciding when to wake in the morning, what to eat,
how to answer a question, or what is required to start your car. Such constructed associations have
likely been made by humans ever since humans developed rational capabilities. Further, relevance
relations have not just been utilized but they have also been recognized, named, and discussed since
at least ancient Greek times.
This contrast between theory and practice suggests that the problem of relevance is the
problem to solve. That is, I suggest that the door to its solution is opened by insight into the nature
of the problem and the path to solution is provided by approach. The first task is to determine
exactly what problems occur. Some researchers identify and discuss problems and I have collected,
analysed, and assessed these in following sub-section. However, most just propose solutions to an
implied problem. In any case, proposed solutions can be evaluated to determine how doors may
have been or can be closed, inadvertently or otherwise. Accordingly, my search for problems
carries through to subsequent chapters where I analyse and evaluate proposed solutions Further, I
suggest that the assessment of both problem and approach must be continuous with problem
solving. However, we do not always know exactly what a problem is until we have solved it and
see that the solution works. Determining that a solution works is easy with mechanical problems
(an engine does not run) but not so easy with conceptual and some theoretical problems. Hence, I
provide a partial/provisional general theory of relevance, which can be used as a test of problem
assessment and approach, and I suggest that the theory be evaluated on the basis of its coherence,
factual correctness, and application to other problems.

7
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2.1 Problem Statements from the Literature
The following is a sample of problem statements that I will analyse and evaluate to identify
problems from which I will formulate specific research objectives and determine if any obstacles
occur from researchers’ perceptions of the problem.
In 2003, through correspondence, R.H. Johnson suggests that the “problem for the theory of
argument/informal logic is that relevance is put forth as a criterion for premises and yet there is
not a coherent story about it in LSD [Logical Self-Defense]. The problem is that no one has yet
come up with an analysis of relevance which yields anything like a useful and specifiable
process/method for determining relevance.”
In 2003, M. Lipman, in a book on critical thinking, says that relevance is a “fairly fuzzy notion”.
In 2001, T. Anderson, in an article on information retrieval decisions, says that information
researchers are still trying to understand what relevance means for individuals who search for
information and how they make such judgements.
In 2000, R.H. Johnson, in a book on argumentation theory, says that nothing is more basic to
reasoning/ argumentation than relevance, yet it has been “strongly resistant to analysis”.
In 2000, B. Hoijland, in proposing a solution to the ‘relevance problem’ in information science,
says, “Considering the huge amount of research done with the relevance concept... it is almost
unbelievable that such simple and important issues as presented here have hitherto been
missing.” Those “issues” concern his proposal to shift researchers’ perspective from relevance to
non-relevance and to consider the epistemic basis of relevance judgments.
In 1997, S. Mizzaro, after reviewing about 160 articles on relevance in information science, says
that relevance is not a well understood concept despite it being one of the central concepts, if not
the central concept, for documentation, information science, and information retrieval.
In 1996, T. Sarasevic, in a critical review of relevance research in information science, says that,
despite some studies in philosophy, communications, logic, and psychology, relevance is a notion
that has not attracted wide theorizing. He speculates reasons to be that the notion is difficult to
deal with and rather narrow. Further, being intuitive, handy, widely used, and primitive, the term
and notion is used in the explication of many other phenomena and notions.
In 1996, L. Schamber, in a methodological paper in information science, suggests that the main
problems for researchers include defining relevance, identifying the range of factors contributing
to relevance judgments, and developing techniques to quantify relevance judgments.
In 1995, D. Sperber and D. Wilson, in a book on the communicative and cognitive aspects of
relevance, state that ‘relevance* is a “fuzzy term, used differently by different people or by the
same people at different times...There is no reason to believe that a proper semantic analysis of
the English word ’relevance* would also characterize a concept of scientific psychology.” In
developing such a concept, they maintain that the "fact that there is an ordinary language notion
of relevance with a fozzy and variable meaning is a hindrance rather than a help."
In 1994, J. Woods, from the perspective of argumentation theory/informal logic, considers the
notion of relevance to be the most intuitive within the family of argumentation concepts. He also
8
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thought that none is worse off theoretically because no one has developed a theory of relevance,
which leaves us without knowing what relevance is.
In 1994, T. Froelich, in a review of relevance research in information science, suggested that
relevance is the most fundamental concern in information science yet highly debated.
In 1974, M. Bunge, in a treatise on philosophy, comments that, despite the popularity of
‘relevance’ in philosophic research, it is not always identified as a relation.
In 1947, A. Naess, in a book on semantics and argumentation, claims that the initial decision to
include an argument for or against a standpoint depends on determining degree of relevance,
which is ultimately intuitive. One can only ‘feel’ such relevance. Even so, he suggests that at an
advanced stage we might be able to replace intuition with an explanation but not entirely so.

2.2 Summary and Discussion of Problem Statements
This sample of problem statements provides a clear sense that relevance is an important
and fundamental concept but problematic. The two main difficulties identified in most of the
statements generally concern semantic and methodological problems. Specifically, they involve
defining ‘relevance’ and/or understanding its meaning and determining how to evaluate relevance
claims or presuppositions. But how is that relevance remains a “fuzzy notion” as Lipman (2003)
claims; “poorly understood” as Anderson (2001) and Mizzaro (1997) claim; or intuitive or
unexplained as Naess (1947), Sarsevic (1996), Sperber and Wilson (1995), and Woods (1994)
claim, when hundreds of articles and definitions have been published in the last half of the 20th
century? Perhaps the nature of semantic problem has not been adequately understood, an incorrect
approach to it has been taken, or information sources have been inappropriate. Perhaps the
hundreds of accounts and definitions, dozens of related terms in ordinary language, and countless
expressions have just obscured what ‘relevance’ means. We find ourselves, as Socrates would say,
in the confusion of variability and we are like drunkards swirling in confusion. That variability is
like a movement and we need to, as Plato would say, tie ‘relevance’ down.
I suggest that the problem is not as Serasevic (1996) might be suggesting - one that needs
more extensive research of the same kind - but rather one of clarification. Specifically, we need to
examine various expressions as found in definitions and ordinary usage, determine the basic
concept that the term ‘relevance’ designates so that we can (i) collect a representative sample of the
concept’s usage, including usage as designated by synonymous terms and expressions, (ii) identify
referents, and (iii) describe and classify relevance statements and their referents. Then, we can
develop a general theory of relevance.

9
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At variance with my suggestion, Sperber and Wilson (1995) dismiss semantic analysis as a
means relevant to their project o f developing a psychological notion of ‘relevance’. However, they
have not conducted a semantic analysis to justify its dismissal, nor have they speculated reasons
why it ought to be dismissed. As they admit, the fuzzy notion is a hindrance and they must rely on
intuitive means to identify relevance relations, which they acknowledge is problematic (119.6). In
highlighting this point, I do not mean to imply that their account of relevance is intuitionist, as
outlined in Section 3.2.2, or that it is necessarily corrupted by mistaken relevance claims. The main
point is that, if we open the door to semantic analysis, we can see what results from it and then
determine whether or not it can provide help in developing a psychological concept of relevance, or
any other particular type of relevance relation. In initiating that analysis, we can be encouraged by
Aristotle who said that one way to know something is by its genus, which is characterized by a set
of properties common to all types. For example, if a biology student has never heard of the pika
and you tell her that it is a lagomorph or member of the rabbit family, knowing any of the essential
features of this class would tell her a lot about the pika. Even so, further description of features
common to all pikas is required for her to distinguish the pika from other species in the class. A
difference between the two cases is that we have at least a vague idea what relevance is, whereas
the biology student is unfamiliar with pikas. Nonetheless, the point concerns what we can know or
understand about a class by its genus. My suggestion is that, through a semantic analysis, we can
attempt to discover the generic concept of relevance. If successful, this provides us with the
essential conditions that all types satisfy and helps us understand the types better because we know
what is common to them. Further, if we can determine the characteristics common and exclusive to
each type, we can develop a systematic understanding of relevance, which we currently lack.
I favour essentialism despite philosophers, like Wittgenstein, who claim that some concepts
are family resemblance concepts. First, I suggest that we should try to define concepts
sytematically before suggesting that it does not apply to relevance. We can be encouraged by the
success of essentialism in the sciences through which the periodic table, biological classifications,
and quantitative concepts have been developed or in music where note duration and pitch have been
specifically and systematically defined. Without being essentialist, scientists would not be able to
consistently identify respective instances by way o f these concepts and musicians would not be able
to play together with harmonious results. This is not to say that identifying essential conditions is
easy, always possible, or even accomplished when someone thinks it has been accomplished.

10
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3.0 General Approach and Perspective
The statements outlined in Chapter 2 have provided an indication that two main
dimensions of the relevance problem concern semantics and method. Each provides a broad frame
within which specific research questions can be formulated and then analysed to determine their
nature. From these analyses, potential approaches and information sources can be identified and
evaluated. Then, an appropriate approach and information source can be selected. I present the
research questions in Section 3.1 and the analyses and evaluations in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. In
Section 3.1,1 also present the initial frame of the study that I developed after reviewing a range of
the literature on relevance from a variety of disciplines. In Section 3.2,1 discuss why a multi
disciplinary approach is required to develop a generic definition of ‘relevance’, which is inclusive
of types of relevance, and a corresponding general theory of relevance.

3.1 Research Objectives
The initial frame of the study was composed of the following tasks:
(I) Summarization/Analysis of Existing Literature on Relevance.
• Distinguish accounts of relevance (generic) from types of relevance judgments/statements.
• Identify, outline, and compare accounts of relevance and types ofjudgments/statements.
• Develop an overall synthesis of current accounts.
• Identify and explain issues.
• Identify and explain key areas requiring further work.
(II) Identification and Assessment of Approaches/Methods Utilized to Elucidate Relevance
• Determine goats or why accounts of relevance have been developed.
• Determine how the problem of relevance has been conceived.
• Identify and assess approaches/methods employed in the literature.
• Determine the nature/kind(s) of problem encountered (e.g. normative, descriptive, etc.).
• Identify methods available to address such problems.
• Determine how best to address the problem or problem types.
This initial frame provides a perspective and indication of the background work that has
informed my report. In particular, I have reviewed and analysed a wide range of literature on
relevance from argumentation theory, informal logic, rhetoric, formal logic/relevance logic, fallacy
theory, lexicography, psychology/cognition, communications, artificial intelligence,
knowledge/information systems, law, and foundations of science. However, my thesis is limited to
the following general questions, with greatest emphasis on the first three.

u
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• What is relevance?
• What is the problem of relevance?
• How do we determine what relevance is?
• How do we make relevance judgments or evaluate relevance claims?
Even within this more limited scope, space and time restrictions require me to select key
examples of the literature to illustrate some main themes of my research. Being limited to elements
selected from various articles, no implications beyond these elements are intended. Further,
because my emphasis is on the semantic dimensions of relevance, I have omitted literature that
concerns the development of symbolic languages and algorithms. Finally, the study is framed by
the scientific and systematic philosophical perspective developed by Mario Bunge, which I will
elaborate on in the next section. Because his work is extensive, I can only sketch main elements
both related to my study and necessary to provide a general perspective.

3.2 Methodological Considerations
In this section I outline specific background considerations and the general approach I take
to analyse and evaluate previous usage and elucidations of relevance and to develop an account of
my own. My purpose here is to sketch and briefly discuss two alternative approaches to address the
question of what relevance is - stipulation and intuitionism . The latter is based on different basic
postulates from those of Bunge’s scientific philosophy. I do not intend to refute these alternative
positions. Rather, I intend only to indicate why I have not followed them and why I prefer Bunge’s
approach. Any competition between positions is not an issue that I address in this thesis. However,
I suggest that positions ought to be evaluated by comparing the account of relevance developed
from each. Finally, I will outline information sources that have been used to elucidate ‘relevance’,
rule out some, provide reasons for doing so, and indicate the sources that I will utilize.

3.2.1 General Considerations Concerning the Question, ‘What is relevance?’
Why ask the Question? As detailed in Section 4.2, the term ‘relevance’ has occurred in the
English language for at least 500 years, the concept has been recognized since at least ancient
Greek times, we frequently make relevance judgements with relative ease, and plenty of definitions
are readily available. However, if a person wants to know precisely what ‘relevance’ means and
lookes it up in one of Merriam-Webster’s current dictionaries, he would read that relevance is “a
relation to the matter at hand”. This definition is not particularly useful because we need to
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determine what kind of relation ‘relevance’ designates, why no first relatum is specified, and what
exactly ‘matter at hand’ means. Definitions of these terms lead to more vaguely defined terms and
then on to more terms, which might also be vaguely defined. Or, we get taken back to relevance
empty-handed, so to speak, when a definition of a later term makes use of ‘relevance’. (Please see
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 for detailed analyses.) Even specialized definitions make use of synonymous
phrases like ‘has a bearing on’ (Blair 1989), or ‘speaks for or against’ (Naess 1947) to indicate the
meaning of relevance. This indefiniteness invites us to examine definitions of ‘relevance’ and
attempt to develop a systematic definition. In this regard, my concern is primarily with a generic
definition that encompasses all types of relevance relations.
To be more concrete, I will outline an analogous biological example to illustrate what I
mean by the problem of indefiniteness and the solution of systematic definition. Suppose that you
are novice gardener in a conversation about gardening with more experienced gardeners. The
unfamiliar name 'Glechoma hederaceae ’ is mentioned. You recognize it as a plant but do not
know precisely what it is. So you ask, ‘What is it?’ The answer to this question differs from the
answer to the question of what relevance is because a precise, systematic framework is available to
situate the conception of the plant but is available not for relevance. The biological framework is a
result of hundreds of years of collecting, describing, and classifying plants. Also, specimens of the
plant can be reliably identified and shown to someone because the essential conditions needed to
distinguish it from other plants are known. In contrast, we are unsure of the essential conditions of
the generic concept of relevance. As a result, what it delimits is not precisely known and we cannot
be certain that we have identified a particular instance, as will be discussed in Section 6.1 when
considering whether or not relevance is any relation or a particular kind of relation. Also, we
cannot be sure that we have identified a representative sample of all instances of relevance to
develop a general theory. Further, numerous definitions have been developed for the generic
concept and even more for some types of relevance (e.g., premise relevance, information retrieval
relevance). These confound the identification of instances because they delimit different classes,
unless the definitions are just synonymous expressions and the sets completely overlap. Even so,
numerous expressions are confusing until an analysis is done to determine that the expressions are
equivalent. Different definitions that delimit different classes result in different membership of each
class even though all share the same class name. If the class is large and the members are varied, a
complex classification system is possible for each definition. That is, numerous classification
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systems could be developed. I suggest that what we need is a Copemican solution to Ptolemaic
problem, which means we need a new look at the referents of relevance statements and a simpler
and systematic representation of them.
The kind of answer we want for the relevance question is similar to what would be
provided for the plant. We want a detailed description, classification, and theory. Specifically, G.
hderaceae would be identified as a plant in the mint family and further taxonomic information
could be provided for it. It would be described as an aromatic, perennial evergreen plant that
prefers moist shady areas and reproduces by underground stems called rhizomes. A picture or
specimen of it could be shown and more detailed descriptions of it could be provided to distinguish
it from other plants. Also, one of its many common names (synonyms) such as creeping charley or
ground ivy could be mentioned. Its evolutionary history could be described as could the dynamics
of its recent distribution. That is, we would say that it was originally native to Europe but is now
naturalized in North America. I obtained this information, and more, in about 10 minutes through
an internet search. In contrast, I have spent two years trying to determine what relevance is and I
will use most of this thesis in an attempt to elucidate what it is.
Nature o f the Question. I suggest that the question ‘What is relevance?’ expresses a
factual and a semantic question. The factual question is ‘What is the occurrence of relevance?’ It
concerns acts such as relevance judgments and goal directed behaviour. The semantic question,
which is my principal concern, is ‘What does ‘relevance’ mean?’ The semantic question concerns
the concept of relevance and its term, where the latter is an indicator of the former. Both are
representational objects. Hence, the semantic question concerns referential relations that have been
established for both, where such relations establish the meaning of the term and concept. Other
types of meaning can be associated with the term and concept. However, referential relations are
my only concern. Grasping the meaning of relevance is required to identify instances of the
concept’s use when ‘relevance’ terms are not used; to model relations between objects identified by
a relevance statement; and to evaluate the correctness of a term’s usage. The precision of the
definition determines how well we are able to perform these tasks.
The term ‘relevance’, the concept relevance, and their referential relations come into
existence through constructive, cognitive acts. Hence, all have a temporal dimension. The semantic
question also has a temporal dimension in that it demarcates a point in time when asked. Thus, I
suggest that the semantic question is initially and necessarily a contemporary-historic question.
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‘Relevance’ terms exist now and through these we refer to their contemporary meaning. Further,
they have existed for at least 500 years (Section 4.2), have been communicated in such a way that
each term/meaning unit remained more or less stable, and other English speakers accepted and
continued to use the terms as such, at least sufficiently long to become established in the language.
In any case, time always passes after invention and acceptance. Similarly, if someone asks ‘Where
do you live?’, you would not answer by indicating what future residence you would like to have.
Your answer would identify your current residence, which you have previously occupied.
I also suggest that the semantic question encompasses historical meaning that can be either
communal or peculiar. Lexicographers, by and large, attempt to discover and report on communal
meaning when developing a dictionary. Nonetheless, individuals have the freedom to attach special
meaning to the terms, as misuse, irony, stipulations, and codes indicate.
Overview o f a General Approach to the Question. Asking why the semantic question is
asked and determining its fundamental nature is crucial to determining an approach to it. First,
determining what relevance is requires initially determining what ‘relevance’ means, as explained
in the previous paragraph. Doing so requires determining the historical senses assigned to or
implied by the term ‘relevance’ and its relatives. Arranging the terms hierarchically assists our
understanding of the basic concept. Completing these tasks establishes a systematic, semantic
framework. Two data sources needed to complete this work include dictionaries and actual
statements that contain the terms or otherwise refer to the concept. Second, because various
expressions can refer to the same basic statement, definitions and similar statements must be
reduced to that basic statement. Doing so can be difficult when definitions contain terms not
systematically defined. Third, definitions and statements must be analysed to determine their
structure. Fourth, the essential semantic/conceptual domain of each element of that structure must
be determined. When aggregating these elements, the semantic/conceptual domain of the term as a
whole can be determined. Finally, referents and their relations must be identified and modelled.
Below, I elaborate on the main points.
Structure and Function. Outside concept formation, our first point of contact with the
concept of relevance is through a linguistic system (e.g., a sentence) that contains the term
‘relevance’ or one of its relatives. Such systems are constructed when elements are arranged in a
way that conforms to grammatical convention. As such, syntax provides a perspective to
understand one aspect of a relevance statement. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4., I outline the essential
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structure of a relevance statement, which includes at least two relata, a relational term, and an
indication of the direction of relation. I also discuss the issue of direction in Section 6.1.3.
Grammatically, ‘relevance’ functions as a noun and ‘relevant’ functions as an adjective. Such a
classification draws attention to the representational function of the terms and associated concepts
and the need to identify, analyse, and model referents. In Chapter 4 and Section 6 .1,1 analyse
definitions o f ‘relevance’ and its relatives to identify the kinds of objects delimited by these terms.
Term/Expression versus Basic Concept/Proposition. The terms ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’
and various expressions (e.g., definitions and statements) using such terms must be distinguished
from the basic concepts that they designate. Further, related terms must be considered and these
include terms that either designate the same basic concept, include the basic concept at the same or
higher level o f generality, or designate subtypes of the concept. In other words, the term ‘relevance’
must be situated within its greater semantic context, as will be shown specifically in Chapter 4.
Identifying Conceptual Elements o f a Term. Because the meaning of ‘relevance’ is a
function of its original usage and/or definition and its subsequent usage through whatever terms are
used to designate it, analysis of historical definitions and usage is required to identify the basic
concept of relevance, as will be shown in Chapter 4. The process essentially involves collecting a
variety of expressions that employ the terms ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’; outlining their common
structure, which for relevance includes two relata terms, a relational term, and a direction of
relation; collecting definitions of relata and relational terms; identifying and modelling the referents
of each term, and reducing various statements and definitions to the basic concept. Getting beyond
linguistic expression to identify the basic concept can be difficult if the concept has a long history;
the concept has been and is currently employed in various languages, word forms within such
languages have changed (e.g., the Scottish ‘releuancie’) and/or the concept has shifted to different
or expanded to other terms; and lexicographers themselves have not gotten beyond expression
which means their definitions could present to us terminological/conceptual confusion.
Identifying Instances o f Conceptual Usage. Once the basic concept is identified, its
occurrence in statements and definitions can be readily identified, as can types of relevance
relations or judgments. As mentioned, the first point of contact is with symbols/terms. The most
obvious way of identifying the basic concept is through a term. However, a term can be misused
and this can be determined by comparing its use to the essential concept previously assigned to the
term. A less obvious way to identify the concept, but nonetheless important, is identifying
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expressions that do not name a relevance relation, as ‘relevance’ and its relatives do, but all the
same refer to the same basic concept. In other words, a term within a statement naming a relevance
relation is not necessary to indicate a relevance relation. For example, Aristotle begins his Rhetoric
with a subtle relevance statement when he writes that both rhetoric and dialectic “are concerned
with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite
science.” (Book I; 1.1.) The statement identifies the appropriate reference class o f rhetoric and
dialectic, from which evidence is obtained. This is a fact-concept relation that Bunge (1974) calls
evidential relevance. Aristotle then complains that previous “framers” of rhetorical treatises “have
constructed but a small portion of that art”, which means they have not considered all relevant
evidence. Aristotle explains that rhetoric essentially concerns persuasion and he notes that,
previous writers have neglected to account for the enthymeme, which is an essential means of
persuasion, and have instead focussed on non-essentials. Accordingly, Aristotle concludes that
arousing “prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts,
but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.” (Book I; 1.2 ). That is,
Aristotle maintains that emotional appeals are outside the frame of relevance established by
rhetoric as defined by its essential features.

3.2.2 Alternative Approaches to the Semantic Question
In this section I evaluate two alternative approaches to discover the meaning of relevance
and rule them out as preferred approaches. My intent is not to refute any of these approaches but
to specify the reasons why I did not choose them. In other words, my conclusion o f preference is
different from a conclusion of refutation even though someone could use my reasons to support a
conclusion of refutation. I do not attempt a refutation because it would require a more extensive
treatment than I can provide here. I begin by discussing stipulation, which is the most common
means by which researchers have approached the semantic question (e.g., Blair 1989; Bowles
1989,1990; Bunge 1974; Hitchcock 1992). Such definitions are often given in an appeal to the
reader’s intuitions (Carey 2004; Naess 1947). However, sometimes examples that conform to the
definition are constructed or found in other discourse, which can also be problematic (Section 3.3).
Whether any research or what research has informed the construction o f the definition is not often
reported, as if such a definition is produced independently of experience.
Stipulation. Stipulation has a legitimate role in developing new meanings, which apply to
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the future and are subject to others’ acceptance. How widespread that meaning becomes is a
function of acceptance by others, the number o f others who accept it, countervailing influences,
and communication factors. Further, stipulation is an important means of ensuring consistency in
meaning, reasoning, and communication. For example, it can be important to isolate a particular
sense within a broader context of a word’s meaning (e.g., in an impact assessment, the use of ‘jc
lumens’ vs. ‘bright’) or select a particular sense of an ambiguous word (e.g., in relation to
roughness, use o f ‘coarse in texture’ vs. ‘uneven surface’).
Despite these advantages, the use o f stipulation to determine the meaning of ‘relevance’ is
problematic in several respects. First, stipulating a definition is a purposive act of construction and
delimits a point in time. If the definition is not based on a term’s previous usage, it is prescriptive
and initially peculiar. That is, it answers the question ‘What is xT but it does so only for the
person stipulating the definition and anyone who accepts the definition after its stipulation. So,
such a stipulation is not a report/interpretation of the usage of a term that has been previously
accepted by a community of language users. Second, a stipulation can assign an entirely new
meaning to a term, which means that such a stipulation cannot be a correct description of past
usage/meaning. For example, as noted in Section 4.2.5, Samuel Johnson constructed a definition of
the English term ‘relevance’ based on its sense in French, not the predominant sense which was
used in English by the Scots. Third, finding confirming examples o f a stipulated definition is
insufficient to determine the meaning of a term and identify associated concepts. Such a stipulation
might correspond to previous definitions and usage by lucky coincidence but nothing guarantees
that the stipulation and associated examples are representative of the scope of meaning previously
established. As such, stipulation cannot clarify a previously constructed concept. Rather, it can
lead to greater terminological/conceptual complexity, language instability, and confusion. Fourth,
care must be taken to ensure that found or constructed examples actually do correspond to the
definition. This requires detailed analysis and modelling of both conceptual relations and the
system of referents to which the terms/concepts o f the example are meant to apply. In conclusion,
despite advantages of establishing meaning and ensuring consistency in meaning, reasoning, and
communication, stipulation is an inappropriate method to determine meanings previously assigned
to ‘relevance’ and its relatives. Such is my reason for excluding it as an approach for my study.
Intuitive Appeals. Bunge (2003: 152) defines ‘intuition’ as insight; specifically, the
“ability to understand or produce new ideas instantly and without prior rational elaboration.” He
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explains that an intuition is a pre-analytic, immediate understanding of something. It can be
conceived as occupying one end of a continuum. At the other end is reason, which is characterized
by exactness and formality. He emphasises that intuitions never come out of the blue. Rather, they
culminate processes of learning and search. So, intuitability depends on both the subject matter and
the knower. For example, what is intuitive to the master might be counterintuitive to the apprentice.
If promising, intuitions can be exactified. He emphasises that history has shown that counter
intuitiveness in science is often a trademark of originality and depth. In contrast, intuitionism is a
methodological/epistemic position. Bunge (2003: 152) defines it as irrationalism; specifically “the
view according to which intuition is superior to both experience and reason.” Bunge does not deny
the importance of intuition but he rejects intuitionism because of the overwhelming importance and
success of methods employing experience and reason, as science does.
The point to be taken from the analysis o f problem statements and understanding o f
intuition is that we need to get beyond our vague intuitions about relevance and develop an explicit
account/understanding of it, which I suggest requires analysis/evaluation of both definitions/usage
and their referents. In contrast, an account fails to provide either an explication of concepts or
explanation of facts if it ends at a crucial moment with ‘it seems intuitively clear to me that such is
the case’, provides an example of a relevance statement without analysing it, or defines ‘relevance’
only with a synonym. The last case is clear but the first two need further elaboration.
An appeal to intuition, as a final test, can be problematic. (For example, see Naess 1947.)
Acceptance of a claim or position becomes a matter o f correspondence to others’ intuitions, which
we must survey and statistically evaluate. Surveying opinions involves considerable effort,
expense, and difficult sampling issues. Given these concerns, we would have to develop a policy to
decide which issues are worth surveying and, accordingly, which issues ought to be resolved or left
forever in conflict. Nonetheless, if we do survey opinions and find that they conflict, we could face
interminable conflict if left simply as intuitions. To resolve the issue perhaps we could vote on
whether or not to accept or reject the example, but our intuitions even on that might conflict. Even
if we agreed to vote, we would have to find a satisfactory way to do so. But again our intuitions
could vary. Supposing that we could agree, a vote would get us beyond the impasse but it might
not resolve dissatisfaction, particularly for those who lose. Nor would a vote resolve the initial
conflicting intuitions. They remain despite agreeing to accept the vote for the sake of reaching an
agreement. Alternatively, persons with ardent beliefs and/or inclined to exercise power could
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appeal to force or act forcefully and require acceptance or rejection. But like the survey strategy,
we make no rational advance and would have no direct understanding o f the object to be explained
or explicated. Nonetheless, if attempting to explain/explicate an object and we become stymied,
intuition might be the best we can do at a particular time. But this should stimulate exploration of
different approaches and further research to develop an adequate explanation/explication (See
Bunge 1962 for other details.) In conclusion, I suggest that intuition should play a secondary role
to problem assessment, data analysis, and the development of explicit accounts.
When illustrating a definition o f ‘relevance’ or point about it, an example of a relevance
statement can be provided without systematically analysing it. (For example, see Bunge 1974.) The
example might be provided because it appeals to the author’s intuitions or it is based on the
author’s greater body of knowledge. Without further information the reader cannot distinguish
between the two. In the first case, intuition becomes a problematic final test. In the second case, no
elucidation is provided and the account is incomplete. The reader has two choices. One is to appeal
to his own intuition, but this becomes a problematic final test. The other is to provide the
elucidation. In later sections, I take on this task of elucidating examples and often find surprising
results because I find that the examples are problematic in some respect. Accordingly, the account
based on a problematic example is also problematic.

3.2.3 The Need for a Conceptual System
The term and concept ‘relevance’ are already situated within a semantic context or become
situated as such when a definition is stipulated, as we see when looking up the term in a dictionary.
That context’s clarity, detail, depth, and structure is an issue needing appraisal, as will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Further, to elucidate the notion of relevance, one can only do so by
situating it within a web of other terms and concepts. In any case, a conceptual system is
preferable to a mere aggregate of limited terms and concepts (Bunge 1973,2001,2004). For
example, scientists examining a range o f skin infections have been hampered by an unsystematic
terminological and conceptual framework created by an unsystematic understanding of pathogenic
yeast species. In particular, yeasts have not been correctly identified and classified, which has
confounded the association of cause/organism with effect/symptom (Guarro 1999). Essentially, the
problems involve both a mismatch between term/concept and fact and an imprecise representation
of facts. As a result, determining relevant medical treatment has been problematic and unsuccessful
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because the conceptualization leads to an assumption of non-pathogenicity and treatment of
symptoms; e.g., treating rashes to alleviate discomfort through the application o f oil or nitrogen
based substances inadvertently feeds the yeast (Gueho 1987; Marcon and Powell 1992).
This case is analogous to the problem o f relevance where terms also represent concepts
and these represent either an existing set o f terms/conceps or a system of factual objects, which
suggests that the initial task in developing an account o f relevance is to understand the semantic
web within which it is situated. Doing so is akin to science where assessing intelligibility of an
hypothesis comes prior to testing it (Bunge 2001; Borsodi 1967). Additionally, when relevance
statements represent factual objects, we need to develop an understanding o f respective factual
systems, including their dynamics; ensure that we have a corresponding structured language that
represents the systemic structure o f factual referents; apply rules to combine terms/concepts, which
promotes consistent reasoning; and apply tests to evaluate reasoning as expressed through
language.
Choosing a conceptual system is important because its individual elements and the system
as a whole create a frame that determines the relevance of information, explications of concepts,
and explanations of facts. I have chosen Bunge’s system because it spans semantics, ontology,
epistemology, ethics, and technology; has been developed from a basis o f current factual
knowledge; is based on a principle of exactness; and has been applied to physics, psychology,
biology, social sciences, and science in general. Further, Bunge (2004) has written extensively on
systems theory and philosophic research. A systems approach is crucial to elucidating relevance
because, as detailed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, a relevance statement refers to various types of
relations involving conceptual and/or factual objects. Modelling the referent systems to construct
or evaluate a relevance statement and to develop a general theory of relevance depends on
knowledge of those systems. In adopting Bunge’s system I will assume that he has adequately
defended its foundations. However, I will not assume, as he does not, that revisions, refinements,
and re-articulations within the general ‘spirit’ o f the system are not needed.
Other conceptual systems representing perspectives like idealism, nominalism, empiricism,
or positivism might also be used to explicate relevance. Each would generate a different perception
of the problem, approach to it, data sources, and account of relevance. That is, each position would
create its own frame o f relevance, which would determine the nature o f the inquiry or argument and
its results. Doing so would be o f value because results could be compared, which would provide a
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test of the respective positions. It would also be an alternate strategy to that of critiquing the
foundations o f respective positions. But such a project is beyond the scope of this thesis.

3.2.4 An Overview of Bunge’s Account of Scientific Philosophy
As mentioned, the choice o f Bunge’s approach and conceptual system create a frame of
relevance that distinguishes it from other approaches/conceptual systems and determines both the
nature o f my inquiry and its results. The following provides a broad overview o f the essential
elements o f the approach and position that Bunge calls ‘scientific philosophy’.
Underlying Bunge’s philosophy is scientism. It is a view that scientific research is the best
way to secure accurate and deep factual knowledge, not that it is the only source of knowledge.
Neither is it a view that all scientific findings are true and final. Rather, scientific explanations are
subject to further refinement or even replacement (Bunge 1998b:68.2) much as technological
prototypes are. Consider, for example, the technological innovation that has occurred from the first
telephone to the modem cell phone. Bunge (2003: 262) maintains that what scientism denies is the
existence o f inscrutable things other than those that have disappeared without leaving perceptive
traces. Stated positively, science relies on real objects that can be investigated to supply evidence
for hypotheses. This evidential relation involves a mutual referential link from data and hypothesis
to the same referent. The link is not merely from a statement to another statement (2003: 93). In
contrast, obscurantists assert both the existence o f inscrutable entities (e.g., unreal imaginaiy
objects) and incorrigible statements (e.g., dogmas). Given such a view, one might question whether
discovering the physical laws necessary to invent the telephone or seeing the need to refine the first
telephone would have been possible.
Bunge’s view of scientism is in direct opposition to a sense that Blackburn (1996)
articulates. Here ‘scientism’ is taken to be a pejorative term for...
“...the beliefthat the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized
in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other enquiry.
The classic statement of scientism is the physicist E. Rutherford’s saying ‘there is
physics and there is stamp-collecting’. ”
First, the quotation is likely incorrect. The Oxford Dictionary o f Modem Quotations (Knowles
2002) contains the following quotation by Rutherford “All science is either physics or stamp
collecting.” Second, how either statement connects to Blackburn’s characterization o f scientism is
not clear. Rutherford might be making a distinction between description/classification (e.g., stamp22
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collecting) and explanation (e.g., theoretical physics) to emphasise that theory is an ultimate goal
of science. However, if Blackburn’s outline o f scientism is meant to illustrate a view that physics is
the quintessential science and that everything reduces to physics or is amenable to methods o f
physics, then the view o f science is undeservedly limited, misrepresentative, and unnecessarily
reductionist and is inconsistent with Bunge’s position (1998,2001,2004).
For Bunge, science is the critical search for, or utilization of, patterns in ideas, nature, or
society. He characterizes basic science as the disinterested search for new factual knowledge,
whereas applied science is the search for new factual knowledge o f possible utility in industry or
government (Bunge 2003: 259,290). Formal science refers only to representational constructs
(e.g., concepts) and their combinations; e.g., logic and mathematics. Factual science refers to
concrete things for which it requires empirical procedures such as measurement and conceptual
procedures such as calculation (Bunge 2003:259). Bunge suggests that factual science is relevant
to all philosophic branches, except logic, because science concerns all that exists or may exist; i.e.,
anything conceptual, material, natural, or social (Bunge 2003:261).
Concerning Bunge’s scientific philosophy, its aims are to (i) be exact, clear, concise, and
internally consistent; (ii) agree with the bulk o f current science and technology to prevent
(immediately) obsolete views on, for example, being, knowing, or doing; (iii) be helpful in
identifying new and interesting philosophic problems; (iv) be instrumental in evaluating philosophic
ideas; (v) be capable of participating competently, and sometimes constructively, in some of the
scientific, moral, or political controversies o f the day; and (vi) be helpful in identifying bunk
(Bunge 2003: 29,261). Similarly, to practice scientific philosophy is to construct hypotheses or
theories that are precise, compatible with the bulk of relevant scientific knowledge, and entail
empirically testable consequences when joined with subsidiary hypotheses and empirical data
(Bunge 1973; 1999: If; 2003: 262). Confirmation and falsification are required as are empirical
and conceptual tests for well-formedness, meaningfulness, truth, and fruitfulness. These produce
either positive evidence, which provides an indication of truth, or negative evidence, which
provides an indication of falsity. Testing presupposes testability. This is a property of a
proposition or scientific theory. Specifically, testability is the ability to confirm or infirm a
proposition or theory and, hence, assign a truth value. Testability is a function of conceptual
precision (Bunge 2003: 291). Another important related concept is scrutability, which is the ability
to examine an object. Specifically, it is a joint property of the object being scrutinized and the
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knower’s means of observation and analysis.
Bunge’s extensive reviews of disciplines within the sciences, humanities, and technology
lead him to maintain that a generic scientific method is applicable to all intellectual pursuits (Bunge
1998: 8). The method involves the following steps:
a. Survey a relevant body of knowledge.
b. Choose a problem within a body of knowledge.
c. Formulate or reformulate the problem.
d. Apply or invent an approach to handle the problem.
e. Articulate a tentative solution (a hypothesis, theory, experimental design, etc).
f. Check the tentative solution.
g. Evaluate the tentative solution in light of both test and background knowledge.
h. Revise or repeat any of the previous steps.
i. Estimate the impact on background knowledge.
j. Provide a final evaluation; i.e., until new notice.
Given this broad outline o f a scientifically informed philosophic study, we can now move
on to consider what information sources are relevant to the problem o f relevance.
3.3 Information Sources
One potential source of information is the historical record o f previous constructions that
express the concept o f relevance. By ‘historical’, I mean the time period prior to the semantic
question being asked. Such constructions include relevance statements and definitions. As
constructions, they are facts that can be inventoried, described, and classified. Hence, scientific
principles apply to this aspect o f the semantic question. A second source o f information is
constructive acts that occur after asking the semantic question or any related question about the
meaning or use o f relevance. Commonly, such constructions are used by a particular person to
illustrate a definition o f ‘relevance’ or a point about it. Analogously, an engineer can inquire about
the design o f historical structures as well as structures she builds from previous designs or a
modification o f them. Similarly, a biologist can study other children as well as his own. In all three
cases, the new constructions become part o f the population of previous instances. The
appropriateness of using either source depends on the purpose of the inquiry. As mentioned, if the
purpose is to discover the meaning o f relevance, I suggest that historical records provide the only
evidence to answer that question. However, if the purpose is to reform previous meaning or create
new meaning, a stipulation can be constructed without having to articulate a representative
generalization about previous usage. Examples that are constructed to illustrate the stipulation are
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appropriate to it but not necessarily any previous usage.
In this section, I will outline the information sources that I consider appropriate to
developing a general theory of relevance. I will examine the problem o f using previously
constructed examples to develop a representative generalization o f previous usage. I will also
examine examples that are constructed to illustrate a definition or make a point about relevance.

3.3.1 Previously Constructed Definitions and Relevance Statements
Ernest Vincent Wright alludes to a particular restriction in writing his book that other
authors normally do not encounter:
‘Now, any author, from history's dawn, always had that most important aid to
writing—an ability to call upon any word in his dictionary in building up his story. That
is, our strict laws as to word construction did not block his path. But in my story that
mighty obstruction will constantly stand in my path; for many an important, common
word I cannot adopt, owing to its orthography.’ From Gadsby, 1939.
The passage cryptically mentions that his restriction involves letters. Although we are not told
exactly what that restriction is, it can be discovered because the text is a sample of the book and
the restriction applies to it. The question that the text generates is, ‘What is the rule?’ Analogously,
we routinely express relevance judgments without explaining them and can discover what relevance
is/means by analysing such data. The question that this text generates is, ‘What does relevance
mean?’ But what data should be analysed to address this semantic question?
An obvious but incomplete answer is that we should analyse statements containing the
terms ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’. However, in any such analysis, we need to recognize that the
association between a term and its meaning is not a lawful relation as is the bonding between
sodium and chloride in a supersaturated solution. Rather, the association between a term and its
meaning is a convention that must be learned, but might be learned and applied incorrectly.
Further, nothing restricts anyone from assigning a radically new meaning to a term either through
usage or stipulation. In any event, a great variance in meaning associated with a term can result
over time. A second problem is that o f the number o f statements required to establish an adequate
sample. However, 1 am not aware o f any studies that determine the size of an adequate sample. A
third problem is the sample’s representativeness, which is a function o f different types of
statements (e.g., topics or disciplines within which the terms are used), their relative size, and the
size o f the sample taken for each type. A stratified random sample would alleviate these concerns
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but 1am not aware of any studies that provide information on the population of relevance
statements from which such a sampling strategy could be designed.
Even if these problems were to be solved, inventorying statements that include just
‘relevance’, ‘relevant’, and their negations would inadequate^ represent the concept o f relevance
because the concept is also expressed through the use of synonymous, other related terms, and
expressions, which reflect explicit judgments. For example, as discussed in Sections 4.3,4.4, and
particularly 6.1, i f ‘relevance’ is synonymous with ‘relation’, then any relational statement is a
relevance statement and a theory o f relevance must account for all types of relational statements.
However, if the two terms are not synonymous, differences must be identified and instances o f their
respective use distinguished. Otherwise, a representative theory o f relevance could not be
developed. Similarly, the overlap in meaning between ‘relevance’ or ‘relevant’ and any other
related term like ‘connection’ or ‘apt’ must be determined to identify instances o f the basic concept
designated by ‘relevance’. Otherwise, a theory o f relevance would be incomplete. The same applies
to synonymous expressions that do not contain an obvious term related to relevance; such as,
‘Your reaction has a lot to do with how I proceed’, which can be also stated as ‘Your reaction is
highly relevant to my course o f action.’ Finally, the concept of relevance can be employed without
making an explicit judgement. For example, in writing this paragraph, 1 make judgements
concerning the relevance o f one statement to another and the relevance of these to the subsection,
section, chapter, and thesis as a whole. But 1 do not make them explicit.
The burden o f collecting a representative sample of statements that includes the use of the
concept o f relevance is somewhat alleviated by work done in lexicography, where statements have
been collected and used to develop definitions. Also, other researchers have attempted to define or
otherwise elucidate relevance. In both cases, these definitions and elucidations become an integral
part o f the system o f language users. Accordingly, the primary data base for the study will include
(i) definitions from general or special dictionaries and the academic literature wherever definitions
o f ‘relevance’ are given; (ii) statements containing relevance expressions; and (iii) elucidations of
either the concept o f relevance or the nature of relevance judgments, including examples used to
illustrate these. When necessary, I will construct simple, realistic statements and examine these
within the light o f a theoretical point. However, 1 will guard against using such examples to ‘prove’
a point, which would introduce a circularity or provide an insufficient confirmatoiy instance.
I will focus on usage o f the term ‘relevance’ rather than ‘irrelevance’ because examples o f
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the latter concern what relevance is not, which takes into consideration a vastly greater domain
than what relevance is. To enumerate each type o f irrelevance (x m-> y„) would take us down a
long, winding, and never ending road (y„). For example, the statement ‘My pencil is dull’(x) is
irrelevant to any statement that has or will be made (yn), except the one that represents what I have
decided to do next as represented by my conclusion, ‘Therefore, 1 will sharpen i t/ To explain, I am
the determiner o f relevance because I am the one responsible for determining what the terms that I
use mean. Here, 1 choose to conform to convention, as others would assume, since I have not
defined terms myself. Beyond the linguistic level, it is my association between the state o f my
pencil and what 1 ought to do about it, given my particular situation and how I interpret it, that is
the determiner o f relevance. In this particular case, these determiners create a very narrow frame.
What is outside this frame is vast and it does not reveal the nature o f the relation I constructed.
Certainly, having noticed the dull pencil, a number o f relevant possibilities arise in terms o f what I
could do, what others could do, or what others say 1 could or should do but this identifies possible
relevance relations as opposed to the one actual relevance relation established by the
frames/determiners that 1 mentioned. The difference between the two stages, from an individual’s
perspective, is one o f deliberation and decision. From an interpersonal perspective, the difference is
between my decision and others’ recommendation.
The literature contains many examples o f irrelevance to illustrate relevance and Hjorland
(2000) thinks that irrelevance is the key to deciphering the riddle of relevance in information
science. In contrast, I side with Archimedes who tinkered with machines until they worked and then
explained the principles upon which they did, in fact, work. Given that correct relevance judgments
are as common as they are, we have no shortage o f ‘working machines’. However, my limited
review of the literature indicates that we have few explanations why they work, which indicates a
problem in finding a way to explain them. Hence, my emphasis is on the problem o f relevance and
positive information sources. I do not ignore statements of irrelevance. However, 1 suggest that we
need to understand them by way of positive examples. I illustrate how in numerous later sections.

3.3.2 Relevance Statements Constructed to Illustrate a Definition
At times, constructing an example that illustrates a definition can be useful, providing that
correspondence actually occurs (Tables 21-25), circularity does not occur, limitations of the
example are stated, and the example is not contrived or simplistic. Distinguishing between a useful
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illustration and a contrived or simplistic example is not always easy. Further, anyone constructing
an example can fall victim to the latter. To construct a good example or to evaluate an example, it
must be thoroughly analysed. To illustrate what I mean, I will examine Stephen Carey’s example
and a s s e s s m e n t of the argumentum ad hominem, a fallacy of relevance, which he alleges occurs in
response to his recommendation to buy his book Scientific Method. Carey writes:
If...I argue that every student ought to know something about science and, so, ought to read this
book, you might reply that I receive a royalty from the sale of copies of the book. If your point is
to mount an objection to my argument, you are guilty of an ad hominem fallacy. Even though
what you say is true, the point you make is not relevant to the argument I have given. By pointing
out that I stand to profit if students by [sic\ this book, you attack my motives for arguing as I
have, but you have not shown that my argument is flawed. (108.2)
Carey’s initial argument is:
A-P^ Every student ought to know something about science.
A-C : So, every’ student ought to read Carey’s book.
The objection finds a hidden motive/implicit premise to Carey’s argument.
O-P,: Every student ought to know something about science.
0-P2: Carey receives royalties from selling the bode.
O-C : So, every student ought to read Carey’s book.
Carey’s response is:
R-Pj: 0-P2is an attack on Carey’s motives not his argument.
R-C : Therefore, 0-P2is irrelevant to the argument.
Two interrelated problems occur in this example. One is that it is contrived. The other is
that Carey assumes that any personal attack produces a fallacious argument. The example is
contrived because it is constructed, does not represent a real case, and is misleading because it is
incomplete. Concerning the latter, the example does not include reasons why the opponent suspects
that Carey’s motivation includes financial gain and, in his response, Carey merely denies that he is
motivated by financial gain. So, we are provided only with an affirmation and a denial. To rectify
the problem Carey must specify reasons to support the respective claims. He cannot report them
because no real person is available to defend the claims.
The inadequacy of the example could be a result of three possible factors. First, Carey’s
denial might have resulted from a superficial or hasty response to the objection. Such a response is
of no help in illustrating a fallacious argument. Second, he might have relied on an intuition that
royalties received from book sales are generally not connected to recommendations to purchase a
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book. However, the latter is false because we know that people have been motivated by personal
gain to make such recommendations and Carey did not rule out that possibility when presenting his
first argument. So, challenging the recommendation through counter-argument or questioning is
certainly relevant. In turn, this shows that Carey’s assumption that every personal attack results in
a fallacious argument is false. Even if Carey had included a denial in his initial argument, the
example would still be incomplete and the allegation of personal gain would still be relevant
because we know that people have been dishonest when motivated by personal gain. However, we
do not know anything about Carey that would engender or compromise our trust. Third, Carey
might have objected to the counter-argument because financial gain was not part of his original
argument. So, the counter-argument goes beyond the unit of thought expressed by the argument.
However, the counter-argument is relevant to the argument because the counter-argument points to
a substantive problem with the argument, which results from its inadequacy.
Detailing the implications of Carey’s example and further questioning it can also show
why it is contrived. Doing so also increases both the doubt about his denial o f being motivated by
personal gain and the relevance of questioning his motivation. In the initial argument, Carey
recommends that all students should read his book rather than others’ books. First, suppose that he
receives one dollar for each book sold. UNESCO (2003) reports that currently over 100 million
students are enrolled in universities across the world. Assuming that his book is translated to other
languages, world enrolment rates remain the same for 10 years, and each student actually buys a
book, Carey’s recommendation would net him a profit of at least one billion dollars over ten years.
Even if only one tenth of total students bought the book, Carey’s profit would be 100 million
dollars over 10 years. Second, numerous books are written on science. Why does Carey
recommend just his book rather than a book on science? The fact is, other ways are available to
become informed about science. Third, Carey does not compare various books to determine their
relative merits and indicate why his is singled out. Similarly, a car dealer could say that, because
we need a car, we ought to buy one of his. But he does not tell us why he recommends that
particular car and we do not even know if it is a new car or a ‘bucket of bolts’ behind the shop.
In summary, I suggest that the example is contrived and fails to meet the intent of
illustrating a fallacious argument. Even if it did, Carey does not provide an adequate explanation of
the example so its use provides no understanding of irrelevance, let alone ‘relevance’ which
requires positive examples to illustrate it.
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4.0 Analysis and Evaluation of General Dictionary Definitions
Given the goal of discovering what ‘relevance’ means, the objectives of this section are to
(i) provide a sufficient understanding of lexicography to permit an analysis/evaluation o f dictionary
definitions; (ii) defend why they ought to be analysed and evaluated; (iii) outline a sample of
definitions, which are ‘wrapped’ by various expressions; (iv) analyse and evaluate definitions and
examples to determine conformity of the example to a definition, evaluate appropriateness of the
definition, and identify the elements and structure o f definitions and statements; (v) analyse and
compare definitions to reduce various expressions to their basic concept, determine the coverage of
the concept of relevance, and determine its relations to other concepts; and (vi) identify issues that
require more detailed examination. The main task is to outline the hierarchic structure of terms,
which is a means to determine essentially what relevance is/is not and how it is situated within a
larger conceptual system. Aside from providing the essential elements to build a preliminary theory
of relevance, which will be synthesized in Chapter 7, this analysis provides a necessary context
within which a theory o f relevance can be built because it provides the semantic context within
which we use language, propose definitions, justify such proposals, or otherwise elucidate notions.

4.1 Dictionaries: Problems/Opportunities for Developing a Theory of Relevance
General dictionaries, like the Oxford or Merriam-Webster dictionaries, do not always
provide precise or systematic definitions. Consequently, these definitions can be rather troublesome
or useless in science, law, and philosophy where precision, consistency, and systemicity are crucial
to reason correctly, order knowledge, and/or specify clear prescriptions. For example, Stehbens
(2001) comments on such problems in cardiovascular research.
...accurate and precise word usage is prerequisite to avoid unintentional
misrepresentation in scientific communication. The increasing frequency of word
misusage necessitates review of a number of definitions and frequently misused words in
vascular pathology. Correction of such errors is essential to foster accurate, standardized
definitions. Otherwise scientific progress is delayed, the unwary are misled and
fallacious data and concepts are propagated. Adherence to correct word usage facilitates
the development of logic and precision so essential in education and in scientific
thinking and literature, whereas consistently misused words ultimately become
meaningless and unusable.
Further, it is said not only that some dictionaries are descriptive in that they provide a record of
usage but also that a mark of a good dictionary is that it is descriptive (Encyclopaedia Britannica
2004). Descriptivists argue that language use and word meaning are constantly changing and
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lexicographers must continually inventory and report usage. Otherwise, dictionaries can and have
become obsolete quite quickly (Landau 1984). However, what lexicographers do in creating a
dictionary is not just describe or report meanings but interpret quotations/usage and construct
definitions from their interpretations, which is evident from consulting dictionaries like OED where
both definitions and usage are available. (Also, see Hanks 1990 and Landau 1984 for practice in
defining terms.) Dictionaries, then, are descriptive in presenting meanings only insofar as they
correctly correspond to actual usage. Unfortunately, where survey data are not reported by a
dictionary, we can not determine whether a definition actually corresponds to usage. Additionally,
citation readers are to be adept at selecting “good” examples and lexicographers select meanings
that occur in sufficient numbers to warrant inclusion in a dictionary (See Landau 1984 for his rules
of definition). Finally, we have a situation in ordinary language that is largely uncontrolled, despite
schooling, whereas in the specialized languages of mathematics or science, correctness of use is a
primary concern, as Stehbens emphasises. This is not to suggest that mathematical or scientific
languages are static because they are not (e.g., ‘energy’, ‘gene’). But it is to say that, at any given
time, definitions in science must accord with best/most current knowledge.
The descriptivist argument, as correct as it is, conceals some essential details about
language and dictionaries. First, someone must, at some time, use or define a word and thereby
give it meaning. That is, words and meanings are constructed through cognitive acts not generated
as weather is from the circulation o f air masses. Insofar as others adopt such meaning and
lexicographers report on it, which standardizes meaning to a degree and for a while, the original
prescription is maintained and perhaps even amplified. Second, if dictionaries were purely
descriptive, they would not contain spelling or pronunciation

guidelines. Third, given cases

when we use dictionary definitions to facilitate communication or resolve linguistic conflicts and
teachers/parents teach and students/children learn a language by appeal to dictionary definitions, a
dictionary is anything but a pure description of usage. Once lexicographers construct a definition
and we decide to employ that definition, then the dictionary becomes prescriptive.
Given that an initial definition/usage is prescriptive and we either adopt it directly or
indirectly through a dictionary, we ought not to feel disinclined to analyse them and recommend
better ones. Besides, what makes an historical use of a term and its related concept a particularly
good use or conception? It might be useful to know historical conceptions to understand what was
meant at that time and to get a clearer indication of what we mean today. However, why should we
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be bound to historical conceptions based on knowledge of that day? Rather than becoming
entrapped by this construction and interpretation process, what we need to understand is the
dynamics o f language and how to manage it for our particular purposes. That is, as our knowledge
changes, so do our conceptions and so ought our definitions. Further, we need to understand how
dictionaries represent conceptions and whether they do so adequately.
Lexicography, which concerns dictionary making, is taken to accord with rigorous
scientific principles (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2004). However, dictionary definitions are
constructed with an emphasis on sense of a term from the sense o f other terms implied by usage, as
will be shown in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. Without consideration of how referents are situated among
other similar and dissimilar objects (factual or conceptual), we cannot develop a precise system of
concepts. We can, however, learn how to use words sufficiently well to meet many ordinary needs.
‘Relevance’ is such a case. Additionally, insofar as dictionary definitions are constructed from
large samples of quotations, as Oxford dictionaries are, one scientific condition is met; i.e., real
data. However, as mentioned, collecting an adequate, representative sample is problematic. Also,
quotations taken out of context might not provide sufficient information to identify a concept
precisely as an author intended and lexicographers do not show the analyses upon which definitions
are made. Finally, from the definition alone, we do not know how well the conception or its
articulation represents its referent. Concerning the latter and given that dictionaries emphasise
sense, we might be unnecessarily hindered when employing such conceptions to build
representations of factual objects. As Diogenes Laertius [3rd C. ] remarked:
...men ought not to investigate things from words, but words from things; for that things are not
made for the sake of words, but words for the sake of things (from Borsodi 1967).
What he means by ‘for the sake o f things’ is that, in such a case, words represent things and, being
representational devices, we ought not to confuse the ‘original’ with the ‘copy’. Similarly, Marcus
Aurelius [121-180] emphasised the need to construct definitions or describe things presented to us
and to do so in a way that allows determining distinctly what kind o f thing it is “in its substance, in
its nudity, in its complete entirety.” Then, he instructs us
...tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it is compounded, and unto
which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive of elevation of mind as to be able to
examine methodically and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to look
at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and what kind of uses
everything has with reference to the whole, and what with reference to man. (from Borsodi 1967)
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The important points of note here are explicitness and precision of definitions and a systems
approach to both factual inquiry and development o f conceptual structures.
When we look up a definition in the dictionary and accept it, we assume that all has gone
well and we can trust it. For many conversational purposes, doing so might meet our needs.
However, dictionary definitions can be inadequate in special situations where precision and
conceptual systems are important. Such is the case with ‘relevance’. Further, our definitions need
to change when corrections or refinements to our knowledge and understanding o f referents occur
or when better articulations allow better conceptual understanding and application. As such, the
generation o f concepts is outside the lexicographer’s purview. The best a l e x i c o g r a p h e r can do is
determine what concept is intended and he does that through interpretation of how symbols are
used within the context of a quotation and, if available, definitions from the same time period.
When we accept a definition, we encounter it at the end of a very long process that
involves (i) concept generation; (ii) the use o f symbols in speech or writing to express that concept,
which may or may not explicitly or specifically reveal the concept and how that concept is
distinguished from others; (iii) the interpretation of those symbols by audiences and their
subsequent usage; (iv) the collection o f selected written quotations and/or definitions by
lexicographers; (v) a decision by lexicographers on which quotations to use; (vi) their
interpretation o f the use of symbols in selected quotations and their identification o f concept, when
terms are not explicitly defined; (vii) their articulation of sense through terms of the day; and (viii)
their (rough) comparison of a defined term to the sense of other terms. As a result, we find
ourselves in a predicament at this late stage of the process, Such is significant, given that language
is of such importance both cognitively and practically. Thomas Hobbes (1615) nicely illustrates
this predicament relative to our needs.
Seeing then that truth consists in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man
that seeks precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and
to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in limetwigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed.
Being caught in a lime-twig, which is a snare that employs a sticky substance (M erriam-W ebster’s
Online Dictionary 2004), is an apt illustration of what others indicate to be the state of our
understanding o f relevance. Hobbes continues:
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By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to
examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them, where they are
negligently set down; or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply
themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which
at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which
lies the foundation of their errors. From whence it happens, that them which trust to
books, do as they that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering
whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the error visible
and not mistrusting their first grounds, know not which way to clear themselves; but
spend time in fluttering over their books; as birds that entering by die chimney, and
finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glass window, for
want of wit to consider which way they came in.
To sum up and conclude Hobbes writes:
Nature itself cannot err: and as men abound in copiousness of language; so they become
more wise, or more mad than ordinary.
Diogenes Laertius, Marcus Aurelius, and Thomas Hobbes offer a clear statement of
problem and a general approach to solve that problem. That is, to avoid confusion, we need to have
and use clear, systematic, factually based definitions that are constructed by considering the facts
themselves as they are systematically situated and by articulating in detail the components of each
definition. As defined in Chapter 1, facts include both concrete things and the systems of which
they are a part as well as facts o f definition and word use through which concepts are identified,
described, and used. Upon using words and we find ourselves in a predicament, we need to step
back through the process of concept generation, definition, and use. We need to do so to seek
greater clarification or correct mistakes. It might also turn out that we do not have enough terms
for our concepts, enough concepts to understand the world, or we insufficiently understand the
world. It might also turn out that we have too many terms and concepts. In such a case, we
encounter a sea o f terminological and conceptual confusion.
General dictionary definitions form a semantic background that we employ or to which we
appeal, given the extent o f our schooling and use o f dictionaries. Hence, dictionary definitions can
be an important starting point, even if it is just to identify their deficiency or get a general sense of
a concept. Further, general dictionaries allow us to trace conceptual relations (as messy as they
might be) because all terms used in a definition are defined elsewhere in the dictionary. Hence, a
standard dictionary has the advantage over single definitions that occur in specialized contexts, like
the academic or professional literature. In the latter two cases, terms that compose the definition
are not often defined. This creates an interpretation problem because the reader cannot determine
34
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the dictionary that an author is using. Also, an author might follow a dictionary more or less
closely, if at all. A substantive problem arises because different dictionaries might offer definitions
that vary subtly (intentionally/extensionally) and subtle differences can at times have a huge logical
difference. For example, Merriam- Webster’s Online Dictionary (2004) defines ‘relevance’ in a
way that restricts it to a current consideration, whereas other dictionaries define it without the
temporal limitation. As a result, the definitions differ greatly in their extension. Finally, despite
advantages of general dictionaries, their definitions are not better than those that occur within a
comprehensive conceptual system. Because dictionary definitions can be non-systematic, as we
shall see with ‘relevance’ definitions, they can create a complex semantic structure and be
unrevealing and burdensome. Accordingly, developing an account of relevance must consider what
is meant by ‘relevance’, which is a function of its use and/or definition; how it is distinguished
from other concepts; and how it is situated within a hierarchic conceptual structure. Dictionaries
provide the best data to begin an analysis to address these questions. I collected definitions from all
paper and online dictionaries but have reported definitions for only the major ones.

4.2 History of the Concept of Relevance
Given that a word originates as a cognitive construction, we can ask why it was conceived.
That is, what purpose did it serve given the context of a problem to solve and referents to
distinguish? Were existing terms/concepts insufficient in this regard or did the term duplicate the
meaning and function of other terms already in use? To answer these questions we must distinguish
between term and concept, and not think the job is done merely by tracing the origin of a term.
However, such historical research on conceptual use is an enormous task and I do not have
sufficient time to undertake it. Nonetheless, collecting readily available information can shed a bit
of light on relevance and inform a theoiy of it. Given these considerations, my objectives are to
trace ‘relevance’ terms back to their origins as used by the Scots and English and, from these
definitions and quotations, identify the kind of relations and relata involved. I will also examine
related words, analyse relevance into its component parts, and trace these back to their French
and/or Latin roots. I will also examine Greek terms that share meaning with ‘relevance’ terms,
which can shed light on the concept o f relevance and assist others to analyse Greek philosophy to
determine if it contains theories of relevance. Finally, I will determine the historical consistency of
the senses o f ‘relevance’ terms; i.e., whether or not the term-concept associations have changed.
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The following analysis and evaluation o f definitions and statements are aimed principally
at determining the basic concept(s) of relevance; i.e., its essential conditions as revealed through
various expressions. It will also yield other elements that I will re-assemble in Chapter 7, where I
provide a preliminary theory of relevance, and permit the discovery o f more obstacles to the
development of such a theoiy. In developing the theory from this historical survey, a number of
considerations apply. First, historical lexical surveys are based on usage. A usage that is incorrect
(inconsistent with either definitions of the day or prior usage) at one time can become standard at a
later time. Similarly, an incorrect definition can also become a standard use. Given such flexibility,
our current or future use is not necessarily constrained by historical usage. Second, even though
concepts associated with terms can change arbitrarily, exact definitions and consistent use are
crucial in specialized contexts and this need is a prime motivation for the development of a general
theory. Third, if definitional changes are to be made, they ought to be made in a spirit of
recommendation rather than dictation because the latter, if uncontrolled, might create unnecessary
complexity. Further, recommending a new definition ought to be based on good reasons. An
analysis of historical and contemporary definitions and usage can provide part o f that rationale; for
example, if variable expressions frustrate the understanding of the basic concept that a term
represents or terms are defined largely by synonyms, which takes us in circles.

4.2.1 Greek Origins
In tracing ‘relevance’ terms back to Greek origins, I relied on others’ translations. In the
case of ‘relevance’, any number of synonyms of the same or different degree o f generality could be
used and the translation hinges on the translator’s understanding of the nuances between the
different English terms, which are not particularly clear, and the nuances of Greek expression.
Also, relevance determinations can be made and expressed without naming them. In this case, the
text must be read, preferably in the original dialect, and instances identified, but this presupposes
diagnostic criteria developed from a systematic conceptual system. Finally, the naming of a
relevance determination is significant beyond its occurrence and expression because it signals an
awareness o f mental and language function. With this in mind, a few translations will be reported
from dictionaries and ancient works.
Dictionaries of English-Ancient Greek contain a few entries that translate Greek words or
phrases to the English ‘relevant’. For example, Liddell and Scott (1889) translate the transliteration
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enestin humas eidenai to ‘it is relevant, pertinent’ and eis to pragma einai to ‘to be pertinent’ or
‘to the purpose’. When searching for the key word ‘relevant’ the entry eneimi, which means ‘be, lie
in’ is retrieved from Slater (1969). Table 1 provides a breakdown of related word forms. Senses of
connection, belonging, and appropriateness are evident. The connection to ‘abode’ is also
interesting as it connects to oikos, which will be discussed shortly. Further, the word huparcho,
which generally means ‘to begin, make a beginning’ is identified as being similar in meaning to
eneimi. Table 2 presents definitions of the related impersonal form huparchei, and one sense which
generally means ‘to be the beginning’. As A1 shows, the word is used to connect a case with an
object that supports it and, as B shows, the relational term ‘belong’ is central to the use of the
word. So, an object that connects to a case or belongs to something is a relevant object. Finally,
Woodhouse (1910) translates oikeios and proseko to ‘relevant’ (Table 3). Oikeios generally refers
to house, which is the place where one belongs and is associated with other family members and
related possessions. The sense of ‘belonging’ and its application to other objects appears to arise
from this root meaning. Proseko, which generally means ‘to have come, be at hand, be present’,
has also taken on senses of belonging, appropriateness, and relatedness and is also used in negative
phrases to denote irrelevance.
A host of Greek words are similar to the English word ‘irrelevant’. Table 4 shows these as
well as words and phrases that have similar meanings. The notions of being strange, foreign, or
alien runs throughout the definitions and is applied to both factual and conceptual objects. In
particular, allotrios is opposed to oikeios and is in a sense synonymous with anoikeios.
The definitions of terms related to ‘relevance’ and ‘irrelevance’ suggest that relevance is a
fitting relation, or a matter of appropriateness. What makes a relation fitting is not answered by
definitions alone but must be found in, for example, an author’s theory of logic, ethics, or rhetoric.
The word ‘relevance’ may or may not be used in such works but when one understands the basic
concept of relevance, the relevance relations can be identified. So, rather than suggesting that no
theory of relevance has been developed (Woods 1994; Gabbay and Woods 2003), I suggest that
many different types of relevance theories have been developed. However, they are not labelled as
theories of relevance.
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Table 1. Breakdown of the Greek Phrase ‘enestin humas eidenaV.
Eniemi/enesan

to send in or into

Enezomai/enesan

to have one's abode in

Eneimi

to be in; (i) to be in a place; to be am ong; to be there, be in abundance;
(ii) to be possible (iii) it is in one's power, one m ay or can

2

Humos/humas

your

3

Eidenai

idea

Aia

epic form used

Eidon/eiden

to see, perceive, behold

Oida/eidenai

to know

1

for gaia - a land, country earth, land

Source: Liddell and Scott (1889)

Table 2. Meanings and Phrases Related to Huparchd.
Huparchd
Huparchei

to begin, m ake a beginning.

A

1. the fact is that,

hds huarchei tou echein : as th e case stands with regard to having.

2. it is allowed, it is possible,
B

huparchon huminpolemein: since it is allowed you to.

1. belong to, fall to one, accrue, he huparchousaphusis: your proper nature, its norm al condition.
tii technei huparchem didous: assigning as a property o f art.
2. o f persons, en panti.. pas chorioi, kai hot me huparchomen: every one in every
place, even outside our sphere o f influence (lit. to which we do not belong).

huparchem denotes the subsistence o f qualities in a subject.
huparxei ti [Idiprotdi]: it will have predicates.
3. in the Logic o f Aristotle -

Source: Liddell and Scott (1889)

Table 3. Definitions of Oikeios and Prosikd related to ‘Relevant’.
S enses C o n c ern in g ‘R elevant’

Oikeios

•
•
•
•

Proseko

• to have com e, be at hand, be present

in o r o f th e house, domestic
o f persons: o f the sam e household, family, or kin, related
o f things: belonging to one's house or family, one's own
proper to a thing, fitting, suitable; belonging to, confotm able to the nature o f a thing

* metaphorical: belong to; o f persons, belong to, be related to; impersonal, it belongs to, concerns
• belonging to one; befitting, proper, meet; o f persons, akin/relations
Senses C o n c ern in g ‘I rre le v a n t’

ou prosekon:
ouden prosekon:
ouden prosekon eniois:
oudenprosekont’en goois parastatein:

though or since it is not fitting
one who has nothing to do w ith the m atter
though there is no connexion in som e cases
having no concern with assisting one in sorrows

Source: Liddell and Scott (1889)
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Table 4. Creek Words and Phrases Similar to the English Word ‘Irrelevant’.
AUotriologed
Allotrios

irrelevantly; to speak o f things foreign to the m atter
1. o f or belonging to another

a. ommasin heirpon

by the help o f ‘another's’ eyes

allotrion charisasthai

be bountifid ‘o f w hat is another's’

gnathmoisi geloidn allotrioism

with faces ‘unlike their ow n’, o f a ‘forced, unnatural’ laugh

allotrion charisasthai

be bountiful ‘o f w hat is another’s ’,

a. amart theros

‘where one has not sow n’

allotridtatois tois somasin chresthai

deal w ith one's body ‘as i f it belonged to another’

tallotria

‘w hat belongs to others, not one's ow n’

2. opposed to oikeios, foreign, strange
(i) a. o f persons - a. phos stranger, b. hostile, unfavourably disposed; c. disinclined
(ii) a. o f things - alien, strange; b. m edical - abnorm al; c. foreign to the purpose

I

3. to be unfavourable disposed tow ards
(i) strangely, marvellously
(ii) in a m anner foreign to

S
1

1

Attotriod

Asuttogistos

J
i

Huperorios

1. over the boundaries, abroad
2. foreign to the purpose, outlandish, alien
3. ton nomou ‘beyond the boundaries o f the nom e

Anoikeios

1. not o f the family
2. unfitting, unseasonable; foreign to, incongruous w/; dissim ilar to; alien from.
3. Astrology - not in its domicile

Adiethetos

not filtered o r strained; ptisane a. gruel w ith the m eal in it

AUophulos

o f another tribe, foreign, alien

Metoikos

settler from abroad, alien resident in a foreign city, denizen

1. estrange from
(i) m ake hostile to
(ii) to b e unnatural, have a strange taste
(iii) to be alienated from one's natural condition
(iv) to be alienated, fall into other
not reasoning justly; non-syllogistic, formally or materially invalid; irrelevant; unattainable by reasoning,
incalculable

Adox-opoiitos

n ot form ing notions, unreasoning

Asun-eleustos

non-coagulating; Gram m ., not form ing a com pound

Asustrophos

n ot form ing a solid m ass

Anetoimos

o ut o f reach, unattainable

Diartesiis

incoherence, irrelevance,

kata diartesin logos: a non-sequitur

Exagdnios

beside the m ark, irrelevant

Epikletos

alien, foreign, irrelevant

Source: Liddell and Scott (1889)
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4.2.2 Latin Origins
The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary (English-Latin) and The Pocket Oxford Latin
Dictionary (Latin-English) provide useful starting points for a more extensive survey because they
provide a set of initial Latin and English synonyms (Morwood 1994; online edition 2003). A search
for ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ in the Latin to English Dictionary cross references to pertineo, which
contains the term ‘relevant’ in its definition (Table 5). A search for ‘relevance’ in the English to
Latin Dictionary provides only a reference to the English word ‘relevant’. Searches for ‘relevant’
yield the synonyms aptus and appositus and searches for ‘irrelevant’ yields the Latin synonyms
non pertinens and alienus (Table 5). The definitions do not indicate any relata but, rather, list
relational terms that vary in degree o f generality/specificity. In order of generality the relational
terms are: (i) connected to, continue or extend through or to, reach, dependent upon; (ii) attached
to, adjacent, near; and (iii) suitable, adapted, appropriate, fit, and belong or pertain to. Where the
term ‘relevant to’ fits within this continuum of generality/ specificity and to what relata it applies
are issues that cannot be determined from these definitions. An inquiry into the Latin usage of these
terms is required. Similarly, a search in Words (Whitaker 2001), a Latin word search engine,
yields only a result for ‘relevant’ but the Latin entries listed are the verbs ‘relevo’, ‘relevare’,
‘relevavi’, ‘relevatus’, which all mean to relieve, alleviate, or diminish.
The Oxford Dictionary o f Latin (Glare 2003) contains more detailed information on both
Latin origins of synonyms of the English term ‘relevant’ and the Latin root word levis. Apposite is
a relational term that generally concerns suitability (Table 6). It is derived directly from appositus,
which concerns proximity in location, accessibility, suitability, inclination, and arguments drawn
from or based upon comparisons. In turn, appositus is derived from the verb appono which
concerns the acts o f arranging things, fitting them together, applying one thing to another,
combining things, reckoning, and attributing. So, acts of combining objects, as in cognitive acts
that combine and compare objects to arrive at a conclusion, are judged to be suitably accomplished
when apposite is applied to them. Aptus is a relational term that includes various senses of the
strength of connection between two objects when fit together (Table 7). Senses of convenience,
order, efficiency, and suitability run through it. Levis is also a relational term that specifically
concerns various senses or applications o f the concept of lightness (Table 8). Specifically, the
relation is a comparative one; so, it requires a cognitive act. The senses o f lightness concern
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Table 5. Latin Synonyms o f Relevant and Irrelevant.
Aptus
Appositus apposite, appositum
Non-Pertineo, -pertinere, -perdnui
AUenus alinus, alina, alinum

attached to; connected, suitable, adapted; (w / ex, w / abl) dependent (upon).
adjacent, near; fit, appropriate.
continue or extend through or to, reach; belong or pertain to, be relevant to.
another’s, foreign; contrary, averse, hostile; unfavourable, insane; debt, [unconnected]

Source: Morwood 1994a,b; Whitakker 2001 - in square brackets.

Table 6. Definitions of Latin Terms Related to Apposite.
Appono, v, tr

1 T o place near or opposite (to), set along- side, b (esp. a table or vessel containing food or drink; cf. sense
2c notam -ere to append a m ark (to), set a m ark (against), d to set by for com parison, set over against; (in
quots transf.); also, to use in comparison.
4 To p ut o r fit on, attach; to apply (m edicam ents, etc.).
5 To bring to bear (upon), apply (to), b to subject, expose (to).
6 a To contribute as an additional elem ent, add (to), b add in speech o r writing, append (to); to add as a
condition o r stipulation, c To bestow, confer (on); modum -ere, to set a lim it (to).
7 To assign, appoint (a person, esp. to som e one else in a specific capacity, e.g. as a guard).
8 To set down in accounting, reckon, attribute (to).

Appositio

The action o f com paring, a comparison.

[APPONO +-TIO]

Appositus1

1 a Situated near o r opposite (to), juxta- posed, adjacent, b ready to hand, accessible, c near in quality, kind,
etc., akin (to).
2 Suitable, apt.
3 ( o f persons) Having regard (for), inclined (towards).
4 ( o f an argum ent) D raw n from , or based upon, comparisons.

[pple. o f A PPO N O ]

Apposite

In a m anner suited (to); (absol.) suitably, appositely.

[APPOsrrvs'+-E]
Source OxfordLatin Dictionary (Glare 2003).

Table 7. Definitions of Latin Terms Related to Aptus.
Aptus
[pple. o f APIO
or APISCOR]

Apte, adv.
[APTVS+-E]
Apto
[as APTVS+-TO]

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2
3

a Tied, fastened, bound, b m ade up by uniting, composed, fitted together.
(usu. transf.) Associated, connected.
(w. ex, abl., o r adv.) D ependent (upon), following (from).
(w. abl.) Fitted or provided (with).
a Prepared o r equipped, ready, b ready for use, handy, convenient, c ( o f persons) adapted or adaptable.
a In good order o r condition, neat, orderly, b (esp. o f style) neat, apt.
(o f persons or active agents) Efficient o r good (at doing something), fitted (for), able (to).
a Suitable for use, useful, convenient, favourable.
Appropriate, fitting, in keeping, apt.
So as to fit exactly, closely, tightly, snugly.
Neatly, aptly, appositely.
Suitably, usefully, properly.

1 a To put in position, fit on, fix. b to put or fasten (arm our, ornaments, etc.) on oneself, don.
2 a T o bring into position for use, bring, to bear, apply, b (w. non-material objs.) to bring into use, employ;
dat. ad) to apply, refer, fit (to).
3 To fit together, jo in ; (transf.) to join. add.
4 a To m ake ready, prepare, b (w. abl.) to equip (with).
5 a To form o r m odify so as to suit, adapt, accom m odate, fit. b to adapt mentally, bring into a suitable fram e
o f m ind, attune.

Source Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare 2003).
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Table 8. Definitions of Latin Terms Related to Levitas.
Leuis1

Lolitas'
[levis'+-tas]

Leuo1, tr.
-a re
~aui
-a ta m
[levis'+o3]
FORM S:
leuasso
{= -auero}

1 a Light in weight, b (o f vehicles or vessels) light in construction, (esp. as adapted for sw ift m ovem ent),
c (as adapted for m ovem ent through the air), d sit tibi terra -is (and sim. phrs.), m ay the earth rest lightly on you
(as a w ish for the dead).
2 a N o t ponderous in m ovem ent, nim ble fleet, b ( o f movements).
3 a N ot weighed dow n, unburdened, (in com - par.) lightened, b (fig.)
5 ( o f actions, m ovem ents, etc) Lacking w eight or force, gentle, slight, light; (also, o f the hand, etc.)
6 a (o f physical conditions) Lacking intensity, m oderate, m ild, slight, b (o f sleep) not oppressive, gentle.
7
Unsubstantial, thin.
10 a ( o f pain, loss, m ischance, etc.) Easy to bear, tolerable, slight; in ~ i habere, to m ake light of. b (o f prices,
expenses, e tc )
11 a Having little force or validity, weak, slight, ineffectual, b lacking severity, mild, c ( o f rum ours, etc.) not firm ly
grounded, idle.
12 Lacking authority or influence, powerless.
13 a Of little consequence, unim portant insignificant, trivial, trifling, b (o f crim es) venial.(forgivable: easily forgiven
o r excused)
14 Intended for am usem ent, not serious, light.
15 a (o f persons) Unreliable, irresponsible, shallow, inconstant, fickle, b (o f actions, em otions, etc.).
1 a L ack o f weight, lightness, b desire for m ovem ent, restlessness.
2
Lack o f intensity (o f pain), mildness.
3 a Unreliability, inconstancy, fickleness, shallowness, b an instance o f this, a folly.
4
W ithout offence or suffering, easily, ~iterferre, to take mildly, tolerate.
5
Inoffensively, mildly; ut ~issime dicam (and sim .), to say the least, to put it mildly.
6
In a fickle m anner, inconstantly, thought- lessly, lightly.
7
W ithout good reason or authority, groundlessly.
1 a To lift o r raise up. b to hold up, support, c to m ake higher, raise, d to set up, erect.
2 a To lift off, rem ove (a load or burden), b to take off, undo (bonds, fastenings).
3
(w. abl.) To relieve, rid (o f burdens o r encum brances); (w/out abl.) to relieve o f burdens, lighten, disencumber.
4 a To reduce in force, potency, etc., lessen, b to lighten the effect o f (an adverse circum stance), c to reduce, bring
dow n (costs, prices, etc.). d to represent as insignificant, m ake light of, belittle.
5 a To m ake m ore tolerable, relieve, lessen (pain, toil, loss, grief, etc.). b (m ed.) to relieve (disease or injury).
6
(w. abl.) T o free from , rid or relieve o f (toil, worry, expense, etc.); (also w. gen.).
7
T o refresh, restore, m ake well.
8 To alleviate the condition, circum stances, etc., of, relieve.

Source Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare 2003).

Table 9. Rank of Current Terms in English Usage based on Frequency of Use.
N ouns

A djectives

R elative R a n k
1

Relevant

1,216

Relevance

5,051

2

Apt

10,440

Pertinence

74,468

3

Pertinent

17,948

Aptness

97,576

4

Apposite

37,112

Appositeness

202,518

Source: Websters Online Dictionary Rosetta Edition
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physical weight, movement, acts committed in relation to others, punishment, burdens, pain,
misfortune, cost, force, validity, groundlesness, authority, power, seriousness, reliability, and
responsibility. Levo concerns acts of lifting, raising, or holding up; removing; alleviating burdens;
reducing potency; and diminishing significance. Unlike the first three terms, terms related to levis
appear at first glance to be the least likely of all terms to capture what we currently mean by
‘relevance’. Yet levo is the root word for it. So, it seems odd for it to have the prevalence that it
does relative to the other terms (Table 9). Pertineo is a relational term that has a factual sense
concerning the extension o f physical features or related processes (Table 10). It also has a
pragmatic sense concerning objectives and the directing of actions and words, interests of a person,
ownership of possessions, and application o f the law. Linguistically, pertineo is used to refer to
conceptual or factual objects/events. As with the Greek, various relational terms applied to
conceptual objects are ultimately connected to word senses referring to factual situations. For
example, pertineo refers to physical extensions or connections and oikeios refers to the home. Such
associations might be interesting to explore further. In both cases, refinement of conceptual
distinctions requires further analysis o f statements in context.
Also of importance is the root word relevo and its various forms (-are, ~aui, ~atum) that
are constructed from the elements re and levo, all of which are spelled with a ‘u’ rather than a ‘v’
in the Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare 2003). Its definition is as follows:
la. To reduce the load of, relieve a burden, b. to make (a load) less heavy, lighten.
2a. To relive (a person, etc) of physical pain or discomfort, ease, refresh, etc. b. to relieve of
anxiety or sim. c. to relive of a liability or expense, d. to free of guilt, exonerate.
3. To make (physical discomfort, etc) more tolerable, lighten, alleviate; (also hardships,
misfortunes, or sim.) b. to reduce (expenditure) to lessen in force, intensity, or sim.
4. To raise from a fallen position, to lift (one’s eyes).
The first three senses apply to concerns of sentient beings, particularly humans but the fourth sense
applies to a much broader realm of objects. The senses most significant are those of relieving
liability or expense, freeing of guilt, and exonerating. These are the senses picked up by the Scots
in the 1500’s and applied in the courts thereafter, as discussed in Section 4.2.4 . It is through this
path that we come by our current terms ‘relevant’ and ‘relevance’.
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Table 10. Definitions of the Latin Term Pertineo.
Pertineo, intr.
-e re
~ui,
[per-+teneo]

l a ( o f physical features, etc.) To extend (to a point expressed or implied), reach, stretch, b (w. per} to extend
over th e w hole ( o f an area), be diffused (throughout), c (esp. o f an influence, condition, etc.) to extend (to) in
its operation, progress, o r sim .; (also transf. or fig.).
2a ( o f actions, words, etc.) To be aim ed (at) directed (towards som e object), b to tend (to som e result, usu.
desired), be conducive (to).
3 a ( o f w ords o r speech) To point (to a conclusion), refer (to an individual, etc.). b ( o f events, omens, etc.).
4 a T o relate o r pertain (to), have to do (with), b quod (quantum ) ad
et, as far as — is concerned, c ad (in) rem
-ere, to be relevant o r to the point; also -ere alone.
5 T o be a concern (to a person, his m ind, etc.), be the business (of).
6 a (o f possessions) To belong by right (to), be the property (of); (also trans., o f a quality, etc) b. ( o f persons) to
belong (to a group), be associated (with), c ( o f actions, etc.) to be attributable (to), be the w ork (of).
7 T o com e within the scope ( o f a law category, etc.).

Source Oxford Latin Dictionary (Glare 2003).

4J2J Latin Origins and Meanings of Elements o f ‘Relevance ’ Terms
‘Relevance’ terms can be analysed into three elements: the prefix ‘re’, the root word ‘lev’
and various suffixes, all of which are derivatives of Latin. Further, there are the Latin words that
combine ‘re’ and ‘lev’. As Tables 11 and 12 show, the coverage o f these Latin terms is quite
broad. Given Whitaker’s definitions (2001; Table 11), the noun forms using entem refer to the
state of an object being raised up, comforted, released, lightened, lessened, smoothed, or depilated.
However, given Hoad’s definitions (1996; Table 12), the noun forms using entem refer to the state
of an object that has returned to a state o f being raised, comforted, released, lightened, lessened,
smoothed, or dipilated; hence, the notions of relief, alleviation, diminishment that derive from
relevo and forms of relevare. Hoad (1996) reports that Latin words containing the prefix re- began
to occur in English during the 1200's and became more frequent in the 1400s. However, ‘re’
became an English prefix only in the 1600s when formations on native words were modelled to
some extent on foreign compositions, as ‘recall’ is on the Latin revocare. The ambiguity of re- is
shown in forms like re-cover (cover again) and ‘recover’.
OED (1989) reports that the suffixes -ance, -ancy, -ence, -ant, and -ent used in English
have been taken either from French, which was taken from Latin, or occasionally directly from
Latin (Table 13). Historically, English speakers have either adopted the whole French word (e.g.,
‘relever’), which are based on an adaptation of Latin suffixes (e.g. antia), or they attached the
French suffixes -ance or -ence to English words, particularly participles. These suffixes in English
are just spelling variations, which reflect historical changes in convention. However, they have the
same sense. When attached to participles, they form partly nouns o f action, as in Old French, and
partly nouns of state, quality, or condition, as in Latin. The latter idea is more distinctly expressed
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Table 11. Latin Elements o f‘Relevance’ Terms.
re

thing; event, business; fact; cause; property

levo, levare, levavi, levatus, levant

lift or raise up; com fort; release, free from ; lighten, lessen,
relieve; m ake sm ooth, polish; free from hair, depilate

relevo, relevare, relevavi, relevatus, relevant

relieve, alleviate, dim inish

entem

to be, exist

Source: Whitaker 2001

Table 12. Definitions of the Prefix ‘re’.
1.

re

(1.) backw ards from a point reached o r to die starting-point, e.g. recedere RECEDE, revocare REVOKE; passing
som etim es into ‘aw ay’, e.g. removare REM OVE.
(2.) back to an earlier state o r over to another condition, e.g. renovare RENOVATE, resumere RESUM E.
(3.) back in a place, from going forward, e.g. residare RESIDE, retinere RETAIN.
(4.) again, in return, (the m ost frequent use in new).
(5.) in a contrary direction, so that w hat has been done is annulled or destroyed ( = UN -2), e.g. renuntare
REN O U N C E, revelare unveil, REVEAL1
(6.) in opposition o r conflict, e.g. rebellis REBEL, recriminari RECRIM INATE.
(7.) in response to a stim ulus, with intensive force, e.g. requirere REQUIRE, resohere RESOLVE.

2.

re

(from

res\ thing, affair) in the m atter o f concerning

Source: Hoad (1996)

Table 13. Etymology and Current Definitions o f‘Relev’ Suffixes.
Current Meaning

Etymology

Element

Function

-ance

noun
suffix

M id English, from Old French, from L
-antia, from -ant-, -ans -ant + -ia -y

-ancy

noun
suffix

Latin

-ant

noun
suffix

M iddle English, from O ld French, from
-ant, prp. suffix, from Latin -ant-, -ans,
prp.. suffix o f first conjugation, from -a(stem vowel o f first conjugation) + -nt-,
-ns, prp. suffix; akin to O ld English
-nde, present participle suffix, Greek
-nt-, -n, particle suffix

-ant

adjective
suffix

-antia —see: -ance

1 : action o r process <fiirtherance> : instance o f an action or
process <perform ance>
2 : quality or state : instance o f a quality or state
<protuberance>
3 : am ount o r degree <conductance>
1 : quality o r state <piquancy>

1 a : one that perform s (a specified a c tio n ): personal or
im personal agent <claim ant> <coolant> b: thing that prom otes
(a specified action o r process) <expectorant>
2 : one connected with <annuitan£>
3 : thing acted upon (in a specified m anner) <inhalant>

1 : perform ing (a specified action) or being (in a specified
condition) <som nam bulant>
2 : prom oting (a specified action o r process) <expectorant>

Source: O E D 1989
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by the variant -ancy, which has been formed in English as a direct adaptation of a Latin suffix.
The suffixes -ent and -ant are attached to participles to form mostly adjectives and some nouns.
Both forms are adaptations of the Latin word entem, which means ‘to be’ or ‘exist’. Understanding
the role o f these suffixes is important to assess claims that relevance is a property o f a first relatum
like a premise, as discussed in Section 7.3.

4.2.4 Old Scots Use o f ‘Relevance’ 1100 to cl800
The first records o f ‘relevance’ terms used in the English language are from Old Scots.
The origins of ‘relevance’ is documented in The Dictionary o f the Scots Language (DSL). This
dictionary comprises the two major historical dictionaries: (i) the Dictionary o f the Older Scottish
Tongue (DOST), which contains information about Scots words in use from the 12th century to the
end of the 17* century and (ii) the Scottish National Dictionary (SND), which contains
information about Scots words in use from the 18* century to the present day. OED (1989) also
provides some early quotations from the Scots. The definitions in DSL are written in modem
English but all the quotations from DOST are in Old Scots, which is almost another language. It
would be worth analyzing these quotations but I do not have sufficient time to translate all the
unusual terms. Instead, I have collected all definitions of ‘relevance’ terms from DOST and
analysed the quotations from OED. Appendix 1 provides definitions of ‘relevance’ terms.
The two terms ‘relev’ and ‘relation’ appear to be the semantic wellspring o f ‘relevance’.
The term ‘relev’ is a semantically complex word that originated around 1375. It has been adapted
from the Latin ‘relevare’, particularly the senses ‘to raise again’ and ‘assist’ and its early use was
with reference mainly to help given in a battle. Since then its sense has expanded to include many
kinds of assistance: (i) rescuing a person from trouble, difficulty or danger; (ii) bringing or giving
aid to someone by one’s action; (iii) assisting a person by donation or providing necessary
provisions; (iv) freeing a person or community from mental pressure/distress, physical pain or
discomfort, punishment, penalty, legal obligation, or financial burden; (v) freeing a person, bird, or
ship from bondage or captivity; (vi) making a need or weakness less harmful or oppressive; (vii)
exalting or elevating a person or thing or raising in rank, standing, or condition; and (viii)
recovering or regaining land (DOST).
Based on the number of senses and not necessarily frequency of use, the chief application
o f ‘relev’ is in reference to humans or human problems or interests. Occasionally, direct reference
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is to land or a ship but these are a person’s property (interest) for which relief was either sought or
given. The application o f ‘relev’ to a bird is similar in that it concerns a bird’s interests; in
particular, its interest to be freed when held in captivity. Thus, most senses o f ‘relev’ apply to
beings that encounter problems or have interests. It is evident how the notions o f ‘raise’ and ‘help’
are combined. When in need of help, we are down and need a hand up. ‘Relev’ conceptualizes that
elevation. However, the sense o f ‘relev’ referring to the exaltation or elevation of a person or thing
or raising something in rank, standing, or condition (sense vii above) is a broader notion. It
concerns the attribution of significance to something, which is a subjective evaluation.
The term ‘relation’ originated in the Scots language around 1390 and, up to about 1600, it
referred to a narration or report. In law, it specifically referred to a witness’s statement of the
circumstances known to him. However, around 1661 ‘relation’ acquired senses o f (i) making a
relation either to something or o f a matter and (ii) making a reference or allusion. Around this time,
‘relation’ also became more general to include any connection or correspondence whatsoever. The
words ‘relative’ and ‘relate’ also centre around mostly the early senses o f ‘relation’ (DOST).
The early Scots concept o f relation appears to be limited to whatever a person might
formally or informally say. In court, for example, a narration would be given on the speaker’s
behalf or against someone within the context of an allegation made before a judge. Generally, then,
this sense of relation applies to an element of communication. The later conception of making or
representing any relation is much broader than the earlier sense in that it applies to any system, not
just a communication system. Interestingly, a speaker defending himself or being defended does so
against a charge or accusation. DOST defines the Old Scots term ‘charge’ most generally as a
load, weight, or burden. More specifically, ‘charge’ is defined as (i) a task, duty, or commission
laid upon or assigned to one; (ii) task of looking after something; (iii) an accusation; (iv) an
injunction, command, or order; and (v) responsibility or blame. Accordingly, a charged person
seeks relief, a lightening. Also, ‘burden’ in Old Scots means a heavy bundle of sticks, usually slung
over one’s back and a burden-taker is someone who takes responsibility for another. So, a
representative of an accused person takes on the responsibility to relieve the charge and the
prosecuter takes on the burden o f proving the charge; i.e., justly placing a burden on the accused
who may or may not have placed a burden on someone else.
The later acquisition o f ‘allusion’ by ‘relation’ is of interest to the development or
continuance o f ‘relevance’, which emerged in Scottish courts about 140 years earlier than this
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sense of ‘relation’. The term ‘allude’ means to play upon words (OED) or refer indirectly; i.e., to
mention something or somebody, usually briefly, without giving a precise name or explicit
identification but usually making clear by other means to whom or what reference is made
(Encarta 2004). One can see how the courts might not approve o f such indirectness and
implicitness and how essential points o f a narration must be raised up from a welter to be clearly
and explicitly considered by a judge. Further, of all that might be explicitly narrated in court, the
problem is to determine what actually connects the allegations and statements to legal principles;
hence, what ought to be elevated above the fray to be considered by a judge, who is a higher
authority to whom we rise when he/she enters the courtroom.
The acquisition of the notion of allusion by ‘relation’ is also interesting in that the term
allusion is a form o f the Latin ludere, which means ‘to play’ or ludus which means ‘play or game’.
In particular, it means to pretend to be or act as if something were true (Encarta 2004). These
forms also supply a root meaning to the words (x) ‘ludicrous’, which means absurd, incongruous,
impractical, or unsuitable; (ii) ‘collude’, which means to work secretly with somebody particularly
to do something illegal or undesirable; (iii) ‘delude’, which means to lead into false belief or to
persuade somebody to believe in something that is untrue or unreal (iv) ‘elude’, which means either
(a) to escape from or avoid somebody or something by cunning, skill, or resourcefulness or (b) to
be beyond somebody’s understanding or be unable to be recalled, which specifically comes from
the Latin eltidere - to deceive, escape from, win from somebody at play; and (v) illusion, which
means a deceptive appearance or a false idea, conception, or belief concerning something {Encarta
2004). In all cases, relations between objects are evaluated and the judgment of no connection is
expressed, as is with an irrelevance judgment. For example, (i) ludicrous concerns the incongruity
of two statements; (ii) collude concerns the disconnection between one’s plans or actions and
another’s knowledge of them and the law; (iii) delude concerns a statement that does not
correspond to what a person claims the statement represents; (iv) elude concerns the disconnection
between a person and others or what one wants to recall and what can be recalled; and (v) illusion
concerns the disconnection between an appearance, idea, conception, or belief and that which is
represented by such objects. Accordingly, all of these words are related to relevance in that
relevance also concerns connection/disconnection between objects.
The adjectival term ‘relevant’ came into the Scots language around 1516. It was first used
in a legal context to mean (i) legally pertinent, competent, or sufficient or (ii) conformity with
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correct legal procedures or rules (DOST). For example, OED provides the following quote from
Scottish law: “[They] find the libel relevant to infer the pains of law” (Appendix 2). Given that to
be pertinent, competent, or sufficient a statement must conform to correct legal procedures or rules,
these two senses are co-extensive. The SND notes that the Scots word ‘relevant’ is similar to (i) the
French word ‘relever’, which means ‘to be dependent on’, and (ii) both the Italian word ‘rilevare’
and Spanish word ‘relevar’, which mean ‘to be o f importance or consequence’. The Italian and
Spanish terms are similar to the Scots word ‘relevant’ because any statement containing the notion
of significance expresses an n-ary relation between objects, which means any such statement
presupposes a connection between at least two objects. The Scots word ‘relevant’ used in a legal
context must also include the notion of significance because what is considered in a legal decision
must be of significance. What is not considered in a judgement is that which is insignificant. The
degree of significance and its determination is another matter, which can be a central strategic or
pragmatic concern (see Section 6.2). The French word ‘relever’, meaning ‘dependent on’, might be
a broader conception in that it might refer to any relation.
As the context of use and definitions of Old Scots ‘relevance’ terms show (Appendix I), (i)
all first relata concern such conceptual objects as allegations, pleadings, actions, and defenses and
(ii) second relata concern such conceptual objects as legal procedures, rules, or cases, although
procedures may also be factual. In general, the relata concern whatever is brought before the court
and aspects of decisions that the court must make. The relational terms include pertinent,
competent, sufficient, conformity, bearing, supporting, applicable, and propriety.

4.2.5 Scots and English Usage cl800 - 2004
According to the Scottish National Dictionary (SND), the original Scottish sense of
‘relevant’ as ‘pertinent or germane to any matter’ became standard English only in the late 18th
centuiy. Samuel Johnson (1755) included only the term ‘relevant’ in his Dictionary o f the English
Language and only on the testimony of some earlier dictionaries; e.g. Bailey, who prepared two
general dictionaries in the 1700's. These earlier dictionaries took ‘relevant’ to mean ‘relieving’,
which is a translation of the original French (SND). Nonetheless, SND reports that the Scottish
sense o f ‘relevant’ might have come into English usage through Parliament as it appeared in a work
of Burke’s. SND does not provide a reference to Burke’s work but presumably they are referring to
Edmund Burke, the 18th centuiy English parliamentarian. SND explains that Burke’s definition is
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an extension from the original and still current application in Scottish Law; i.e., the sense of legally
sufficient, pertinent or adequate, especially o f a claim, charge or defence, where the factual
statements alleged, if proved, would justify the granting o f the penalty, remedy or discharge sought.
Aside from the etymology, SND distinguishes between ordinary and legal senses of
‘relevant’ and defines it by listing its synonyms. The ordinary sense is “to be pertinent or germane
to any matter”. The “still current” Scottish legal sense is “legally sufficient, pertinent or adequate,
esp. of a claim, charge or defence, where the facts alleged, if proved, would justify the granting of
the penalty, remedy or discharge sought.” The structure of the definition is as follows:
'

Sense

1" Relatum

Ordinary

X

Legal

• factual
statements

• claim
• charge
• defence

Relational Term

V* Relatum

• relevant
• pertinent
• germ ane

• a n y m atter

• legally sufficient
• legally pertinent
• legally adequate

• penalty
• remedy
• discharge

Concerning the ordinary sense of ‘relevant’ and given that ‘matter’ refers to both (i) physical
objects, causes, events, states, or acts and (ii) subjects, themes, topics or questions treated in
written composition or discourse (SND), no limitation to the second relatum is specified. Whether
this actually bears out upon examining the quotations remains to be seen, and would need to be
done by someone who has access to the old Scottish legal literature and knows the Old Scots
tongue. In contrast, the second relatum of the legal sense of ‘relevant’ is limited to legal
concepts/decisions or post-judgment acts, all of which pertain to human beings. Despite the
intervening conceptual objects within such a relevance statement, the relations are ultimately fact to
fact, given that legal decisions concern (i) a person’s acts (e.g., possible killing) and facts related to
a person’s acts (e.g., a weapon) and (ii) court actions that follow judgment (e.g., confinement of the
person). So, one would say that the fact of killing a person is relevant to the fact of imprisoning the
murderer. The process of investigating the crime, laying the charges, and judging are all facts but
these are guided by legal principles, which are conceptual. Here, the relevance relation between
principles and factual procedure is pragmatic. Further, the acts of a crime are factual. But when
acts are represented conceptually in factual statements, a referential relation is created between the
statement and fact. Further, when the factual statements are employed to support another
statement/conclusion (e.g., that a particular person committed a crime), a conceptual relation is
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constructed, specifically an inferential relation. Finally, the verdict and sentencing judgment are
conceptual objects that have a referential relation to a future state. This relation is also a
prescriptive, pragmatic relation in that it determines future acts and states; i.e., it determines
generally what ought to be done to the convicted person. Both are concept-fact relations.
The OED’s definitions, quotations, and relata are shown in Appendix 2. These include
both Scottish sources from the 1500's and later English sources. I have kept the Old Scots and later
English quotations together to show a continuous historical record. Also, some of the early Scottish
quotations from OED differ from those reported by SND. Each table in Appendix 2 presents a
classification of relata. As shown, the relations are fact-concept, concept-concept, concept-fact,
and fact-fact. The first three categories involve human concerns such as issues, decisions, or
interests. Generally, they involve inquiries, arguments, education, social regulation/law, and
pragmatic concerns. Fact-fact relations need a closer examination.
Table 14 outlines quotations from which I have identified factual relata and identified the
context of the quotation. Part of the difficulty of analyzing these quotations arises from
ambiguities; specifically, determining whether or not the referent is a factual or conceptual object
and exactly what that object is. In some cases, the object can be either factual or conceptual.
Where a statement could be constructed using factual relata, I have included the quotation in this
table and have analysed and evaluated it accordingly.
The 1818 quotation (All Fools' Day, It will come in most irrelevantly and impertinently
seasonable to the time o f day.) concerns a relation between a day o f celebration (events) and the
context within which it was to occur. OED defines ‘time of day’ as (i) hour of the clock, period of
the world's history, etc; (ii) the hour or exact time as shown by the clock; hence, a point or stage in
any course or period; and (iii) not to help or cooperate with (a person) at all, to be surly or mean
towards (colloq.); and (iv) the prevailing aspect of affairs; the state of the case (colloq. or slang).
Given the relation between the event and the state within which it is about to occur, a non-specific
judgment about its timing is also expressed, which might be that the event is inappropriate. In any
case, the relevance statement concerns human affairs, which are subjective concerns.
The 1823 quotation (A Poor Relation..is the most irrelevant thing in nature.) concerns a
relation between two blood relatives but it is difficult to interpret in specific terms. It might be an
emphatic statement that places a poor person within the context of all that exists and expresses an
opinion about the writer’s or other person’s attitudes toward a poor relative. It might also suggest
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Table 14. Fact-Fact Relations in OED Relevance Quotations.
1“ R e la tu m

TP R e la tu m

D ate

All Fool’s Day

tim e o f day

1818

A P oor Relation..is the m ost irrelevant
thing in nature.

poor relation

<person related>

1823

Population and the supply o f food m ust
be exactly relevant.

population

food supply

1868

The value..is absolutely relevant to the
dem and for them .

value o f an
unspecified item

dem and

1868

Irrelevancy

To use the weapons o f one o f these
societies against a sin or error in the
other society, is a total irrelevancy and
misapplication.

a w eapon from
one society
<regulation
and/or act>

sin or error in
another society

1876

Relevance

W hat relevance had such a feet to the
duty o f the hour?

fact

duty o f the hour
(act or duty)

1890

Q u o tatio n

C o n tex t

T erm /S ense

Celebration
Tim ing

Irrelevantly

All Fools' Day, It will com e in m ost
irrelevantly and impertinently
seasonable to the tim e o f day.

Socio-economic
Status

Irrelevant

Econom ics:
Supply and Dem and

Relevant lb

Pragmatic:
Concerns o r Acts
M oral Concerns
Decision

Legend: < x > an assumed object.

that anyone ought to have the same opinion about a poor relative. Within this opinion, a specific
attitude toward the poor person is suggested but is not made explicit. Further, because attitudes
lead to acts, the quotation might also imply how a poor person ought to be treated. In any case, the
irrelevance statement concerns subjective beings; specifically, a wealthier person’s regard or
treatment of a poor relative. So, the relevance statement expresses a fact-concept or fact-fact
relation, but within the realm of subjective beings.
The 1868 quotations, (i) Population and the supply o f food must be exactly relevant and
(ii) The value., is absolutely relevant to the demandfo r them, make use of a peculiar sense of
relevant; i.e., proportionality or correspondence. These are relational statements but quite distinct
from other senses of relevance in that they can include any factual relations; i.e., non-subjective
relations. The idea of any proportionality might be an extension from an original definition of
‘relevance’ made by Daliymple (1681) in The Institutions o f the Law o f Scotland (OED; App. 2).
Here, he defined relevancy as follows: “The meaning of Relevancy (which is more accustomed with
us, than else~where) imports the Justice of the point, that is alledged to be Relevant.” From the
definition alone, it is not clear exactly what he meant but he could mean that relevance is the
relation between a point and legal principles. (See discussion below on a similar, later definition.)
That is, for a point to be relevant it must correspond or connect to or fall within legal principles.
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The idea of proportionality might come from Aristotle, or other Ancient Greeks, who held that
justice is a matter o f proportionality. However, the appearance is that relevance as proportionality
has gone beyond the original limitation to justice issues and now includes any relation of
proportionality.
The 1876 quotation (To use the weapons o f one o f these societies against a sin or error
in the other society, is a total irrelevancy and misapplication.) concerns a relation between either
(i) social policies that regulate acts or military technology or (ii) acts that occur in one society and
their use in another society, given acts of sin or error that have occurred there. As a fact-fact
relation, it is a statement of appropriateness concerning societal relations, or more specifically
subjective relations.
The 1890 quotation (What relevance had such a fa ct to the duty o f the hour?) concerns a
relation between an unspecified fact and an unspecified duty of the hour. People use the word ‘fact’
ambiguously to mean either a factual object (e.g., thing) or conceptual object (e.g., statement
representing a thing). Concerning ‘duty of the hour’, OED defines duty either as an obligation,
which is a conceptual object, or as an act, which is a factual object. Without knowing more about
the context of the quotation, determining the intended sense of duty is not possible. Nonetheless, I
have classified this quotation as a fact-fact relation, or more specifically a fact-act relation,
because someone could make such a statement. Encarta defines ‘of the hour’ as ‘enjoying the
highest degree of relevance, importance, or popularity at the current moment or particular time’
and OED defines it generally as ‘a definite time, an appointed time, an occasion’ and specifically
as ‘of the present hour, of the very time that is now with us’. In any case, the statement expresses a
human concern. So, the relation is between an unspecified fact and a subjective being.
A few quotations use both a relevance term and a term that is used to define relevance. For
example, the 1818 quotation on All Fools Day states that it has come in most “irrelevantly and
impertinently” and the 1876 quotation on societal weapons states that their use in another society is
a total “irrelevancy and misapplication”. Further, the 1878 quotation, “His Irish enterprise had
lost its appositeness and relevancy”, is similar (App. 2). It is difficult to know, without context,
whether such usage is redundant or whether the writers were trying to make a distinction. So, the
outstanding questions concern whether the terms, as used, (i) are equivalent conceptually and, if so,
the redundancy may be a matter of emphasis or clarification by being more specific or (ii) overlap
conceptually. In the case of the weapons quotation, ‘irrelevancy’ might be applied to conceptual

53

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

objects (policies) and ‘misapplication’ might be applied to facts (acts).
Finally, one of OED’s quotations is from an 1838 dictionary of Scottish Law by William
Bell. In his words: “The relevancy o f the libel is the justice and sufficiency o f the matters therein
stated to warrant a decree in the terms asked.” SND does not have an entry for ‘justice’ but
DOST defines it as follows:
la. Administration of the law in maintenance of right or equity; judicial execution of the law by
assignment of reward or punishment; also, the judicial proceedings attendant upon these.
b. Legal redress of wrong; the granting of one’s rights by the intervention of the legal authority.
2. Justice in the administration of the law; equity.
SND provides the explanation that ‘sufficient’, an adjective, is applied to a wide range of objects
and means ‘substantial, solid, adequate in regard to strength or condition’. SND does not have an
entry for ‘substantial’ but has one for ‘substantious’ which is defined as substantial. So, turning to
DOST ‘substantial’, an adjective, is defined as (i) material and (ii) that which involves an essential
point or feature or something that is material, significant, or o f major importance. It defines
‘substance’, a noun, as (i) essential nature, essence and (ii) corporeal nature, physical reality.
DOST also has an entry for the term ‘sufficiand’, which in legal contexts is applied to pledges,
testimony, and witnesses. It means ‘adequate or satisfactory; specifically, conforming to the
requirements o f the law’. Given the definitions o f ‘justice’ and ‘sufficient’, it is not clear why Bell
used the two terms, assuming he used them to distinguish concepts. However, an overlap occurs
between the two senses. Both refer to the idea o f consistency or conformity to the law. ‘Sufficient’
relies on the notions of strength and significance but, upon analysis, ‘justice’ might also refer to
such ideas. Nonetheless, it appears that what he means is that the libel/case must conform to law
and be significant enough to warrant application o f it. As in the original Scottish usage, relevance
is taken to be a relation of significance. Hence, it excludes non-subjective fact-fact associations;
such as, grains of sand on a beach or elements of a chemical compound. I suspect that such an
explanation accounts for the ‘unnatural’ sound or sense o f incorrectness, which occurs at least to
me, when speaking o f a water molecule and saying ‘hydrogen is relevant to oxygen’ but not when
saying the more general ‘hydrogen is associated with oxygen’.

54

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4.3 Cross Comparison of Current General Dictionary Definitions
43.1 General Nature and Structure of Definitions
Tables 15 and 16 contain definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ from five general
dictionaries. These definitions have been analysed into their component parts. Common to all
definitions is a system of terms and concepts that have a similar structure. Specifically, two sets of
objects (relata) are connected by various relational terms/concepts. The first relata are mostly
unspecified or nondescript but the second relata are identified as various factual or conceptual
objects expressed at varying degrees o f generality. The relational terms also vaiy in degree of
generality. The general structure of each definition can be formalized as semantic (5), conditional
(C), and abstract statements (A), as follows:
S , : Object x is relevant to object y means that x is related to y.
C,: If jc is relevant to y, then x must be related to y.
C2: Whenever x is relevant to y, then x must be related to y.
A , : ‘xRy ’ or iRxy\ where R ambiguously refers to ‘relevant to’ and ‘related to’.
A2 : xRy -> xR,y, where R, = ‘relevant to’ and R„ = ‘related to’.
A3: (xw->y)h (x *"-> y).
At this point, it is an open question whether we can write the bidirectional ‘xRvy <-> xR„y\ which
presupposes that ‘relevance’ is conceptually equivalent to ‘relation’; their use is interchangeable;
and, when used, they yield synonymous expressions. In other words, the set relation between
relevance and relation is one of complete overlap. (See Section 6.1).
As is evident from Tables 15 and 16, definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ are very
similar, with the exception o f Merriam-Webster’s definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’, where
the former contains different specific senses even though ‘relevance’ should subsume all definitions
of ‘relevant’. This is clear when considering the second difference to notice, which is that of
grammatical function. ‘Relevance’, by way of the suffix -ance, refers to a state and functions as a
noun that literally represents something raised up or, perhaps more specifically, something
selected, isolated, and brought to attention. That ‘something’ is proximately a conceptual system
and being expressed through a sign system it must refer to and correspond with an established
conceptual system and, at times, ultimately a factual system. So, relevance, in this particular sense,
names the system ‘x R y\ O f course, a more general function o f ‘relevance’ is to name a particular
theory of relevance or a set theories. Here, the term sits at a higher level o f abstraction than its use
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Table 15. Definitions of ‘Relevance’ from General Dictionaries.
R elatio n al T erm

1* R e la tu m

V* R e la tu m

relation

X

m atter under consideration

applicability
pertinence

X

<m eans>

anything social
<ends>

2 : The ability ( o f info retrieval system) to retrieve material that satisfies the needs o f the user.

satisfaction

m aterial

info system user needs

1. Pertinence to the m atter at hand.

pertinence

X

m atter at hand

S ource

D efinition
1. Relation to the matter at hand.

M erriam
Webster

American
Heritage

lb. Practical and especially social applicability : Pertinence

2. Applicability to social issues: e.g., a governmental policy lacking relevance.

applicability

3. CompSci: The capability o f a search engine/function to retrieve data appropriate to a user's needs.
Cambridge
Intem ’l

1. The degree to which som ething is related or useful to w hat is happening or being talked about.

la. Relevancy the quality or fact o f being relevant; (i) bearing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the
m atter in hand (ii) correspondent or proportional to something).

OED
b. A relevant remark; spec, in recent use, pertinency to important current issues (as education to one's later
career, etc.); social or vocational relevancy.

1. Connection: the sensible or logical connection that one thing has with another, for example, a matter
being discussed or investigated.

X

(gov’t policy)

social issues

appropriateness

data

info system user needs

degree o f relatedness
degree o f usefulness

X

an occurrence
topic o f discussion

bearing upon
connected with
pertinent to
correspondent to
proportional to

X

m atter in hand
something; y

pertinency

connection
sensible connection
logical connection

rem ark
education

X

thing

y

current/societal issues
vocation
thing (y)
(m atter being discussed)
(m atter being investigated)

Encarta
2. Applicability to current issues: applicability to or connection w ith real-world issues, present-day events,
or the current state o f society.

Legend: ( )
o

= examples rather than delimiting term s o f a definition.
= assum ed object.
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applicability
connection

X

current issues
(real world issues)
(current events)
(current state o f society)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 16. Definitions of ‘Relevant’ from General Dictionaries.
R e la tio n al T e rm

I 1* R e la tu m

2"* R e la tu m

la . Having significant and demonstrable bearing on the m atter at hand.

bearing

X

m atter a t hand

b : Affording evidence tending to prove or disprove the m atter at issue or under discussion.

evidence
p ro o f

X

m atter a t issue
m atter under discussion

X

social y

D efinition

S o urce

M erriam
W ebster

American
Heritage

c : Having social relevance.
2. Proportional, relative.

proportional
relative

X

y

Having a bearing on or connection with the m atter at hand.

bearing
connection

X

m atter at hand

X

an occurrence
topic o f discussion

correct for
suitable for

X

purpose

bearing upon
connected with
pertinent to

X

m atter in hand

correspondent to
proportional to

X

som ething

X

som ething
(m atter discussed)
(m atter investigated)

X

society
real w orld issues
present day events
current state o f society

connected with

1. Connected with what is happening or being discussed.
Cambridge
International

2. Correct or suitable for a particular purpose.

1. Bearing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand.
OED
2. Correspondent or proportional to something.

1. Connected: having some sensible or logical connection w ith something else, for example, a m atter being
discussed or investigated.
Encarta

Legend: ( )
<>

2. Having social significance: having som e bearing on or importance for real-world issues, present-day events,
o r the current state o f society

= examples rather than delimiting term s o f a definition.
= assum ed object
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sensible or
logical connection

bearing
importance
significance

in particular relevance statements. In contrast, ‘relevant’, by virtue of the suffix -ant, functions as
an adjective and is associated with the first relatum o f the relational statement. But, as is evident in
all the definitions, the function o f ‘relevant’ is not to describe the first relatum, as other adjectives
would, but rather to indicate a connection between the first and the second relata. So, the adjectival
view places undue emphasis on the first relatum at the expense of the connection or second
relatum, as does ‘relevant’ when used as an adjective. Such a position is at odds with an adjectival
view of ‘relevant’, which takes it to represent properties of the first relatum; e.g., properties of a
premise set (Blair 1989,1992; Johnson 2000). Now, I said that ‘relevant’ has an indicator
function, which means ‘relevant’ itself does not connect. Rather, humans connect the relata both
cognitively when thinking and physically when writing or speaking. Further, when we make an
assertion, as mentioned with ‘relevance’, we must employ language correctly, which means we
must conform to grammatical and semantic conventions, and we must represent referents (ideas or
facts) correctly. In both cases, the referent of a relevance statement, being a relational statement, is
not just an individual object but a system of objects. In other words, a relevance statement asserts
that a connection occurs between two objects, which identifies a system. So, the essential problem
in evaluating a relevance statement is to determine whether or not the relata are correctly identified
and are connected as asserted.

4.3.2 Nature of the 2BdRelata
Table 17 presents all 2nd relata from general definitions of both ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’.
I have separated the most general senses of each term’s definition from more specific senses. I have
also separated terms o f a definition that delimit a semantic category from terms that identify
examples used to illustrate a particular semantic category.
2ndRelata o f General Senses o f ‘Relevance ’ and ‘Relevant O f the twelve general senses
of ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’, two of the 2nd relata are topics of discussion (Cl), six are a matters at
hand (M-W, OED, AH), two are things (E), and two are occurrences (Cl). First, a ‘topic of
discussion’ is a very general relatum that is expressed through physical objects (sounds,
inscriptions) and occurs within a communication event. Accordingly, such a relevance relation
occurs only within the context of an information exchange between at least two persons. These may
be immediate in face-to-face spoken exchanges or drawn out over time in written communications,
providing that someone reads and responds to the initial written work. Further, any communication
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Table 17. Comparison of Second Relata in General Dictionary Definitions.
V* R e la ta

S ource
R elevance

oa
£

R e le v an t

MW

m atter under consideration

m atter at hand

AH

m atter at hand

m atter at hand

OED

m atter in hand

m atter in hand

thing ( y )
(m atter being discussed)
(m atter being investigated)

something
(m atter being discussed)
(m atter being investigated)

topic o f discussion

topic o f discussion

an occurrence

an occurrence

ends
anything social
inform ation system user needs

m atter a t issue or under discussion
that is to be proved/disproved

a

a

2

E

a
6
Cl

MW

social.v

93

u
X
tj
£*5

AH

OED

s.
i/i
E

social issues
inform ation system user needs
current issues
societal issues
vocation/education

y/som ething that is proportional
o r correspondent

current issues
real world issues
current events
current state o f society

society
real world issues
present day events
current state o f society

Legend: ( ) = examples, not the delimiting terms of a definition; MW=Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary;
AH = American Heritage; E= Encarta; OEIX)xford English Dictionary; Cl=Cambridge International Dictionary.

event presupposes both cognitive acts, through which concepts are associated and the relevance
relation is established, and referents to the conceptual and symbol associations. From an audience
perspective, the sounds/inscriptions are the immediate point of contact to identify the symbolically
represented referents that are claimed to be associated as asserted. O f course, problems of concept
formation and communication can interfere with the successful transmittal of intended information
and this context must be considered in any evaluation of such relevance claims. Semantically, the
topic of discussion creates a frame of relevance which determines what can be appropriately
brought into relation with it. Its function, then, is similar to a question, hypothesis, or theory. In
other words, the 2nd relatum limits or determines the Is*relatum. Walton (1982, 1999) explores the
notion o f topical relevance but uses different terms and provides a different explanation and
structure.
Second, ‘matter at hand’ refers generally to a current consideration and specifically to a
current judgement or decision (M-W, OED, AH). Such a relevance relation can be (i) formulated
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when a lone person deliberates or (ii) expressed when individuals exchange information in a
communication event. The temporal restriction to a current activity is specified but is unnecessary
because a relevance relation does not disappear after a decision has been made, providing that it is
physically encoded somehow. Further, we can easily distinguish temporal frames with expressions
such as ‘x is relevant to judgment y ' and ‘x was relevant to judgment y when it was made’.
Consequently, the definition should be revised to remove the temporal restriction. Relevance
relations concerning judgments are ubiquitous and concern all kinds o f deliberations and pragmatic
considerations. Normative theories o f particular types o f relevance relations are researched in, for
example, law, science, engineering, medicine, resource management, environmental impact
assessment, architecture, and urban/regional planning, communications, and rhetoric. Any formal
or rule governed deliberative process (e.g., court proceedings or meetings) specify various types of
relevance requirements (e.g., standing and substantive admissibility). For example, standing
concerns the right to file a law suit or a petition (Hill and Hill 2002). As such, judgments of
standing determine which parties have relevant claims to be heard before the court. Within that,
other legal principles determine what information is relevant or admissible. A general theory of
relevance must take into consideration such a broad range o f types. One such example is pragmadialectics, which is one type of decision making procedure (van Eemeren and Grottendorst 2004).
Third, the use o f ‘thing’ or ‘something’ in Encarta’s definition is somewhat problematic
because the terms have fifteen and five senses, respectively. What is not clear is whether one,
some, or all senses delimit the second relatum. These senses range from any nondescript object to
more specific objects such as details, aims, garments, or deeds. The thing is, the referent of ‘thing’
must be identified by considering the context within which either ‘thing’ or ‘something’ is used.
Even so, the examples given for Encarta’s definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ give us some
guidance as to what they mean. The examples concern matters being discussed or investigated.
Further, given that Encarta’s definition specifies a logical connection between relata and they
define ‘logical’ as ‘based on facts’ (specifically, clear rational thought and sensible reasoning), the
second relatum would be a conceptual object because such objects occur in reasoning. However,
Encarta’s definitions also refer to a sensible connection between things, which is ambiguous. They
define ‘sensible’ in terms of good reason, practicality, perception, consciousness, and awareness.
This also ties in with a sense they give for ‘logic’, which is the “inescapable relationship and
pattern of events: the relationship between certain events, situations, or objects, and the inevitable
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Table 18. Cambridge Dictionary’s Examples of Relevance Statements.
1* R e la tu m

E xam ple

T* R e la tu m

(a) Education should be relevant to the child’s needs.

education

child’s needs

(b) For further inform ation, please refer to the relevant leaflet.

leaflet

inform ation needs

(c) The point is highly relevant to this discussion.

point

discussion

(d) I'm sorry but your personal wishes are not relevant (= im portant) in this case.

personal wish

a particular case

consequences of their interaction.” In any event, I will take into consideration the possibility that
they treat the second relatum as either a conceptual or factual object.
Fourth, the Cambridge Dictionary defines the second relatum identified as ‘what is
happening’ or ‘discussion’ as a current occurrence, which is a fact. Setting aside the temporal
restriction, it is not clear how they arrived at that specification given their examples, as outlined in
Table 18. Concerning (a), education is certainly a process and a complex one that involves, at a
minimum, a teacher and/or information and a student. So, it involves both factual and conceptual
objects and a complex set o f relevance relations between facts (teacher-teacher, teacher-student,
student-employer, student-environment) and conceptual objects. Concerning (b), presumably the
statement was made within a discussion. However, the leaflet (fact) is relevant to an information
need (mental state represented linguistically) only because it contains information (concepts)
required. So, the leaflet itself is only derivatively relevant. Concerning (c), a discussion is an
occurrence, for sure, but a point is not relevant to the factual occurrence of the discussion itself but
to other conceptual objects expressed within a discussion and to the topic o f discussion. So, the act
of discussing is also derivatively relevant. Concerning (d), the example contains a vague reference
to a nondescript case to which wishes are apparently irrelevant. If the case is an occurrence like a
discussion, previous comments apply to the definition. If the case is a topic, then the relation is
between the topic (concept) and a linguistic expression o f a personal need (concept->fact). Further,
it is not clear why ‘relevant’ in this example must be restricted to importance. If the case is a traffic
violation like speeding, then my personal wishes of not paying the fine are not connected to the
case by virtue of legal principles that rule out such considerations. As such, my personal wishes
can have no importance to such a case. This example emphasises that importance is relational and,
hence, presupposes a connection between two objects. All examples indicate why taking a systems
view of relevance statements is necessary to their analysis and evaluation.
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Encarta’s definition possibly identifies the second relatum also as a fact. As discussed, this
possibility arises from their definitions o f ‘thing’, ‘logical’, and ‘sensible’. Given that the first
relatum is also identified as a thing, two associated factual objects can be in a relevance relation as
opposed to a relation between a fact and a conceptual object. The differences are (where Na =
sodium and Cl = chloride):
(i) Fact R,-> Fact
Na m-> Cl
(ii) Fact *’- > Topic
Na **-> Synapse Function
(iii) Fact *"-> Research Objective
Na *■-> Determination o f Neural Mechanism
The issue here is whether or not ‘relevance’ and ‘relation’ are synonymous terms or ‘relevance’ is a
subcategory o f ‘relation’, which is a matter I will take up in Section 6.1.
2ndRelata o f Specific Senses o f ‘Relevance ’ and ‘Relevant ’. O f the 19 types of relata
identified, two main groups (concepts, facts) and several subgroups are apparent. Concerning
conceptual objects, nine concern issues or more specifically social issues (MW, AH, OED, E), one
concerns matters to be proved/disproved (MW), one concerns ends/objectives (MW), and two
concern information system user needs (MW, AH). Considering factual objects, five concern
society or the current state of society (MW, E) and one concerns something that is proportional or
correspondent to something else (OED). The first group of conceptual objects all concern either
pragmatic (C-F relation), moral (C-F relation), or epistemic matters (C-C or C-F relation),of which
all have a cognitive dimension and are human/subject problems. The second group of factual
objects includes vague references to ‘society’. Because no examples are provided, it is not clear
whether issues are implicit or whether or not statements refer to purely factual, non- significant
relations. However, given that (i) the context is a matter o f applicability and (ii) the factual/social
relations would be subject/subject or subject/non-subject relations rather than non-subject/non
subject relations, the definitions must be limited to relations of significance. The sense of ‘relevant’
meaning proportionality/correspondence can involve any relatum whatsoever. However, OED
defines it from a 19th centuiy quotation and Merriam-Webster does not indicate its data base. The
question arises whether or not this sense is anomalous or obsolescent.

62

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 1. Relations of the Second Relatum as a Conceptual Object.
Non-Factual

C /C ( s )

Factual

|
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l 1* R e la tu m
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V *

ac(s)
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Relatum: C
t 1
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To summarize, a conceptual object has a representational function and includes any
concept (C) or system of concepts (C(s)); such as, a proposition, theory, or classification system.
The representational relations are shown in Figure 1. The second relatum is an instance of
language use and, through its expression and unless terms are specially defined, the intent is to
conform to a pre-established semantic structure. The double arrows between the 2nd Relatum and
the conceptual objects indicate a mutual semantic relation. These conceptual objects can refer
either to other conceptual objects and ultimately be non-factual or they can refer to facts. The 2nd
Relatum can be considered in terms o f a direct relation to facts, where the relations would be
referential/evidential ( t 1) or pragmatic ( \ ) .

4 3 3 Nature of the Is*Relata
Most definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ do not specify particular types of objects for
the first relatum. O f the 23 senses, only five objects have been specified. These are: material or
data retrieved by an information system, remarks, education, and means to an end. These are all
facts or concepts and involve human pragmatic or moral concerns. For some reason lexicographers
have found it easier or more useful to identify categories for the 2nd Relatum, even if veiy broad
but not for the 1st Relatum, except in reference to a few specific cases. Presumably, a greater
variety o f types as a whole occur for the Is*Relatum - perhaps even anything. However, in a given
instance the first relatum would be limited by the frame established by the second relatum.
However, unlike the second relatum that delimits or determines the first relatum, the direction of a
relevance relation is from the first to the second relatum; i.e., x m-> y ; y d-> x. This will be
discussed more specifically in Section 6.1.3. Finally, given that the 2nd Relatum determines the Is*
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Relatum, where the former is a conceptual object, as expressed in a relevance statement, the latter
must also be a conceptual object because such are the objects that occur in cognitive processes,
despite the inclination to associate directly with or think in terms of factual referents.

43.4 Nature of Relational Terms
All definitions of ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ include relational terms, many o f which are
very general and nondescript. Some have either (i) a descriptive or normative sense; e.g., ‘relation’,
‘connection’, ‘sensible connection’, ‘bearing upon’, and ‘correspondence’; (ii) a normative sense;
e.g.,‘correctness’, ‘suitability’, ‘usefulness’, ‘applicability ’, ‘pertinence’, ‘satisfaction’,
‘importance’, and ‘significance’; or (iii) a descriptive sense; e.g., ‘proportionality’. Concerning
proportionality, although it can have a purely descriptive sense (e.g., length vs. width of a
rectangle), the quotations used by OED to construct the definition are normative (App. 2). A
further analysis of the definitions of relational terms should be conducted to provide a better
understanding of the conceptual ground that ‘relevance’ covers as well as its structure.

4.4 Reduction of Merriam-Webster’s General Definition o f ‘Relevance’
To clarify the conceptual structure of dictionary definitions o f ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’,
we need further definitions of the terms that compose each definition particularly because
‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ are defined so broadly. Although worthwhile, this is a time-consuming
and laborious task. Accordingly, I will limit my analysis to the general definition of ‘relevance’
from Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary (Table 19). It is selected because it includes the term
‘relation’, and we are not yet clear on the overlap between ‘relation’ and ‘relevance’. The following
analysis of ‘relation’ is reductive. The intent is to analyse to a level o f concreteness that provides a
clear semantic structure or discover that the definitions are hopelessly confused and need to be
completely revamped.
The definition o f ‘relation’ in Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary (Table 19) is
complex, dense, and highly abstract. Further, its elements are assembled like pieces of a puzzle that
lie in a box. As such, its intelligibility and utility are compromised, as is ‘relevance’. To understand
the definition and its relation to ‘relevance’ we need to (i) isolate the individual propositions; (ii)
identify which words refer to the first or second relatum or the relation itself; (iii) determine
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Table 19. Reduction of Merriam-Webster’s General Definition of‘Relevance’.
Relevance: la . Relation to the m atter at hand.
Relation
(n o u n )

A n aspect o r quality (as resem blance) that connects two or m ore things or parts as being o r belonging or working
together or as being o f the sam e kind; specifically : a property that holds betw een an ordered pair o f objects (as
one expressed by is equal to, is less than, o r is the brother of).

Aspect
(noun)

1. A ppearance to the eye o r mind.
2. A particular appearance o f countenance (expression, look, m ental com posure) or a particular
status or phase in w hich som ething appears or may be regarded.

09

i

Resemblance

s

(noun)

n

a

£
Quality

as

(no u n )

Order
(noun)

Matter

aa

la . Peculiar/essential character: nature; b. Inherent feature: property; c. Capacity/ role
4. A distinguishing attribute: Characteristic.
8 : The attribute o f an elem entary sensation that m akes it fundam entally unlike any other
sensation
4b. Arrangem ent/sequence o f objects (e.g., m athem atical elem ents) o r events in time.
5b. A regular or harm onious arrangement.

Som ething under consideration.

Consider

2
V

la . T he quality or state o f resem bling; especially, correspondence in appearance or superficial
qualities b. a point o f likeness. Similarity.
2. Representation, Image.

(verb)

To think about in order to arrive at a judgm ent or decision (proposition expressing a conclusion
or determ ination).

AC

h

A t hand
(adj)

(a) N ear in tim e o r place: w ithin reach.
(b) Currently receiving or deserving attention.

R ednctive Def: A n object is relevant to a judgm ent/decision currently under consideration when the form er is connected to the latter
by virtue o f an aspect (appearance) o r quality (essential o r inherent feature, capacity, role) o f som ething that functions as a connector.

whether the 1st and/or 2nd relatum or a third object has aspects, resemblances, or properties that
connect relata so they are, belong, or work together or are of the same kind; (iv) ground the
definition with concrete examples; and (v) systematically analyse and evaluate the relational
concepts and their referents, which requires an adequate inventory, description, and classification.
Further, the use of ‘specifically’ in the second clause of the definition might be misinterpreted
because we do not always refer specifically to comparative relations when invoking the term
‘relation’. For example, when asserting that Jacob and Wilhelm are the Brothers Grimm, I am
doing more than ordering pairs o f conceptual objects or artefactual representations o f them. I am
asserting a common genetic origin, which is an historical, physical relation realized through
reproductive processes. So, the second clause identifies just one specific kind o f relation.
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Table 20. Initial Analysis of Merriam-Webster’s Definition of‘Relation’.
Def
1

2

1" Relatum

General Relational Term

Specific Relational Term

is connected to
is together w/
belongs together w /
w orks together w /
sam eness o f kind

•a sp e c t
•q u ality
• resem blance

• part

•
•
•
•
•

• property

• ordered

•th in g

• equality
• brotherhood
• lesser m agnitude

V* Relatum
•th in g
•p art

• property

The definition of ‘relation’ can be analysed into the following elements.
1. An aspect or quality (as resemblance) that connects two or more things or parts...
(a) as being together
(b) belonging together
(c) working together
(d) as being of the same kind.
2. A property that holds between an ordered pair of objects (as one expressed by ‘is
equal to’, ‘is less than’, or ‘is the brother of).
Definition 1 contains at least three categories of terms, depending on how one wants to approach
the classification (Table 20). ‘Thing’ and ‘part’ are nondescript terms used to designate the 1st and
2nd Relata. The remaining key terms somehow concern ‘relation’ but how they do and to what they
actually refer is uncertain. ‘Aspect’ is defined in terms of appearance so it identifies a phenomenal
object. As such, an aspect does not connect actual things. Rather, it is involved in the connection of
mental objects within mental processes, as will be explained later. ‘Quality’ has a phenomenal
sense but also refers to things themselves, particularly their actual or potential properties. In the
latter case, a property o f an object must function to connect. Similarly, ‘resemblance’ also has a
phenomenal sense but it subsumes the notion of comparison. So, a resemblance is similar to an
aspect in that the former is part of a cognitive process. These three terms differ from terms (a) to
(d) in sense, function, and/or reference class. For example, the statement ‘A lichen is a life form
where fungi and algae are together’ indicates a general relation between the two kinds of organism
but is silent on what connects the two. The connector could be the referent to a relatum or
something in between. The statement ‘An aspect connects fungi and algae to create the life form
lichen’ refers to a datum that vaguely represents an unidentified connector, which could be an
entire thing, part, process, or property of a relatum or something in between. Likewise, the terms
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‘quality’ and ‘resemblance’, as parts or secondary properties, presuppose an object.
Definition 2 employs more specific and definite notions o f equality, relative magnitude,
and brotherhood. The first two are comparative relations that are constructed through a cognitive
process. So, overlap occurs between this definition and elements o f Definition 1. For ‘brotherhood’
to be in this category and to be an object of ordering, it must be treated as a linguistic or
conceptual object rather than a historical, factual relation.
To provide greater clarity, I have constructed tables to show the structure of definitions for
each type of relation as well as corresponding statements. I have also constructed figures to
illustrate the nature of the terms found within the definition. They result partly from reverse
engineering the definition and partly from an application o f the definition. The tables can be read
from top to bottom. They are structured into columns that contain 1st Relatum, relational terms,
and 2nd Relatum. The relational terms are ranked in order of decreasing generality. Statements are
constructed from both a particular sense and the definitions outlined in the corresponding figure.
To read the figures, it helps to visualize them like a picture and read from the ground up. Each
figure starts at the bottom with an actual, artefactual system and progresses upwards to a depiction
o f the system’s perceptual representation, to a conceptual representation of the artefactual system
as attained through perception of it, and then to a related set of definitions.
Definition la/b: Being/Belonging Together. Figure 2 and Table 21 concern the relation of
being or belonging together by virtue of an aspect, quality, or resemblance, where each of these
three terms is reduced to a part or property of an object. Figure 2 contains the system S(s), or
which I have just represented here with black objects, whereas the original factual system
in the figure is larger and darker. Three objects occur together and are connected by dashes. A
binaiy relation within the system is composed of two objects ($,<*) connected by a third object (-).
Other systems, like two pages glued together or two 2x4's fastened with a 3" common nail, are also
composed of two objects connected by a third object. How these objects are connected is a matter
of physics. For example, the means o f connection in the case of (i)

and glued paper

involves the adhesion of ink and glue to paper, respectively and (ii) the nailed 2x4's involves
friction between the nail and wood. In the case of ‘

t hey belong together because I designed

them to be together to meet my purpose in elucidating the notion of relation. As a corollaiy,
someone who would take them apart or their becoming otherwise disconnected would frustrate my
intentions, which is another way of saying they belong together. Now, a nut and a bolt are held
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Figure 2. Characterization of a Factual System that Corresponds to Definition l(a)/(b).
S

=df a system
*S(s)j
<S j , Cj , S. , C2 , s,>
c
= * 8 dash that connects O bjects s,, s2, s3 in S(s)
s
a sun shaped object generated by a hum an through a
hum an constructed com puter
Sj
=df an s occupying the left hand position o f sytem S(s)
s2
a n s occupying the m iddle position o f system S(s)
s3 =df an s occupying the right hand position o f system S(s)

V e rb a l D efinitions o f
A b stra c te d P e rc e p ts

D esignation

A b stra c tio n o f P ercep ts

Sj

Cj

Sj

Cj

Sj

i

i

i

i

i

O

-

#

(representation)

P e rc e p t o f F a c tu a l System
(representation)

uni
F a c tu a l System s
Legend: U

/ = referential relations.

Table 21. Relation Definition l(a)/(b): An aspect or quality (as resemblance) that
connects two or more things or parts as being or belonging together.
G e n e ra l R elation

1" R e la tu m
D efinition

1. is connected to
2. is together w /
3. belongs together w/

•th in g
• part

V* R e la tu m
•th in g
•p art

Specific R elation
1. aspect
2. quality
3. resem blance
S ta te m e n t

O bject

s,...

... is connected by dash c, to ...

O bject

s,...

... is together w ith ...

O bject

...

... object Sj.
... object

s2.

... object s2.
... w ithin system S(s)snd constructed to remain
together as assem bled, belongs together with...

Legend: 1,2,3 = rank o f the degree o f generality relative to term s in a given set, w here 1 is m ost general.
<>

= contains an ordered set

together but no third object keeps them together, which is also the case with hydrogen and oxygen
atoms that form a water molecule. The nut resists the pull of gravity when the bolt is held vertically
because it rests on the thread of the bolt and remains there by virtue o f the friction between
touching parts of the nut and bolt. So, here we have just a property of two things that produces the
means by which they are related.
None o f the mentioned systems involve a phenomenal object as a connector. However, in
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such a case, we see that one ‘tit’ resembles another ‘tit’ and, by definition, we know that
resemblance is a matter of similarity, which is a comparison between two objects or features of
them. As such, the relation is a cognitively determined one. That is, we do the connecting through
cognitive operations based on percepts and other mental objects (See Fig 6; Definition 2). This
kind of relation is fundamentally different from the factual relations outlined in Figure 2 and Table
21. So, we need to remove ‘aspect’, ‘resemblance’, and the phenomenal sense o f ‘quality’ from
Definition la/b and place it in Definition 2 where other comparative relations are identified.
Definition lc: Working Together. Figure 3 and Table 22 concern the relation of working
together by virtue of an aspect, quality, or resemblance. The relevant sense o f ‘work’ is ‘effective
operation’ (Merriam-Webster 2004). Essentially, objects that work together are mechanisms and
the include machines, organisms, and individuals in a social system (Bunge 2003). Figure 3 is an
illustration of a starter motor, an artefactual mechanism. A real starter motor is held together by
bolts, which are individual objects within the system, that cause sufficient friction and pressure to
keep the system together. The parts work together by virtue of their design, materials, precise
construction, correct assembly, and appropriate supply o f electricity. More generally, the parts
work together because of their composition, structure, and electrodynamics. How they work
together is a matter of physics. Similarly, humans can work together in a group but such a system
coheres by virtue of, for example, a common objective, willingness to cooperate, acts of
cooperation, emotional/physical rewards for cooperating, and rules to guide acts. So, at bottom, the
relation that connects human individuals is a complex system of shared mental objects that are
themselves connected within an individual to other mental and internal/external objects and, when
these mental objects are acted upon, a host of other mental and physical connections are generated.
How this system of mental objects connects individuals within its greater social system is a matter
of psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, sociology, history, biology, chemistry, and physics.
Again, resemblance plays no role in this sense of relation.
Definition 1(d): Sameness o f Kind. Figure 4 and Table 23 concern the relation of being
the same kind by virtue o f an aspect, quality, or resemblance. To be of the same kind, objects must
have common parts or properties. Figure 4 outlines the outcome of a process o f observation,
definition, and description o f the system S(s)t from which common characteristics of individual
objects are determined and compared. However, no extensive comparative analysis is completed to
identify exclusive parts or properties o f these objects. From the perspective and scale of

69

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 3. Schematic of a Starter Motor to Illustrate Parts that Work Together.

Table 22. Relation Definition 1(c): An aspect or quality (as resemblance) that connects
two or more things or parts as working together.
G e n e ra l R e la tio n s

1" R e la tu m
D efinition

•th in g

1.

•p art

is connected to
2 . is together w /
3. w orks together w/

V* R e la tu m
•filing
• p a rt

Specific R e la tio n s
1.

S ta te m e n t

aspect
2 . quality
3. resem blance

Parts collection 1 ...

... is connected by bolts to ...

... parts collection 2 .

Parts collection 1 ...

... w orks together w ith ...

... parts collection 2 .

observation when normally reading a printed page, we compare objects in Figure 4 and see that s2,
s2, and s3are identical and so are ct and c2. Each individual of the respective sets obviously differs
from others in both the space it occupies and elements that compose it. Further, if we were to
magnify the page, we would see minor variances between the objects such as pocks along the
surface of the lines. Nonetheless, we can assert that S j, s2, and s3 are of the same kind by virtue of
their (i) material composition, which is ink; (ii) substrate, which is paper; (ii) shape, which is partly
circular, (iv) parts, which include one circle and eight lines per individual; (v) properties of the
lines, which include their size, shape, and direction; and (vi) properties of the ink constituting each
object, which includes reflectivity of light and the subsequent sensation of olive greenness in
humans. So, the objects are connected by an act of comparison that considers aspects, qualities, or
resemblance o f individual objects. In this case, nothing actually connects the objects to make them
of the same kind. But they are connected historically by way of a common origin, which is an
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Figure 4. Characterization of a Factual System that Corresponds to Definition 1(d).
V e rb a l D efinitions o f
A b stra c te d P e rc e p ts

S(s), =df < s „ c , , s „ c , , s 3>

c
s

s,
s2
s3
D escriptions

=it horizontal line that connects O bjects s „ s2, s3 in S(s),
= * a sun shaped object generated by a hum an through a hum an constructed com puter
=m an s occupying the left hand position o f system Sfs),
=dc an s occupying the m iddle position o f system Sfs) ,
=jf an s occupying the right hand position o f system Sfs),

Overall:

a physical system generated by a hum an through a hum an constructed com puter
system and occurring either on a m onitor or printed page.
Composition: three sun shaped objects connected by two dashes
Environment: a rectangle divided by wavy lines.
Structure:
< sJy c, , s# c2, s}>
Mechanism: on a printed page, internal, m olecular/atom ic physical processes that resist external
inputs; i.e., cause the printed objects to endure.
s:
a circular, olive green object with a perim eter divided into 8 equal segm ents by 8
short lines that extend outward from the perimeter.
c:
a horizontal, olive green line positioned betw een two s ’s.

D esignation

Sj

Cj

$2

C2

Sj

i

i

i

i

I

»

A b stra c tio n o f P e rc e p ts

\

(rep re sen tatio n )

•»
\

i

/

/

P e rc e p t o f F a c tu a l System
(representation)

n m
F a c tu a l S ystem s

Table 23. Relation Definition Id: An aspect or quality (as resemblance) that connects
two or more things or parts as being of the same kind.
1" R e la tu m
D efinition

G e n e ra l R elation

•th in g

sam e kind

•th in g

• part

Specific R elation

•p a rt

1.

S ta te m e n t

2** R e la tu m

O b jects,...

aspect
2 . quality
3. resemblance
... is the sam e kind as ...
... object s2.

O b jects,...
... is a circular object with a perim eter
divided into 8 equal segments by 8 short
lines and these sam e parts are possessed b y ...

... o b j e c ts ,.
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algorithm/design proximately in a printer, intermediately in a computer, and ultimately in a human
mind (Fig. 5). To note, organisms can be compared on the basis o f similarities and grouped into
species or distinguished on the basis of differences and these groupings may or may not correspond
to ancestral lines, as molecular biologists have shown through DNA analysis of such species as
dimorphic yeasts for which similarity/difference of form was originally used to separate species
(Guarro, 1999).
Definition 2: Comparative Relations. Figure 6 and Table 24 concern relations between
ordered pairs of objects (e.g., ‘is equal to’, ‘is less than’, or ‘is the brother o f ) by virtue of a
property that holds between those objects. The explication/explanation of comparative relations
outlined for Definition Id holds for Definition 2, with the exception of ‘brother o f. This relation
needs a closer look.
Definition 2 specifies ordered pairs o f objects. Certainly, we could physically line up two
actual brothers and order names in a written or spoken sentence or a proposition such as ‘Jacob is
the brother of Wilhelm’. Such are our artefactual creations. However, when we assert a relation of
brotherhood, we can mean something entirely different from such ordered pairs. That is, we refer to
two individuals who have a common origin or a particular social bond that keeps them together as
family or friends. More specifically, a human individual, although unique, is connected to its
parents by way of its genetic constituents obtained from the father’s sperm and mother’s egg and
these determine an individual’s fundamental identity. The connection between brothers is by way of
germ tissue of each parent. In this sense, ‘brotherhood’ refers to the common origin o f two
individuals. A comparative relation can also be constructed by analyzing gene sequences o f each
individual. If left at that, the relation is just comparative but we know that the similarity points
back to common physical sources and reproductive processes. In contrast, the sense of brotherhood
as a social bond is an emotionally and rationally mediated process or situation. As such, the source
of the connection is internal/mental but necessarily connected to the external by perceptual and
other physical processes (acts). How the bond of brotherhood connects can be considered to be, in
a limited way, like a field, such as a gravitational field. They are invisible but operate in a way that
attracts or binds.
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Figure 5. Relation of Common Origin.
P ro d u c t

O rig in /P ro cess
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i
C o m p u te r
C ode
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i
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I

I
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Legend: I - time; - = determines; 1 = reference relation.

Figure 6. Characterization of a Factual System that Corresponds to Definition 2.
V e rb a l D efinitions o f
A b stra c te d P e rc e p ts

S(s) = * a system o f sun shaped objects connected by dashes that w ere generated
by a hum an through a hum an constructed computer.
S (i\ ^ the system o f sun shaped objects and dashes that occupies the left
position w ithin the w avy m edium below.
S(s ) 2 =df the system o f sun shaped objects and dashes that occupies t the right
position within the wavy m edium below.

D esignation

Sfs),

S(s)3

1

1

1

I

i

1

A b stra c tio n o f P e rc e p ts
(representation)

P e rc e p t o f F a c tu a l S ystem
(rep re sen tatio n )

F a c tu a l S ystem s

Table 24. Relation Definition 2: A property that holds between an ordered pair of
objects (as one expressed by ‘is equal to%‘is less than’, or ‘is the brother or).
R elatio n s

1" R e la tu m
D efinition

property o f object x,

S tatem en t

The num ber o f objects in
system Sfs),...

1"

1.

holds between
2 . is equal to
2 . is less than
2 . is the brother o f
... is equal to...

2“*R e la tu m
property o f object x 2

... the num ber o f objects in system

1" R e la tu m T erm

R e la tio n al T erm

Y* R e la tu m T erm

S(s),

equality

S(s)2

R elatio n al P e rc e p t

V* R e la tu m P e rc e p t

R e la tu m P e rc e p t *

(rep re sen tatio n )

(rep re sen tatio n )

(none relative to assertion)
1" R e la tu m F a c t

F a c tu a l R e la tio n /C o n n ecto r

(representation)

Y* R e la tu m F a c t
(representation)

(none relative to assertion)
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S(s)2

Table 25. Relational and Relevance Statements based on M-W’s Definition of‘Relation’.
Def

Relational Statement

Relevance Statement
• O bject

s, is relevant to object s2.

• Object s, w ithin system S(s)and constructed to rem ain together as assembled,
belongs together with object s2.

• O bject

s, is relevant to object s2.

lc :

• Parts collection 1 is connected by bolts to parts collection 2.
• Parts collection 1 w orks together w ith parts collection 2.

• Collection 1 is relevant to collection 2.

Id:

• O bject s, is the sam e kind as object s2.
• O bject s, is a circular object with a perim eter divided into 8 equal segm ents by
8 short lines and these sam e parts are possessed by object s2.

•O b je c t

S/ is relevant to object s2.

• System

Sfs), is relevant to system S fs)2.

la:

• Object -Sj-is connected by dash

lb :

2

:

Legend::

<7

• The num ber o f objects in system
system 5 (s}2.

to object s2.

Sfs)/ is equal to the num ber o f objects in

s = *

The Meaning o f ‘Relevance ’ Based on the Definition o f ‘Relation ’.T o conclude this sub
section, we need to construct relational statements based on Merriam-Webster’s definition of
‘relation’ and examine them (Table 25). For example, using the symbols from the previous Figures
and Tables, the statement ‘Object s2 is connected by dash ct to object s2' would be converted to
‘Object s{ is relevant to object s2.' This and the other relevance statements in Table 25 do not sound
right, at least to me. But such an intuition provides no reason to end the analysis. Concerning la,
why an object like a ‘*>’ is relevant to another such object just because it is related or connected to
it by a dash is not apparent. The same question can be asked in relation to statements based on
Definitions lc, Id, and 2, which concern the working relations of parts within a starter motor,
sameness of kind, and equality, respectively. Concerning lb, when we ask why one ‘<*’ belongs
together with another

it is clear that they belong together because I constructed them to meet a

particular purpose. This suggests that relations between such abiotic objects, which are non
significant in themselves, are not relevant to each other just because they are associated. Rather,
their association is relevant to an object o f significance through acts relevant, for example, to a
purpose. Similarly, the statements related to Definitions la, lc, Id, and 2 could be altered to
connect them to a purpose, problem statement, or question such as what is the nature o f Sfs), what
are the similarities/differences between Sfs) t and Sfs)2, and why does the engine of my car turn
over? The central problem here concerns the relations between the classes ‘relevance’ and
‘relation’; specifically, whether they overlap partially or completely. The relation between these
two terms will be discussed at length in Section 6.1.
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4.5 Summary and Conclusion
Dictionaries provide a crucial source o f data to answer the historical question concerning
the meaning o f ‘relevance.’ Because they provide both definitions and a sample o f historical
statements and define all terms, dictionaries allow a rigorous semantic analysis that cannot be
completed through other sources. Despite their advantages, dictionaries create a number o f
obstacles. Their definitions o f ‘relevance’ terms are unsystematic, imprecise, and variable. Hence,
definitional activity from a variety of disciplines has flourished over the last 50 years. Overcoming
these problems requires collecting, analysing, and evaluating both definitions and statements.
Further, referent systems should be modelled, which requires examining at least two sets o f relata
terms and a set of relational terms. Such referents include factual or conceptual objects and
comparative or non-comparative relations, respectively. Various combinations o f factual and
conceptual objects and different relations o f various directions are possible. By examining a variety
of statements and definitions in these respects, the basic concept o f relevance can be identified.
Such a concept is the most general characterization o f all relevance definitions and statements.
Given my analysis and evaluation o f definitions sampled from dictionaries o f Old Scots
and English, the basic concept predominantly assigned to ‘relevance’ terms has been ‘relation of
significance’. Although the examples largely concern humans or objects significant to humans, I
suggest that significance is a function of an organism. (See Sections 6.14 and 7.3.) Extending the
analysis and evaluation to ancient Greek and Latin terms reveals a similar pattern of usage and the
same basic concept. However, some dictionary definitions are not definite in designating the basic
concept and their expressions open the door to relevance being any relation. This is an important
issue to resolve because it determines the class of objects to which a general theory o f relevance
would refer and from which evidence would be obtained. That is, as one delimits relevance
differently, the general theory o f relevance must change. So, the stability and utility of a general
theoiy of relevance depend on the stability and precision of its generic definition. Nonetheless, any
term can be assigned different meanings, as codes, stipulations, and ironic use of terms indicate.
This means that we do not necessarily need to follow previous conventions. However, I suggest
that historical convention can have a role to play particularly if a term is solidly grounded in a
language, has a predominant sense, and suits communication purposes. In any event, we must
decide which definition best suits our purposes and helps solve related problems. These issues and
tests will be further addressed in the remaining sections o f my thesis.
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5.0 Analysis and Evaluation of Generic and Specific Definitions of ‘Relevance*
Both Mario Bunge (1974, 2003) and David Hitchcock (1992) have developed generic
conceptions of relevance (as expressed by a generic definition) and divided relevance into types. By
‘generic’, I mean the most general sense of a concept that includes all types and instances of that
concept. Because a generic definition must be representative of all types and instances, it is similar
to a factual generalization or biological class. My purpose in this chapter is to outline both
accounts in detail, expand upon them, suggest revisions, identify issues that need more extensive
treatment, and contrast Bunge’s with Hitchcock’s account. In Chapter 7 ,1 will summarize the main
findings and integrate them with others from previous chapters.

5.1 Bunge’s Generic Definition of ‘Relevance’
Bunge’s (1974; 2003) defines a generic sense o f relevance as follows:
(B,)

Relevance is a relation and its relata can be either constructs or facts (1974: 75).

(B2)

Object A is relevant to object B if A makes some difference to B, or B depends on A. Relevance
relates facts, constructs, or constructs and facts. Examples: Biology is conceptually relevant to
psychology (C-C); the economy is factually relevant to politics (F-F); light is referentially
relevant to optics (F-C); economic theory ought to be pragmatically relevant to business (C-F)
(2003:249).

The two definitions express essentially the same basic concept. In Bunge (1974), he expands on 2?,
by defining the same types of relevance relations as included in B2. Central to these definitions is
the distinction between constructs and facts, which for Bunge are mental representations (concepts
and propositions) and all other objects, respectively. He makes the distinction because the two
types of objects are as fundamentally different as a copy and original are. The distinction is both
ontological and epistemic because it concerns the nature of objects where the representational
object is a means o f knowing and the fact is the object known.
Two minor differences occur between the two definitions. First, Bunge uses the term
‘relation’ in Bh whereas in B2 he uses the slightly more specific relational terms ‘makes some
difference’ and ‘depends on’. Whether these two sets of relations completely overlap or not is not
entirely clear. However, I have not undertaken the lengthy analysis that would be required to sort
out their relations. Second, Bunge uses ‘relation’ in B} and ‘relates’ in B2.1 suggest B2 should be
revised to avoid implying the potentially misleading active sense of ‘relates’. The wording is
significant because ‘relevance’, in the sense used, refers to a conceptual object and Bunge (1977)
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maintains that only physical things have causal efficacy. Based on the analyses presented in
Chapter 4 ,1 suggest that the role of the term ‘relevance’ is not to relate objects but to indicate a
relation, which gives it primarily a referential role and necessitates inclusion o f cognitive process
into its conception. Accordingly, I suggest revising Bunge’s definition to read: ‘Relevance
assertions indicate relations between facts, constructs, or constructs and facts.’

5.2 Bunge’s Specific Definitions of ‘Relevance’
Bunge (1974; 75) divides ‘relevance’ into six main types, which correspond to various
combinations of fact/concept relations. Further, he defines each type systematically, begins with
the most basic definitions, and provides examples for some types. The following subsections
present his definitions and examples, which are tabulated so that their structure and composition
are clearly depicted. However, absent from Bunge’s account are detailed models/analyses of the
examples and explanations why the examples are relevance relations. This weakens his account
because we need to work from the ground up to build a general theory that adequately represents
relevance relations and we cannot do that when the relations between objects are not evident.
Analogously, we could be told that a compound is composed entirely o f carbon. However, without
knowing the nature of relations between the atoms, which reveal connections and structure, we
cannot tell if the compound is graphite, coal, or diamond. Further, any theory o f such a compound
would be incomplete. Finally, if we accept that relevance is best defined as a relation of
significance, this notion will have to be worked into Bunge’s account. Accordingly, I have done so
and offered revisions to the account.
Bunge distinguishes between two kinds of conceptual relevance: formal/syntactical and
semantical.
Formal or Syntactical Relevance: Construct c is syntactically relevant to construct c ’ iff there is a
context in which c is logically related to c ’ so that c determines c ’ at least in part. (76.2)
• In a definition, the definiens is syntactically relevant to the definiendum.
• In an argument, the premises are syntactically relevant to the conclusions.

• In a function, the independent variables are syntactically relevant to the dependent variables.
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Examples of Syntactical Relevance
C o n tex t

1" R e la tu m

R elation

2** R e la tu m

c

• logical
• determination
• relevance

c’

D efinition

Defm iens

*<->

D efiniendum

A rg u m e n t

Prem ises

a->

Conclusions

F un ctio n *

Independent Variable

*->

D ependent Variable

(F a c tu a l R e search )

Pure M athem atics

*<_>

Science

S olid S ta te T h e o ry

M etal

*•->

C onductor

S y n tactic Irrelev an ce
O rn ith o lo g y

Black

Raven

* W hen functions have an inverse, the relevance is mutual. ( ) contains an assum ed object.

Bunge does not explain any of his examples and, despite numerous attempts, I am unable
to work out a number o f issues that arise. Doing so requires (i) working through his account of
semantics, which is quite difficult, labourious, and time consuming, (ii) determining what he means
by ‘logical’, ‘formal’, and ‘syntactical’, and (iii) determining what he has in mind with the relata
mentioned and their relations. To illustrate, I will identify three issues that concern the relevance of
a defmiens to a definiendum. First, when Bunge mentions a construct like ‘deflniendum’, is he
referring just to the concept of definiendum, or any concept that is designated by a term functioning
as a definiendum, or both? Second, when constructing a new term, a cognitive act o f designation
determines the term’s referent and from familiarity with that referent we are able to construct a
definition. Further, continued acts accepting and communicating the initial designation and/or
definition or acts o f inscribing plus the endurance of that inscription maintain the designation
and/or definition. So, one construct does not determine the other but rather various acts and factual
conditions determine them and their relations. Third, a definiendum (term) must be conceptually
equivalent to the defmiens (terms o f the definition), as the bidirectional relational term ‘iff attests.
So, how does a term determine other terms equivalent to it or, where A=A, how does A determine
A? We also need to work through the other examples of syntactic relevance, ask similar questions,
and develop detailed models of the various systems involved in a relevance statement.
Semantical Relevance: Construct c is semantically relevant to construct c ’ iff (i) c is syntactically
relevant to c ' and (ii) c and c ' share referents (31); i.e., 3t(c)n3t(c’) * 0. (76.3)
• The specific gravity function is relevant to the weight function.
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• Let c concern a gene in an organism and c’ a molar or phenotypical trait o f the same
organism. Then c will be semantically relevant to c’ just in case genetics happens to contain a
law according to which c determines c' at least in part.
• The biological variables are irrelevant to the psychological ones in the context of
behaviorism.
E xam ples o f S em antical R elevance
* (c)

n

S ( c ’)

P hysics

Specific gravity function

»_>

W eight function

G enetics

Organ ismic gene

*->

Phenotypic trait

Solid S ta te T h e o ry

Metal

*->

Conductor

C o n tex t

P re su m p tio n

A gene is lawfully related to a trait.

Bunge does not explain how these examples are semantically relevant, which just increases
the puzzlement, at least for me. Also, if we accept relevance as a relation o f significance, the issue
to resolve is whether or not a semantic relation is derivatively a relation o f significance, as was
discussed with an example in the Cambridge Dictionary concerning a leaflet and an information
need (Table 18). For it to be a relation of significance, the direction of the relevance relation must
be to a concept that derives its relevance from an object of significance, which would be a human.
However, an explanation would be required to show how that would occur. A simplified model
would be: (c M‘—> c’) R'-> Context. Otherwise, a semantic relation o f non-significance between two
objects could be relevant to a problem; i.e., (c s—> c’) R'-> Context/Problem. Specifically, the issue
is whether or not the concept ‘gene’ is relevant to the concept ‘phenotypic trait’ within the context
of genetics or whether the two concepts are semantically related and relevant/significant to a
problem in genetics. In any case, Bunge’s definition clearly shows that semantic relations are a
function of referent relations.
Bunge develops a general notion of referential relevance and the following examples.
Referential Relevance - General Concept. A construct c is said to be referentially relevant to a
fact (thing, state, event, process) / i f f f i s in the reference class o f c, i.e. i f / e 31 (c).
• Pure mathematics is syntactically relevant to science, which is in turn referentially relevant
to reality.
• According to the Copenhagen interpretation o f the quantum theories, the latter are relevant
to the human mind, while according to the realist interpretation they are not.
• The concept of thinking (or ideation) is referentially relevant to neural activity.
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Examples o f Referential Relevance

c

C o n tex t

/

Science

Reality

(Psychology)

Thinking/Ideation

N eural A ctivity

Copenhagen Interpretation
o f Quantum Theory

Quantum Theories

R ealist Interpretation

Q uantum Theories

(Factual R esearch)

* ->

H um an M ind

H um an M ind

() contains an assum ed object.

Bunge defines ‘referential relevance’ in terms of a construct (concept/concept system)
being relevant to a fact, provided that the fact is a member of the construct’s reference class.
Again, the issue to examine is whether or not the referential relation is a relation of significance.
Key to this issue is the direction of the relation, which Bunge indicates is c R,-> f In other words,
his claim is that a construct is relevant or connected/significant to a fact. Specifically, he claims
that science is relevant to reality because science refers to reality. In contrast, by conceiving of
relevance as a relation of significance, reality would be relevant to science because science is an
activity of humans and reality is the object of scientific study. Similarly, Bunge (2003), by way of
the definition in his dictionary, would claim that science makes a difference to reality or reality
depends on science. Certainly, reality does not depend on science but whether and how science
makes a difference to reality must be ascertained. Here we are hindered because Bunge does not
define ‘makes a difference’. Some o f his examples o f referential relevance might contain a second
term whose referent is derivatively significant. For example, Bunge claims that the concept of
thinking/ideation is relevant to neural activity. No doubt, the concept of thinking/ideation refers to
the fact of neural activity and, hence, is connected by way of designation, which occurs by way of
a cognitive act. But why is such a conceptual object significant to neural activity itself? What
significance does neural activity have in itself that determines whether the concept is relevant to it?
I suggest that, in the context o f the example, (i) it either has no significance in itself, which means
referential relations are not relations of significance or (ii) it is derivatively significant, which
means referential relations are derivatively relations o f significance. Otherwise, the connection
established between a construct and a fact through a cognitive act of designation is significant to a
cognitive goal of a significant object, like a human. That is, (c Rf-> / ) *-> G, where G is a human
being’s goal. Conceived as such, the structure of a relevance statement is similar to that outlined by
Hitchcock (1992), as discussed in the next section. However, unlike Hitchcock, I prefer the concept
so
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of system to situation, emphasise that the first relatum can be a system of varying complexity, and
advocate detailed analysis/evaluation to model relations and separate significance from non
significance relations.
Bunge’s definition and examples o f ‘evidential relevance’ are as follows:
Evidential Relevance: An empirical fact e is evidentially relevant to a construct c iff
there is another construct c’ such that (i) c’ is syntactically relevant to c and (ii) c’ is
referentially relevant to e.
• The conceptual basis of the common lie detector is the hypothesis that increase in hand
sweating is an index of lying.
• Dreams are (so far) irrelevant to the study of personality because there is no scientific theory
in which dream contents and personality traits are related.
• Prior to the theory of evolution the differences among species were not normally regarded as
pointing to (or against) the hypothesis of evolution.
E xam ples o f E vidential R elevance
C o n tex t

c

e

(Law/Psychology)

H ypothesis that increase in hand
sw eating is an index o f lying

<J
V->

Lie detector results

A bsence o f scientific theoiy
linking dream s to personality

Study o f personality

<J
V->

Dreams*

Prior to evolutionary theory

H ypothesis o f evolution

Differences am ong species **

V->
* Not as of date of publication. ** Not normally regarded as relevant at that time.

Bunge’s examples are presented in written form and are not structured to indicate clearly which
elements of the statements correspond to c and c’. For example, he writes, “The conceptual basis
of the common lie detector is the hypothesis that increase in hand sweating is an index of lying”
(77.6). Despite the precise definition, the examples are vague, which leaves us with little to develop
a theory of relevance.
Bunge (1974; 76.1) provides only a definition o f ‘pragmatic relevance’.
Pragmatic Relevance: ...a construct may be regarded as being pragmatically relevant to an action
iff the former is part of a view or theory that is instrumental in bringing forth or preventing the
given action.

O f importance here is the direction of the relation, which is c R'-> f where c c T and T d-> f.
Bunge (1974) does not provide any examples but he does in his dictionary (2003: 249), where he
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writes “economic theory ought to be pragmatically relevant to business”. This is a very general
statement and analysing it helps to understand the relevance relations asserted. Business is a goal,
problem, and activity of human beings. The former two are conceptual objects but the latter is a
factual object/process. So, the pragmatic relevance relation is between economic theory and
humans engaged in business activity (c R'-> f), both of which are objects o f significance given that
they are human constructs. Also of importance to Bunge’s definition is that pragmatic relevance
requires completion of an act. So, his conception excludes contemplation of means and ends
relations, where ends are not acts themselves but representations of future acts or states. Again, we
need to inventory such relational statements and model the referent systems to arrive at a
representative definition of pragmatic relevance.
Bunge (1974) provides only a definition of ‘factual relevance’.
Factual Relevance... a fact may be relevant to another feet iff the former makes some difference
to the latter (1974: 76.1) or the latter depends on the former (2003:249).
Even though Bunge (2003) cites the example of the economy being factually relevant to politics,
which concerns relations of significance, the above definition opens the possibility of any fact being
relevant to any other fact. This issue will be addressed specifically in Section 6.1.

S3 Hitchcock’s Generic Definition of ‘Relevance’
Hitchcock (1992) also outlines a generic sennse of ‘relevance’. He distinguishes between
relevance relations that are dyadic and triadic and formulates a definition only for the latter. I will
focus largely on this definition, as follows, but will also discuss his account of dyadic relations.
Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation (251.1)
He explains that he prefers the term ‘situation’ over ‘context’ because the latter is often associated
with text, whereas ‘situation’ concerns “the complex of antecedent and contemporary
circumstances in which the item which is relevant or irrelevant and the item to which it is relevant
or irrelevant occur”(266.4). As this statement is formulated, a situation does not necessarily play a
determinant role. He explains further that not all antecedent conditions “make a difference” to the
relevance of one item to another and that a person “will specify a situation by mentioning only its
features which do make a difference to the relevance relation between the items under discussion”
(266.4). As formulated, the situation comprises all antecedent conditions but the situation specified
82
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for a relevance statement comprises only those conditions that make a difference. The latter
requires a judgment to determine the relevance of those conditions to the two relata. Hitchcock then
maintains that we should generally treat relevance as a triadic relation and explains how:
"...we should treat relevance generally as a triadic relation, whose third term is the
situation in which the first term is relevant to the second term, and acknowledge that
there will be values of the first two terms for which the value of the third term makes no
difference to whether the first is relevant to the second. For example: the fact that ice
cream was invented in Italy is irrelevant to proving the Pythagorean theorem, regardless
of the situation in which someone is attempting the proof. (252.1)
I suggest that this recommendation is problematic. First, ‘situation’ is defined
ambiguously. In the recommendation, the sense employed is that of ‘the complex antecedent and
contemporary circumstances’, where no condition is determinant. However, the recommendation
applies to the formulation of a relevance statement and it breaks the rule that requires specifying
only determinant conditions. Second, if no antecedent condition has a determinant role, then no
such condition is relevant to a dyadic relation. Accordingly, how and why would anyone bother to
identify irrelevant conditions? Imposing this requirement would unnecessarily complicate the
modelling o f referent systems. Third, treating a dyadic relation as a triadic relation with non
determinant/irrelevant antecedent conditions does not make any sense in the context of developing a
theory o f relevance because it is an exercise of irrelevance with the appearance o f being relevant.
Also, we ought to be sure to inventory dyadic relations and analyse and describe them as they are,
provided we want to develop a representative general theory of relevance. Fourth, despite the
recommendation, Hitchcock outlines two examples that he offers as dyadic relevance relations:
(i) “...the size of the population from which a sample has been (quasi-randomly) selected
is...relevant to determining whether sampling without replacement introduces substantial bias
into the selection method”
(ii) “...student demands in the 1960's for ‘relevant courses’ were indeterminate, since
they did not specify what the courses should be relevant to” (251.4).
However, the first example is a case of a triadic relation where population size is relevant to the
determination o f bias within the situation of a quasi-random selection process. The second example
might also be a case of a triadic relation if the claim was ‘courses ought to be relevant to y within
the situation of university education or some programs within universities’ as opposed to college or
professional programs. So, what we need to do is inventory relevance relations that are considered
to be dyadic, where any inventory is determined by the definition o f ‘relevance’. That is, where
83
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delimitations vary between definitions so would reference classes and inventoried instances. With
any such inventory, we then need to analyse instances and model the referent systems to determine
if the statements actually represent dyadic relations.

5.4 Hitchcock’s Specific Definitions of ‘Relevance’
Hitchcock identifies two types of 2nd relata (outcome and goal) that correspond to two
main types o f relevance (causal and epistemic). He defines ‘causal relevance’ as follows:
(CR)

“...something is relevant to an outcome in a given situation if it helps to cause that
outcome in the situation, irrelevant if it is o f no help” (253.4).

Here, ‘relevance’ is associated with the relational term ‘helps’, which is similar to Bunge’s term
‘makes a difference’. However, Hitchcock allows that propositions or their expression cause beliefs
(254.2f), whereas Bunge holds that they are employed within cognitive processes that formulate
beliefs (2001; 79). Hitchcock provides but does not discuss two examples that concern causal
relevance. Unfortunately, they are both examples of irrelevance so the nature o f relevance relations
cannot be shown directly. The examples are of (i) salt change in a diet being likely irrelevant to
reducing blood pressure for people with normal salt metabolism and (ii) intellectuals not being a
relevant factor in the Polish government’s decision to experiment with a negotiation process after a
strike on Aug 14 (253.4). Hitchcock does not model these examples or identify which elements
correspond to the situation or the two terms. Figure 7 provides this information to assist in
understanding the relations involved. I discuss them in detail because they provide useful
information about relevance.
The first example concerns (i) three factual parameters: salt intake, salt metabolism, and
blood pressure and (ii) a comparison between at least three situations (three salt intake regimes for
at least one person who normally metabolizes salt), despite the apparent wording and grammatical
structure of the example, which, again, attests to the importance of getting beyond expression or
linguistic structure to explore the system of referents that the expression represents. Three trials are
needed to account for the possibility that the baseline conditions might already be at the threshold
o f influence on blood pressure, which would yield a ‘no influence’ result when salt intake is
increased. The following provides three models o f the experiment to represent the three situations
identified above and a general/non-specific model of the experiment. Where ‘- > ’ represents a break
in a series of events and the word groupings name cumulative stages of the series:
84
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S,: Salt Intake Level 1 (Baseline) -> Normal Metabolism of Person p; -> Blood Pressure Value P(b).
Sj. Salt Intake Level 2 (Increase) -> Normal Metabolism of Person p, -> Blood Pressure Value P(b).
S3: Salt Intake Level 3 (Decrease) -> Normal Metabolism of Person p, -> Blood Pressure Value P(b).
S„:

Salt Intake Level / -> Metabolism m of Person p„

-> Blood Pressure Value P(b).

This description of the actual occurrence o f the event, which is a model of the referent system, is at
variance with the model of the relevance relation as structured by a linguistic expression within the
context of a particular conception o f relevance, as shown in Figure 7. Again, relevance relations
ought to be modelled on the basis o f referent systems, which is what the linguistic expression has
been constructed to represent. Further, assuming the factual correctness o f the claim about salt
intake, the following relevance statements can be constructed:
1. Changing salt intake is irrelevant to medical interventions aimed at reducing blood pressure in
a person who normally metabolizes salt because salt intake has no effect on the blood pressure of
such a person.
2. Changing salt intake is relevant to medical interventions aimed at reducing blood pressure in a
person who abnormally metabolizes salt because salt intake affects the blood pressure of such a
person.

These statements also show the structure o f a well-formed relevance formula. It includes
the specification of relevance relations and the system o f referents that determines and justifies the
relevance assertion. Without the latter, the understanding and evaluation o f relevance terminates in
either intuition, which is unrevealing, or an unanswered ‘why’ question in response to the relevance
claim. More specifically, if salt intake increases blood pressure, then salt intake is a possible
medical intervention and is relevant to the goal of reducing blood pressure, which is connected to
an individual’s goal of maintaining health. The frames of relevance operate in the reverse order.
Further, multiple and hierarchic frames of relevance can operate in a given case (e.g., land-use or
technological plans based on multiple goals, objectives, prescriptions, etc.), which again attests to
the importance o f system in understanding, modelling, and evaluating relevance statements. In
contrast, Hitchcock understands the example to be purely a case of causal relevance where the
outcome is a fact, which Bunge calls factual relevance. Even if the case were purely factual, it is
not clear why the relation of salt intake would be relevant to blood pressure given abnormal
metabolism. It is clear that high blood pressure is linked to health status and both are o f concern to
human individuals. If a relevance statement did not contain such a concern, any factual
85
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Figure 7. Models of Hitchcock’s Examples of Causal Relevance.
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association, such as the association of NaCl in distilled water, would be a relevance relation.
Again, this issue will be explored in detail in Section 6.1.
The second example concerns the lack of influence of intellectuals on governmental
decisions after a strike (Fig. 7 ii). A strike is a social occurrence that creates (i) a social change,
which includes factual relations involving beings of significance, and (ii) a demand for further,
future change, which is a complex o f conceptual relations and the possibility of future factual
relations. Apparently, the Polish government needed to respond to the strike (both facts) but did not
consider ‘input’ from intellectuals either because no information was provided or it was ruled out
as irrelevant. ‘Input’ and ‘information’ are synonyms that refer to conceptual objects. The example
actually involves other objects, and their relations are more complex than Hitchcock indicates and
Figure 7 shows. The initial frame of relevance is created by the strike, which is a complex of
factual and conceptual relations created by human individuals. Essentially, the strike is a plea of
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relevance - a raising up o f concerns that individuals consider to be worthy of governmental
attention. Additionally, the strike is observed by the government. By such an act, they establish an
evidential relation between the strike and their potential decisions. Also, the government interprets
the information, which creates a further frame of relevance and a complex of conceptual relations.
Finally, the government decides on the basis o f the selected information and the act of negotiation
is initiated, which is a complex o f conceptual and factual relations o f pragmatic relevance. Now,
the strike is relevant to the act of negotiation because the strike helped to cause the government’s
action (conceived as factual relations of non-significance) because Hitchcock defined relevance that
way. Given such a conception, an avalanche would be relevant to a boulder when it transports the
boulder from its location on an upper slope to the valley bottom. In contrast, conceiving relevance
as a relation of significance, as I recommend, the strike is an act o f a being o f significance and it is
noticed, interpreted, and acted upon by other such beings.
The second main type o f relevance relation that Hitchcock identifies is epistemic relevance:
(ER)

An item of information x is relevant to an epistemic goal y in a given situation if and only if in
that situation x can be put together with other pieces of at least potentially accurate information
to arrive at the epistemic goal, provided that the other pieces of information are not sufficient by
themselves to achieve the epistemic goal if the original information is inaccurate. (257.4)

He explains that, when the goal is knowledge, reasonable belief, or reasonable behaviour, a
statement may help to cause acceptance or settlement but it may not be or ought not to be o f logical
or justificatory help in the acceptance or settlement of the issue (253.6; 254.1). He also notes that
such a relevance judgment requires criteria (254.2). In positive terms, he indicates that an
epistemically relevant item makes a contribution to an epistemic goal, when that item is recognized
(254.3f). In support of this point, Hitchcock provides an example from a Sherlock Holmes’ novel
where a dog in a stable did not bark when a horse, Silver Blaze, was stolen during the night.
Hitchcock explains that this fact is both causally and epistemically relevant to Holmes’ goal of
discovering who stole the horse. But the fact had no effect on the inspector until Holmes pointed
out its relevance (254.3f).
Generalizing, Hitchcock indicates that the first or subject term of a relevance statement is a
piece of information such as a proposition (the dog did not bark), a propositional function (whether
or not the dog barked), or a speech act communicating or requesting information (256.1). A piece
of information is conceptual, as are propositions and propositional functions. But a speech act is
neither informational nor conceptual. For non-informational objects, he maintains that “we leave
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the relation of relevance undefined; it simply makes no sense to ask whether Dr. Watson (or
London, or 1890) is relevant to determining who stole Silver Blaze” (256.1). Perhaps Dr. Watson
could not have stolen the horse and certainly a city or a date has no active agency to steal. But
factual objects must be taken into consideration in modelling epistemic relevance, even if epistemic
relevance involves judgments and is limited to conceptual relations. First, Hitchcock uses (factual)
propositions in his examples (state of a dog), and propositions are representations o f factual
objects. Second, without modelling referential and evidential relations and referent relations, the
account of epistemic relevance would be incomplete.
Hitchcock also discusses the second term of a relevance statement, which is an epistemic
goal: an issue to be settled, a question to be answered, a problem to be solved, or a decision to be
made. He maintains that such a goal is epistemic, not causal, because a person can combine it
ineliminably with other information in a thought process to arrive at the goal. Further, he indicates
that an epistemic goal is always the goal of a particular individual or group of individuals on a
particular occasion (256.2f). However, he does not consider a person or group to be a fourth term
(257.1) because mere difference of individuals are irrelevant to the presence or absence o f a
relevance relation and the differences between individuals can be represented by the situation
(256.3). This account, then, is limited to conceptual relations and it rules out occurrences of
‘stimulus relevance’ studied by psychologists (e.g., Tchakaroff and Haralanovl996). As such, his
overall account does not provide a representative general theory o f relevance.

5.5 Summary and Conclusion
Bunge provides a generic definition o f ‘relevance’, systematically identifies types of
relevance relations, and provides precise definitions of the types. He does so in an ontologically and
epistemically significant way by distinguishing between factual and conceptual objects and the
kinds of relations that occur between them. However, of equal ontological and epistemic
significance, but omitted from Bunge’s account, are mental objects such as memories, perceptions,
and imaginations. To illustrate some of his definitions, Bunge lists examples through very brief
statements but he does not explain why and how they are relevance relations, show how they fit his
definitions, or model the referent systems to which the relevance statements correspond. Rather, he
appeals to our intuitions, expects we have the knowledge to readily understand his examples, gives
us a lot of work to determine why and how the examples are relevance relations, or leaves us in
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obscurity. Further, his generic definition leaves open the possibility that a relevance relation is any
relation, which would make his account of relevance inadequate because it deals only generally
with kinds of relations when we need a more specific identification and description o f types.
Additionally, some specific definitions include relations between factual objects of non
significance, whereas relevance has historically and largely delimited relations that involve objects
of significance. If the definition o f ‘relevance’ as a relation o f significance were to be accepted,
Bunge’s account would need to be re-conceived. Specifically, some o f the definitions he provides
would need to be revised, some examples modelled differently, and some examples omitted.
Whatever its limitations, Bunge provides a useful framework to analyse relevance relations by
distinguishing between mental representational objects (like concepts) and factual objects (like
things). Further, his account is situated within a greater conceptual system. As such, it permits a
greater understanding of relevance, as does a biological taxonomy in understanding a particular
organism.
Hitchcock defines a generic concept of relevance and two main types: causal and
epistemic. His generic definition is structural in that it identifies four elements: two items, a
situation, and a non-specified relation between the two items and the situation. He identifies two
“main” types but his classification is not systematic in that it is not based on an inventory,
description, and classification o f a representative sample of relevance statements. His causal notion
of relevance involves any factual relation and, therefore, includes relations of non-significance. His
epistemic notion of relevance is defined in a way that excludes referent systems and makes his
account purely conceptual, even though he uses factual examples to illustrate the notion, for which
referential/evidential relations must be included, and his notion of situation refers to factual
systems. Further, he outlines the structure of a relevance statement, which can express either a
dyadic or triadic relation. A dyadic relation is composed of two associated objects, whereas a
triadic relation is composed of two associated objects that occur within a situation. However, he
defines relevance only in terms o f triadic relations. Also, he ambiguously defines ‘situation’ to
include either determinant or non-determinant elements and from this he makes a problematic
recommendation to treat relevance generally as a triadic relation, which would introduce irrelevant
considerations into models of dyadic relevance relations and contravene a rule he makes about
specifying a situation only in terms o f determinant factors. The recommendation is also made
without first determining the incidence and relative importance of dyadic relations.
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Hitchcock provides numerous examples but, like Bunge’s, they conform to the definition
because they are constructed by him to do so or they have been constructed by others and happen
to correspond to the definition. Constructing an example to fit a definition runs the risk of
circularity in that it amounts to ‘relevance is jc* because I say ‘relevance is x ’. Nonetheless,
conformity shows that such definitions can generate instances of the conception’s future use
because the example is an instance o f future use. Finding a previously constructed conforming
example gives an indication that the definition fits some previous instances of the concept’s use.
However, a few conforming examples is insufficient to develop a generalization about a generic
concept. Such examples provide information only about that particular set o f examples, whereas a
generic concept must represent all previous instances o f the concept’s use, which is why the
question ‘What is relevance?’ is a historical question and lexicographers describe rather than
prescribe when they construct definitions. Analogously, an archeologist finding a fossilized femur
might be able to determine that it is an instance o f a particular genus o f dinosaur and can describe
details about that particular bone but can say nothing else about the entire individual or species. As
mentioned in Section 3.3, answering the historical question introduces difficult sampling issues.
Hitchcock’s examples are also problematic because they are not sufficiently detailed or modelled, a
non-relation (irrelevance) is used in an attempt to elucidate a relation (relevance), and, upon
analysis, some o f his examples do not conform to the definition o f which they are to be an instance.
Without detailed modelling of both relevance statements and their corresponding referent systems
and positive examples (relevance relations), we are left with intuitively appealing examples that
provide an intuitive account o f relevance. This works only insofar as our intuitions are correct.
However, intuitions provide no public account of relevance and incorrect examples corrupt both
our intuitions and accounts based on them.
Hitchcock discusses relevance under the heading o f ‘ontological status’, whereas Bunge
includes relevance in his account of semantics. However, neither discuss why they make such a
placement. Additionally, both Bunge and Hitchcock say, without elaboration, that relevance is a
relation rather than a particular kind of relation . Further, their definitions of types permits
relevance relations to be relations o f non-significance. The relation between the concepts of
relevance and relation will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter. The main results of
Chapter 5 will be integrated in Chapter 7.
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6.0 Analysis and Evaluation of Issues
The analyses and evaluations o f definitions, accounts, and statements in Chapters 4 and 5
have identified (i) elements that can be incorporated in a general theory of relevance (Chapter 7),
(ii) elements that I suggest ought to be dismissed, (iii) obstacles that hinder the development of
such a theory, and (iv) issues in need of resolution so that a general theory can be developed.
Smaller issues were dealt with as they arose. However, the relation between the notions of
relevance and relation is an issue that occurs in both dictionary definitions and generic accounts o f
relevance and requires extended treatment (Section 6.1). Corresponding issues include identifying
the reference class and, hence, instances to be inventoried. Both need to be resolved prior to
developing a general theory of relevance. In other words, a general theory o f relevance is
determined ultimately by the delimiting function of its definition. Change the definition and the
reference class changes, a different inventory is required, and the general theory must be changed.
The analyses and evaluations o f dictionary definitions in Chapter 4 suggest that relevance
has largely delimited relations of significance. Conceiving of relevance as a relation o f significance
or recognizing that an important class of relevance relations are relations o f significance might be
useful in resolving the issue of whether relevance varies in degree. I discuss this issue in relation to
strength and sufficiency of an argument (Section 6.2).

6.1 Relevance versus Relation
Although dictionaries define ‘relevance’ simply as a relation, the historical account of the
concept and analysis o f dictionary definitions and quotations in Chapter 4 suggest that the precise
notion o f relevance has been limited to relations of significance, which makes relevance a
subcategory of relation. One exception is the 19th century notion of relevance as proportionality or
correspondence. However, it is a distinct notion and would require a separate theory. In contrast to
the notion o f relevance as a relation o f significance, both Bunge (1974) and Hitchcock (1992) say
that relevance is a relation but neither elaborate on that statement despite its ambiguity. This issue
has been touched upon in previous sections but I will examine it here in greater detail.
Asserting that relevance is a relation gives rise to two sets o f interpretations. First,
relevance could refer to the connection between relata (e.g., ‘consumption’ or ‘>’), rather than an
individual relatum, or the entire system. Second, based on the meaning o f ‘is’, either
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(i) the concept of relevance is a subset of the class ‘relation’ (Rv <=Rri) and relevance
statements are translatable to relational statements but not all relational statements are
translatable to relevance statements, or
(ii) the concepts of relevance (Rv) and relation (Rn) are equivalent (Rv = Rri), by which
I mean they are synonyms and interchangeable, as sets they completely overlap, and any
relevance statement is translatable to a relational statement and vice-versa.
Sorting out the overlap between ‘relevance’ and ‘relation’ has implications for Bunge’s definition
of factual relevance, which concerns any fact-fact relation, and for Hitchcock’s definition of causal
relevance, where “something is relevant to an outcome in a given situation if it helps cause that
outcome in the situation” (253.5). We also need to consider whether or not the issue concerning
overlap between ‘relevance’ and ‘relation’ is just a definitional concern that can be addressed by
clarifying conceptual boundaries and consistently using the term, regardless o f whatever overlap is
assigned. Perhaps overlap is not really an issue and we just need to set down a clear and precise
definition and use it consistently. However, making that decision must be addressed within the
context of current/historic usage and the purpose that relevance, as either a relation of significance
or any relation, serves br can serve.

6.1.1 Connection between Relata as the Referent of the Term‘Relevance’
Relevance statements are relational statements, which means that linguistic objects have
been assembled by a cognitive agent to create a conventional form and represent a referent system
composed o f at least two associated objects. At a minimum, a relevance statement must contain at
least three terms: a first relatum, a relational term, and a second relatum. Given that ‘relevance’
does not designate either o f the relata, the issue is whether it designates just a connection, the
referent system, or both. To address the issue, three types of systems and relations between them
must be considered: term/sentence, concept/proposition, and referent. Although the term/sentence
and concept/proposition systems reside in different locations, they have the same representational
function in that they designate the same set of referents. So, in this context, they can be treated
together. As defined in the introduction, I will use ‘statement’ to designate both.
Consider the following statements: (i) ‘Snowshoe hares are relevant to red foxes’ and (ii)
‘Our research objective is to determine the relevance o f snowshoe hares to red foxes.’ As
representations, ‘relevant’ and ‘relevance’ have several functions. First, they indicate a particular
but non-specified relation or potential relation (e.g. consumption) between snowshoe hares (/)) and
red foxes (f2) or a set of non-specified relations (e.g., pathogen transmission and consumption).
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Second, given that the function of the suffix -ance is to indicate a state (Section 4.3.1) and given
that the state cannot be the referent of just one relatum, ‘relevance’ must also refer to the whole
system composed of the two associated objects. Third, the suffix -ant performs an adjectival
function and it superficially appears to describe the first relatum. However, consider the following
statement: ‘Snowshoe hares are relevant/transmit pathogens to red foxes.’ Given that ‘relevant’
indicates the concept and occurrence o f pathogen transmission, if it has an adjectival function, it
must be to describe the state of the predator-prey system by indicating or emphasizing one element
of it, the relation. Fourth, both ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ indicate the direction o f relation between
two objects, which is from the first to the second relatum or f t R'-> f 2. In summary, both ‘relevance’
and ‘relevant’ are highly abstract terms that (i) designate both a non-specified relation or set of
relations between at least two objects as well as the referent system and (ii) the direction of relation
between at least two objects. As a whole, a relevance statement indicates a non-specified relation
and can be replaced with a specific relational statement, which in turn refers to a conceptual or
factual system. Whether or not relevance applies to any factual system is the issue explored next.

6.1.2 Overlap between the Concepts of Relevance and Relation
By previous acts of designation and acceptance, the term ‘relevance’ necessarily indicates
a relation and all relevance statements are relational. However, this does not necessarily mean that
the concepts of relevance and relation are equivalent (Rv = R„) or that any relational statement can
be translated to a relevance statement. Rather, we can only be sure at this point that relevance is at
least a subcategory o f relation (Rv

c

Rn). Determining whether or not the two notions are

equivalent will help decide whether or not relevance is or ought to be limited to relations o f
significance, which has implications to the appropriate use of ‘relevance’, identification of
relevance statements where the concept has been employed but not named, and identification of
possible differences in the evaluation of relevance and other relational statements. I f ‘relevance’
and ‘relation’ are equivalent, then (i) ‘8 > 2' is equivalent to ‘8 is relevant to 2' and (ii) given the
water molecule, ‘H is related to or associated with O’ is equivalent to ‘H is relevant to O’. Sorting
out the relations between the two concepts requires identifying statements concerning relations of
significance and statements concerning relations o f non-significance; determining if any essential
differences occur aside from significance; and, if so, deciding whether these differences actually
make a difference.
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6.1.3 Direction of Relations
Considering only binary relations, the possible directions can be: (a)/i -> f2 ; (b)/i < - / ;
or (c) f \ <- >f i »where/, is any fact and the arrows designate the direction o f the relation.
(Conceptual objects could also be used.) For example, corresponding relations between snowshoe
hares (/j ) and red foxes (f2) include (a) nutrient transfer, which is a one way relation from hares to
foxes, (b) killing, which is a one way relation from foxes to hares, and (c) habitat use or respective
movements within a habitat, which is a reciprocal relation in that a fox partly determines where
hares locate and move within their habitat and vice-versa (Table 26). In each example, the same
problem can be approached through either description, questioning, and definition. To illustrate the
first two ways o f approaching the problem, I will examine the first example - consumption/nutrient
transfer. Similar results can be obtained by analysing the other two examples.
First, the snowshoe hare makes a difference/is relevant to the fox because it is a food item
for the fox. This relation involves the assimilation of material composing the hare by the fox for the
fox’s good. In other words, snowshoe hares make a difference to and are relevant to red foxes by
supplying nutrients needed by the fox (/} m-> f 2). However, the fox’s physiological and anatomical
characteristics determine its nutritional needs, partly determine availability of food items, and these
determine its acts of consumption, which include snowshoe hares. The direction of this relation is
opposite to that of relevance (f2d-> fi) and not included by the relevance assertion.
Second, when saying that hares are relevant to foxes, we can and need to ask why. The
answer is that hares make a difference to foxes by being a source o f nutrients (/} a-> f 2). Again, we
can and need to ask why. The reason that hares make a difference to foxes is that foxes have a
particular anatomy and physiology and they generate a need for and availability of particular kinds
of food (f2d-> fi). As with the description, this questioning demonstrates two different directions of
relations. It also indicates logical priority: anatomy/physiology -> nutritional need/food availability
-> relevant food items.
Third, if relevance and relation are equivalent, then neither is logically prior and both
include the same types and directions of relations. However, if they are not the same, only two
possibilities arise. They are either disjoint or they overlap, where the extent o f overlap would be
partial or entire. The sets cannot be disjoint or partially overlap because the term ‘relation’ could
not be used solely to define relevance and relevance would not always be a relational term. The
only possibility is that relevance is a subcategory of relation and is defined by way of its genus.
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Table 26. Types/Directions of Relations between Two Relata.
F o rm

G e n e ra l S ta te m e n t

Specific R , S ta te m e n t

C o rre sp o n d in g R . S ta te m e n t

f _>fi

Snow shoe hares m ake a
difference to red foxes.

N utrients are transferred from the
snow shoe hare to the red fox.

Snow shoe hares are relevant to red
foxes.

fi <~f 2

R ed foxes m ake a difference to
snow shoe hares.

R ed foxes kill snow shoe hares.

Red foxes are relevant to snow shoe
hares.

fi <->f

Red foxes and snow shoe hares
m ake a difference to each other.

Habitat use o f the snow shoe hare affects
habitat use o f the fox and vice-versa.

Snow shoe hares are relevant to red foxes
and vice-versa.

6.1.4 Relevance as a Relation of Significance
As much as the above analysis might clarify the notions of relation and relevance, it does
little to establish whether relevance is or ought to be limited to relations o f significance, even
though the example is one. To explain, a fox is an object of significance in its own right by virtue
of being an organism that has a need to survive, acts in such a way to survive, and, to do so,
evaluates and selects particular food items. By such a need and act, the selected food item is an
object of relevance to the fox because it makes a difference to the fox. In contrast, hydrogen makes
a difference to oxygen (and vice-versa) because the association of the two alters their structure and
generates a whole with properties that the individual elements do not have when dissociated.
Although the relation is generally one of making a difference, neither element is constituted as such
to need the difference that the association makes. So, we can ask why hydrogen and oxygen are
related/associated by appealing to atomic configuration/forces but we have trouble answering why
they are mutually relevant, unless we appeal to a definition that stipulates that they are relevant.
Saying that hydrogen is relevant to oxygen does not sound right. But this is just an appeal to
intuition. Nonetheless, we can ask others if it appeals to their intuitions, which I’ve done on a
limited basis and encountered the same impression. Further, we can ask why such as statement
does not sound right. I think it does not sound right because we have become used to using
relevance in a particular way. As the historical research and analysis o f dictionary definitions
show, relevance has almost exclusively be used to identify relations of significance. Specifically,
the reason that ‘hydrogen is relevant to oxygen’ does not sound right is that neither has a need to be
associated because neither is an object of significance.
Relations of significance and non-significance can also be examined within the context of
an inquiry. We could follow Hitchcock or Bunge and say that f , is relevant to f 2 in relation to a goal
of inquiry; such as, determining predator-prey or molecular dynamics. In that case, we would say
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that the snowshoe hare is relevant to the red fox and that hydrogen is relevant to oxygen in relation
to respective goals o f the two inquiries. But this is not quite right. The snowshoe hare is relevant to
the red fox because of the nature and acts o f the red fox, not because of our goals. Similarly,
hydrogen does not become relevant/significant to oxygen because o f our goals. Rather, the system
composed o f the two objects, whatever the relation might be, significant or otherwise, is relevant to
the goal (G) o f an inquiry. This can be symbolized for a predator prey system as (/} R‘-> f 2) R'-> G
and the water molecule as (ft combines with f 2) R'-> G. This model is similar to the structure
outlined by Hitchcock in relation to his definition of ‘relevance’ as a triadic relation (Is*term R,->
2nd term/goal in a situation). However, I have used the word ‘context’, which I understand as a
conceptual system (inquiry goals), and I recognize that the referent of the first term can be a system
of any type, level of integration, or degree of complexity.

6.1.5 Classification of Relations
If we accept limiting ‘relevance’ to relations o f significance, we need an understanding of
relations and how relevance as a kind of relation fits in with other kinds. Terminology is a potential
stumbling block because I want to avoid using problematic words like ‘nature’ and ‘natural’.
Nonetheless, various meanings have been assigned to the terms ‘generated’ and ‘constructed’,
which are the terms I have chosen. To avoid potential difficulties, I will stipulate particular senses
for these terms and hope that interpretation will be limited to those senses. Also, in defining
‘constructed’ and using the term ‘construct’, I diverge from Bunge’s definitional framework where
‘construct’ is limited to a sub-class of mental objects (concepts). Although I broaden the notion
assigned to ‘construct’, I remain within Bunge’s ontological perspective and framework. I begin by
distinguishing the class ‘relation’ on the basis of agency. Accordingly, this conception concerns
dynamics and emphasises origin. Specifically, constructed relations require an agent, whereas
generated relations involve no agent. This means that biotic objects are responsible for constructed
relations and abiotic objects are involved in generated relations. I have also incorporated a
distinction between comparative and non-comparative relations (Fig. 8). Definitions of the
following terms are provided in Table 27, Section 7.3.
Generated Relations. Abiotic objects generate relations when, for example, atoms combine
to form a chemical compound, electrons flow (lightning) and produce air vibrations (thunder), the
wind blows a speck o f dust into my eye, or a rock strikes a mountain goat and causes it to fall from
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Figure 8. Tentative Classification of Relations.

I Relation j

/

\

Constructed
/
Representational

C om parative |

Generated

\
| Non-Representational |

| Non-Com parative |

a cliff. The direction of relation is from an abiotic generator to any other object. As such, no
relation of this type could be a relevance relation because no such object is o f significance. That is,
we would not say, ‘My eye is relevant to a speck of dust’ because it was blown into my eye and is
now lodged there.
Constructed Relations. Biotic agents construct relations when, for example, genes regulate
the synthesis o f proteins; a moose browses on a willow twig; a spider weaves a web; a sensation
produces pleasure; or a human perceives, thinks, and writes a sentence. In each case, an object of
significance is involved because each acts in a significant way; e.g., to survive, solve a problem, or
communicate. So, atoms and compounds are relevant to genes, twigs are relevant to moose, webs
are relevant to spiders, and percepts, thoughts, and sentences are relevant to humans. Further, the
first three examples involve non-representational constructs and the last two involve
representational constructs. Concerning the former, I can construct an association between the
physical symbols ‘$% *@ \ which are constructs themselves and as symbols each has meaning but
the unit defies convention (previous/accepted acts o f designation) and is, as far as I know,
nonsense; hence, non-representational. Similarly, I can associate the two concepts ‘round’ and
‘square’. Although each has a factual referent, the unit has no factual referent and cannot even be
imagined. So, it is non-representational in these senses. In both cases, these constructs are relevant
to me to make a point. Concerning representations, I can associate percepts (which are constructed
for us) or concepts (which we mentally construct) of two factual objects (e.g. 8cm Fact A and 2cm
Fact By, compare their respective sizes, which is a further cognitive operation; construct the
symbol ‘>’ to represent how the two conceptual objects have been ordered in my mind with respect
to size; and write ‘A > B’ or ‘8 > 2'. When A and B have factual referents (two zucchinis in my
garden), the connection between the conceptual objects is constructed through a cognitive
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operation. The purpose here is epistemic (e.g., to understand) and/or pragmatic (e.g., to maximize
nutrient intake) and the constructed objects are relevant to me in making a point, which is to tend
my garden or to survive. In contrast, in non-comparative relations the relation is not a cognitively
dependent mental object. They include either constructed or generated relations. First, the blade
and handle of a hoe are constructed relations. They are relevant to me, given that I need to weed the
garden. Without this need, they would not be relevant, unless I had another use for them. Second,
the distribution of soil particles in my garden prior to my efforts are relations generated by a
combination o f erosion and deposition and, as abiotic objects, they do not involve relevance
relations among themselves. However, the distribution of soil particles are of relevance to me,
especially if fine clay particles coalesce to form a cement-like surface, because they affect how well
my plants will grow.

6.1.6 Summary and Conclusion
The deceptively simple statement ‘Relevance is a relation’ turns out to involve a complex
set of issues. Without addressing these issues, the statement opens up possibilities for conceiving of
relevance incorrectly, identifying incorrect relevance relations, and constructing a misrepresentative
theory of relevance. To address these issues, we need to examine the term, concept, and referent
systems in which ‘relevance’ occurs or to which it applies. We also need to examine the set
relations that ‘is’ indicates.
First, ‘relevance’ is a term and a concept that has a representational function. In a general
sense, it designates a referent system that is composed o f at least a binary relation. It also
designates an unspecified relation. When ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ are used in relational
statements, they are combined with at least two relata terms. The statement as a whole identifies a
referent system composed of at least two associated objects. These objects must be specified in a
relevance statement but, because relevance is the relational term, the identity of the relation is not
specified. Identifying that relation must be done by the person constructing the relevance statement.
Otherwise, the referent system must be known sufficiently well and the wording or context of the
relevance statement must allow identification o f the particular relation. If not, the relevance relation
is indeterminate. Despite the non-specification of the relation, ‘relevance’ and ‘relevant’ do have a
specific function, which is to indicate a particular direction of relation between the relata. This
direction, at least for the cases examined, is opposite to that of the direction of determination. As
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such, relevance does not include all types of relations. Rather, it includes the set o f non-determinant
relations abstracted from a referent system; e.g., ‘x is relevant to y because y determines x ' or‘fibre
is relevant to my health because my nutritional needs determine what foods are edible.’
Second, the relation between the concepts o f relevance and relation must be sorted out
further, particularly given the history of the term being limited almost exclusively to relations of
significance. When considering statements like ‘8>2' or ‘hydrogen is associated with oxygen’, we
have to consider whether or not it makes sense to say ‘8 is relevant to 2' or ‘hydrogen is relevant to
oxygen’. To ihe, the statements sound counter-intuitive. In contrast, saying that a rabbit is relevant
to a fox does not jar the intuitions because we understand that the rabbit satisfies a need of the fox.
I suggest that our intuitions result from how we have become accustomed to using relevance, which
is a function of how relevance has been historically used and defined by others. As suggested in
Chapter 4 and further explored in Chapter 5, relevance has been conceived largely as a relation of
significance, which means that an object o f significance, an organism, must play a determinant role
in bringing the relevance relation into existence through its constructive acts. But ‘relevance’ is a
linguistic object constructed by humans through cognitive operations and the meaning associated
with it is through convention. Such flexibility explains why so many stipulated definitions have
been advanced over the last 50 years or so. The crucial decision concerns whether or not it is
advantageous to conceive of relevance as a relation of significance, which can be addressed by
determining whether or not it helps solve other problems. This issue is addressed in Sections 6.2
and 7.3 where I discuss the issues of degree o f relevance and strength/sufficiency o f argument and
provide an account of relevance, respectively.

6.2 Degree of Relevance and Strength/Sufficiency o f an Argument
In this section I outline and comment on four positions taken on whether or not relevance
varies in degree. In particular, I analyse and evaluate each position and offer alternative accounts
based on the conception o f relevance as a relation of significance. I present an overall conclusion in
the last section.

6.2.1 Naess’ Account of Degree of Relevance and Strength of an Argument
Arne Naess (1947) provides an account o f both relevance and degree o f relevance within
the context of his elucidation of the development, structure, and evaluation of argumentation
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concerning “difficult courses of action” (97.1). To understand his notion o f degree of relevance, we
must first understand his conception o f relevance. But before that, we must understand his
conception of argument, argumentation, and other related concepts. Naess uses the term
‘argument’ to denote both premises and sub-arguments adduced in relation to a standpoint taken on
an issue (106.3). He sees arguments to be “appeals to rationality in the light o f the facts” or,
alternatively, “that element in our expression which carries the power to convince people in rational
discussion, that is, their factual content and consequences” (97.1). Accordingly, he distinguishes
reason (what speaks in favour o f a standpoint) and motivation (psychological, sociological, and
other causal factors that motivate a decision) and identifies/discusses two main rational evaluation
criteria (98.2). First, tenability generally concerns the “cognitive adequacy or inadequacy of
reasons” (98.2) or, more specifically, the likelihood of truth or falsity o f factual claims or the
acceptability of normative principles (110.2). Second, relevance concerns how strongly an
argument “speaks for or against” a standpoint, which varies and is its proof-potential. As such,
relevance is conceived in such a way that it varies in degree. According to Naess, asserted
relevance relations are assessed, in descriptive matters, by determining how likely it is that, if the
premise is true (tenable), so too is the standpoint or conclusion, where likelihood also varies. In
normative matters, asserted relevance relations are assessed by the consistency between (i)
principle and action and (ii) action and consequence (110.2).
According to Naess’ conception, (i) tenability and relevance are evaluation criteria that are
applied to arguments; (ii) tenability and relevance are linked to two elements o f expression that
have the power to convince; i.e., expressions of factual content and consequences o f actions; (iii)
tenability and relevance have a distinctive set of relations where tenability concerns an individual
claim and relevance concerns a relation between claims; (iv) relevance subsumes strength, which
Naess considers also to be variable; and (v) a relevance judgement is a normative assessment o f a
relation between premise and conclusion, which is either likelihood or consistency, and involves the
transfer o f tenability from premise to conclusion. Three main comments are in order.
First, as evaluation criteria, tenability and relevance apply to constitutive elements (factual
content/consequences) o f an expression that functions as a premise. The relation between the
evaluation criteria and content of an expression is not clear, other than it is indicated by the general
relational term ‘apply’. The evaluation criteria may be depicted as being above or before and
distinct from the expression to which they are applied (normative level/relevance judgment ->
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object of evaluation/premise). If so, what is clear is that discovering the criteria requires a higher
order cognitive process that operates on two lower order mental objects, which are themselves
ordered at two levels: an implicit/explicit evaluation and its object, an expression (meta-level
evaluation -> {normative level/relevance judgement -> object of evaluation/premise-conclusion}).
This model, albeit common, does not help identify the relation between the evaluative judgment and
its object. It is a start but it can take us in the wrong direction. To continue, considering that
‘relevance’ is a non-specific relational term that indicates a more specific relation, the relations
between premise and conclusion, as identified by terms like ‘inference’, ‘entails’, ‘supports’, and
‘makes likely’, are specific kinds of relevance relations. That is, relevance is not a specific kind of
relation itself in addition to relations indicated by the previously mentioned terms. Rather, the term
‘relevance’ is a broad inclusive term that indicates or subsumes types of relevance relations, of
which inferential relations are one particular kind.
In support o f this claim about relevance, consider the factual issue of what caused a flood
and corresponding claims. Where T is a threshold and x is a positive value, ‘The amount of rainfall
was T+ x, whereas the amount of snow melt was T-x. Therefore, rainfall, not snow melt, was likely
the predominant factor that caused the flood.’ Supposing that the data are reliable but not
supposing they are complete, the premise that rainfall exceeded a threshold, but snow melt did not,
makes the conclusion likely true. That is, the tenability of the premise is transferred to the
conclusion to make it tenable to the degree that the premise is tenable. The conclusion is not
entirely so because other factors might have played a role in the flood. Claiming that the premise
being true makes the conclusion likely true is an abstract relational statement. The premiseconclusion, as a specific relational statement, is a linguistic device that represents a referent, which
in this case must be a factual system. So, the premise-conclusion relation involves a claim that the
referents are associated as asserted. Specifically, the assertion is that rainfall, not snow melt,
caused the flood, which involves a complex series of causal relations vaguely represented by the
premise and conclusion. Given that the premise-conclusion purports to represent a factual system,
an accurate hydrological model o f the particular watershed to which the argument refers must be
developed and such a model functions normatively when applied to statements concerning the state
or dynamics o f the watershed. That is, the hydrological model has a dual function of factual
representation and normative evaluation. Normatively, it supplies the necessary and sufficient
conditions (number of flood factors) that a conclusion must satisfy and premises must express,
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which is a specification of sufficiency conditions. The hydrological model is also used to rule out
erroneous premises.
The preceding explanation has focussed on the referential function of a relational statement
(premise-conclusion) and relevance as a connection, where relevance indicates or subsumes a host
of different connections from the linguistic level, as expressed at different levels of generality,
down to the referent level. However, the notion o f significance has not yet been mentioned. Given
that the premise concerns the facts designated by ‘rainfall’ and the conclusion concerns the facts
designated by ‘flood’, the premise-conclusion relations are entirely factual. Conceiving of relevance
as a relation o f non-significance, we could say, ‘rainfall is relevant to the flood’. It would be
relevant by virtue o f the fact that rainfall caused the flood and the statement would specifically
mean ‘rainfall is a predominant factor in causing the flood’. This example would suggest that such
premise-conclusion relations are not relations o f significance. However, the dimension of the
relevance statement identified is its function in representing facts. Even though the premise and
conclusion express factual representations o f causal relations, the information expressed through
the premise (a conceptual object) is relevant to the conclusion (a conceptual object) because the
conclusion represents an answer to an epistemic problem, which is framed by the question, ‘What
caused the flood?’ In other words, the premise and conclusion are conceptual entities connected to
an epistemic problem, where the conclusion represents an answer to a problem that we try to solve
through the premises. Hence, the conclusion is derivatively an object of significance because it is
constructed by a being o f significance. Interpreting factual premises and conclusions to be relations
of non-significance is based on appearance.
Second, Naess assigns the power of convincing to an expression. Because relevance, as he
conceives it, is an element of a premise-conclusion relation, relevance would have a power to
convince. I suggest that both claims are incorrect and misleading. Certainly, spoken and heard
expressions involve physical objects that are dynamically linked. Specifically, a spoken expression
has qualities that can generate a complex set of emotive responses but these can also be partly
modified by rational responses. (Test: When hearing bad news, consider how you feel and consider
how you reason or rationalize to manage the emotional response.) So, when people speak, they
exercise the power to influence and when people listen, they are influenced by the physical
dimensions of an expression and an interpretation o f its meaning but both are mediated by other
responses. However, attributing to an expression or relevance the power o f convincing is another
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matter. If expressions cause beliefs, we would have no choice in what we believe, as NaCl has no
choice but to dissociate in distilled water. But people can lie to themselves and to others or
otherwise refuse to believe what is evident to them. The attribution of power to an expression is
misleading because it directs us to the wrong explanations o f belief and relevance. Further, any
such explanation would require elucidation of causal mechanisms. Without them, we are left with
appeals to intuition, which fails to identify underlying cognitive mechanisms. In contrast to Naess’s
position, I suggest that evaluating tenability and relevance is an implicit or explicit cognitive
process, which is a higher order evaluation of a mental object - the expression. So, our task is to
examine such processes, understand what evaluations are made, and articulate the cognitive and
rational mechanisms involved. The explanation o f relevance judgments by way of a hydrological
argument is one step in that direction.
Third, Naess conceives tenability and relevance in terms of each having a distinctive set of
relations, which are referential/evidential and inferential relations, respectively. However, analysing
these relations further reveals that tenability and relevance are interrelated in a complex way.
Briefly, establishing referential/evidential relations involves determining what evidence is relevant
to an epistemic goal; such as determining what caused a flood. Inferential relations presuppose a
relevant connection between two statements, which I suggest involves a relation of significance.
Further, whatever is represented by a premise by way o f its referential/evidential relations is
transferred to the conclusion. Consider the equivalence relation: 2+2 = 4 or the hydrological
argument presented above. In both cases, the premises contribute something to the conclusion. I
will elaborate further on these relations at the end of this section. Now, we turn to the remainder of
Naess’s account of argumentation and degree of relevance.
Naess distinguishes two kinds o f argument surveys (inventories) that can be taken with
regard to a particular issue. Although he does not say so, such a survey involves relevance
judgments that are determined by the issue of interest. Nonetheless, he explains that the first survey
is conducted not to make a decision but merely to take an inventory o f any argument advanced,
pro/contra, relevant/irrelevant, or tenable/untenable in relation to an issue. The second survey often
follows or is based on the first survey but the intent is to make a decision. So, judgments are
required to select only tenable and most relevant arguments. These are then organized in two ways:
hierarchically to show the structure o f the complex argument and in terms o f their stand for or
against the standpoint (102f). Naess claims that the relevance judgment is ultimately intuitive but
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such reliance does not necessarily lessen the certainty o f the judgment because an explanation
might be offered at a later time (109.4). However, as noted below, he does not offer any
explanations for the examples that he provides, which we need to develop a theory of relevance.
Naess identifies a pitfall o f assessing arguments for or against a standpoint, which involves
evening the weight o f arguments or losing sight of the essential elements that are conclusive. He
explains that to guard against such a pitfall, we must learn how to evaluate arguments for and
against a standpoint, which includes assessing tenability, relevance, consistency of a set of
arguments/premises, sufficiency, and correctness of inference, and we must realize that some
arguments are more relevant or more conclusive than others (102.1, 107.3). Further, standpoints
must be clearly/precisely stated to determine the relevance of arguments to it. If the standpoint is
complex, it must be broken down so that arguments for or against each element can be aligned
accordingly (104.4; 105.2). To decide between alternative standpoints, Naess indicates that “we
normally weigh the various considerations which we take to be relevant and base our decision on
an estimate o f their relative importance. The same applies to any arguable issue” (97.1).
Naess provides several examples to illustrate his account. The following examples concern
degree o f relevance with respect to a descriptive (DI) and normative issue (NI). Where F0, P, andC
are the standpoint, pro-argument, and counter-argument, respectively:
(DI)

F„: It will rain tonight.
P,: The sky is covered with gray clouds
P2: The swallows are flying low.
C,: The barometer is rising.

Naess explains that, in this case, degree of relevance o f P,/P2 and Q is a function o f the
“hypotheses” ‘Pj/P2-> F0’ and ‘C i-> not-F0', respectively. To note, these hypotheses are often
referred to as conditionals or warrants in the terminology employed by Toulmin (1958), Blair
(1989, 1992), or Freeman (1992). Naess explains that, to decide, we must compare the strength of
the two hypotheses. In doing so, he claims that the relevance of P /P 2 is “slight”, which makes F0
extremely uncertain, particularly given P2. However, he does not explain why Pi/P2 is slight. So,
we are, again, left with the ‘blank space’ that intuition provides. Explaining the relevance relation
requires establishing whether or not a positive association occurs between the proposed factors
(density/coverage of clouds, flight of swallows, and barometric levels) and precipitation, either in
terms of being a cause or indicator. It also requires detailing the complex meteorological system
sufficiently to identify its composition and structure so that we can understand the role and
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reliability of those factors. As science has shown throughout the ages, intuitions can lead to strong
but incorrect convictions and the nature of facts can be highly counter-intuitive (Bunge 1962,
1998a; Sagan 1974; Wolpert 1992).
The example o f a normative issue is as follows.

(NI)

F1; As long as I study I have to devote all my time to my subject.
(F2:1 must set aside some of my working hours for reading poetry.)
P,: I will be earning a steady income a year earlier.
P2:1 shall be a useful member of society a year earlier.

Ct: I shan’t be a social success.
C2:1 shall become one-sided.

Naess specifies that (i) the decision maker considers the tenability o f all pro- and contraarguments to be the same and (ii) degree o f relevance must be the decisive factor, which in this
case is contingent upon the implicit or explicit norms that are accepted (111). Naess reports that
the decision maker prefers being a useful and prosperous citizen over having a rich inner life with
no money. So, the decision maker accepts Fi (112.1). Implicit in Naess’s account is that the weight
attached to an argument or norm is a function of preference, which is a complex assessment that
includes consideration of relations between a person, acts, and consequences and depends on
knowledge o f those objects. Again, to avoid intuitive appeals and to provide an explicit account,
this system must be elucidated in sufficient detail to permit identification of both the essential
elements and the structure o f the system. Doing so involves a host of relevance judgments that
generally involve concept-fact relations, as Bunge outlines. Further, given that preference is the
source of argument weight, to have a preference requires the existence o f a being o f significance.
So, the notion of significance is key to understanding the nature o f relevance relations and related
notions like tenability, degree of relevance, and strength.

6.2.2 Blair’s Account of Degree of Relevance and Sufficiency
J. Anthony Blair (1989) examines the issue o f degree of relevance within the context o f
related work by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984), who conceive of relevance as the potential
of premises to justify or refute a conclusion, and both Krabbe (1987) and Naess (1966/1947), who
conceive o f relevance as the potential of premises to prove a conclusion (69.2f). Blair (71.3) also
reports that Naess conceives o f premise relevance in terms o f ‘speaking for or against’ a
conclusion. Blair suggests these broad conceptions of relevance are essentially the same and
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analyses them into two elements: (i) the bearing that premises have on a conclusion and (ii) given
that they do bear on the conclusion, the degree o f support provided to the conclusion. He names the
first ‘relevance’ and the second ‘sufficiency’ (69.3) and implies that the former is logically prior to
the latter. Blair then takes up Naess’s contention that ‘speaking for or against’ a conclusion can
vary in extent. He agrees with Naess that relevance varies in degree but opposes Naess’s definition.
Specifically, Blair reports Naess’s claim that, in relation to a normative issue expression Fo,
premises P vary in degree of relevance according to the degree o f their value or the benefit that
accrues when the premises are realized (71.2f). Blair suggests that, by Naess's account, the value
of the premise, "The threat of nuclear war is ended for all time", should make it highly relevant to
any conclusion such as, "Canada should add frigates to its navy". He concludes:
But P does not speak for or against Fo at all; in fact, it seems just irrelevant to Fo. Granted that if
a normative Fo is causally sufficient to effect a P, then the greater the value of that P or the
benefit of its realization, the greater the relevance of P to Fo, but that is not the condition Naess
lays down here, for he goes on to add: "This rule applies also [my stress] where P is an assertion
about what follows from accepting Fo..." (p. 109). So Naess's attempt to differentiate between
relevance in arguments with descriptive conclusions and arguments with normative conclusions
needs revision. (71.3)
First, Naess’s primary condition of ‘relevance’ is that a premise must speak for or against
a conclusion (110.2). So, Blair’s premise cannot be used to support any conclusion. Rather, it must
support a conclusion to which it is relevant. Further, whether or not the premise in Blair’s example
speaks for or against the conclusion is indeterminate because insufficient information has been
provided to determine a connection between the two statements. If the lack of nuclear threat is
accompanied by a greater risk from other sources for which frigates are designed (i.e., surface or
submarine attack), then the premise would speak/be relevant to the conclusion. However, if the
lack of nuclear threat is accompanied by a risk reduction from other sources for which frigates are
designed, then the premise would speak against the conclusion. In this case, contrary to Naess’s
definition, the premise would be irrelevant because relevance denotes a connection and must be
positive despite that ‘speak against’ linguistically alludes otherwise, as previously discussed in
Section 3.3. Instead, the premise would be relevant to the opposite conclusion and the issue itself.
Second, Blair’s example is not consistent with Naess’s account, given that Naess is
concerned with the adoption of a position on an issue where premises represent benefits or
consequences of adopting that position. Blair’s premise (end of nuclear threat) is not a consequence
of adopting the conclusion (adding frigates), which is a position on the issue o f whether or not
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Canada should increase its naval capacity. In contrast, a relevant premise satisfying both accounts
would be ‘Canadian sovereignty and citizens would be protected from current increase in
submarine and surface threats.’ This premise, if realized, would have greater benefit than realizing
the premise ‘More Canadians could become naval officers and earn a greater income.’
Third, Blair speaks problematically about the causal efficacy of a premise. Further, Blair
writes in terms of the causal sufficiency o f a normative conclusion to effect a premise that can vary
both in its value/benefit upon realization and its relevance to the conclusion. So, he accepts the idea
that relevance varies in degree but conceives it ultimately as a function o f the causal sufficiency of
a normative conclusion.
Blair’s position on degree o f relevance in this paper arises from his conceptions o f premise
relevance, which he also connects to sufficiency. I suggest that all these concepts require
clarification. Blair defines relevance by way of the synonymous relational terms ‘having something
to do with’ and ‘bearing on’ and associates relevance with the expression “have some bearing
rather than none at all on the claim in question”(68.2f). That a premise has some bearing on a
conclusion could mean that (i) a premise provides partial support or meets part of the sufficiency
requirement without any variance occurring between premises in providing such support or (ii) a
premise differs from others in the degree of support that it provides to a conclusion. Determining
and specifying why relevance varies would rectify this ambiguity. Blair also explains that a
relevant premise causes a person to be more or less inclined to accept a conclusion than he/she
would be otherwise (68.2f). Here, no mention o f relevance varying is made but clearly belief is
subject to variance. Additionally, Blair associates sufficiency with relevant premises that “provide
more or less support for the claim in question” (69.3). This phrasing is similarly unclear as the
previous one containing ‘some’.
Whether or not relevance varies in degree and, if so, why it varies, depends on the
conception of relevance. First, if relevance is defined only in terms of connection, it could be
treated as a discrete value and might be analogous to a light switch that connects or disconnects
when on or off and permits only a fixed current to flow when on. In such a case, relevance would
not vary in degree. However, we cannot say that relevance is like a light switch because we need to
know how the relata o f relevance relations are connected and, even with such connections, we
might find examples to confirm that they can vaiy in degree, as they can with physical objects
other than light switches. For example, two boards vary in their connection to each other depending
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on their degree of overlap. So, the question is, which of the two analogies corresponds to
relevance? I have not addressed this question but I suggest that an adequate sample of relevance
statements should be examined with this point in mind. Nonetheless, suppose that relevance is
defined only in terms o f connection and that these connections are discrete. Strength of a premise
would be a function o f its connection, whereas sufficiency would be a function o f the number of
premises/connections required to establish a conclusion, where each premise would connect to the
conclusion to the same degree and have the same strength. A corresponding analogy would be
connections between two braided wires where the individual filaments are the same gauge and the
flow of current is a function of the number of individual wires connected. Sufficiency would be
determined by the capacity of the wire to conduct electricity or the threshold level of current needed
to run an appliance.
Second, if relevance is defined as a connection of significance and even if it is found that
connections in relevance relations do not vary, relevance can still vary because significance varies.
The appropriate analogy would be that relevance is like a dimmer switch that allows a variable
current to flow when a connection has been made or relevance is like two braided wires, where
individual wires are different gauges. In such a conception, strength would be a function of both
the number o f connections and the significance of each one.
Concerning sufficiency, Blair makes an apt point by distinguishing between it and
relevance. However, as he intimates, a link occurs to relevance. As discussed below, that link
involves (i) relevance as a connection of significance, o f which strength is a measure, and (ii) the
degree o f strength required to establish a conclusion fully, which can be conceived as a match
between the premise set and the conclusion.

6.2J Hitchcock’s Account of Degree of Relevance
David Hitchcock (1992) discusses the issue of whether or not relevance varies in degree,
notes that others express relevance in degrees, but does not find such evidence from his personal
“attunement” to usage of the term over several months. So, he indicates that his intuitions on the
matter conflict (252.4; 266 endnote 6). He considers possibilities to resolve these conflicting
intuitions but does not take a stand on the issue. I take up where he left off and I evaluate the
solutions he tentatively proposes.
The first possibility that Hitchcock identifies is the claim that, because irrelevance does not
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vary in degree, relevance does not either. Specifically, he writes:

“...it is tempting to argue that relevance is not a matter of degree, on the ground that
irrelevance, its contradictory, is not a matter of degree: one thing is never more
irrelevant than another to something.” (253.1)
The direction of Hitchcock’s thought is important to notice. His ground concerns the nature of
irrelevance, which is what relevance is not. From this premise, he attempts to conclude what
relevance is. In support of the claim, he gives the example that neither the invention of ice cream
nor the freezing point o f water are more or less irrelevant than the other in proving the Pythagorean
theorem. He concludes:
“Each is equally irrelevant, or, better, simply irrelevant. Likewise, it seems, a relevant piece of
information must be simply relevant, not more or less relevant.” (253.1)
Also notice his use of ‘seems’, which is used in place o f an analysis and explication. In this overall
passage, Hitchcock argues by way of analogy, as indicated by his use o f ‘likewise’. Essentially, the
argument is:
Irrelevance does not vary in degree, as shown by comparing the examples.
Relevance seems to be similar to irrelevance in this regard.
Therefore, relevance seems also not to vary in degree.
This argument is not particularly convincing because of its intuitive appeal. Also, the conclusion
about the nature o f relevance is based on what relevance is not. That is, he relies on not-a to make
conclusions about a, where a is positive and logically prior to not-a, as is evident from the term
‘not-a’ which contains ‘a ’. Specifically, he divides objects into two categories a and not-a. Two
interpretations are possible: (i) not-a includes all other objects than a, which means both sets
include positive instances, and (ii) a exists or a does not exist; e.g., a = hobbits exist versus not-a
= hobbits do not exist. The former set includes positive instances, whereas the latter set is empty.
Both interpretations are needed to understand relevance and irrelevance statements.
Consider the case where a and not-a both designate non-empty sets and a single statement
‘x x'-> y ’ and not-a includes the set o f statements ‘x m-> z ’, where z includes everything except y.
For example, the set a includes only the statement, ‘Dietary fibre is relevant to the physical health
of organisms, like humans.’ The set not-a includes statements such as, ‘Dietary fibre is irrelevant
to solving a mathematical problem, washing dishes, writing an essay, etc.’ In the first example, the
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assertion is that a positive relation occurs between dietary fibre and the physical health of
particular organisms. In this case, dietary fibre occurs within a greater physiological system, which
must be understood and modelled to elucidate relevance relations. In the second example, the
assertion is that dietary fibre is not associated with any o f the listed objects. This set, then, is a list
of statements through which an assertion of non-association is made. That is, the first statement
expresses the assertion that the system named ‘dietaiy fibre/physical health’ occurs, whereas the
second statement expresses the assertion that no such system like ‘dietary fibre/mathematical
solution’ occurs. In terms o f sets, then, the first set has a member but the second set is empty.
In terms of using not-a (irrelevance/non-systems) to determine the nature o f a
(relevance/systems), we have only a set o f statements expressing what a is not, which concerns all
objects (z) not associated with x. Even if we were to identify and describe everything not associated
with x, we would still not know the nature of the relations x has with other objects. Similarly,
where not-a (irrelevance/non-systems) is an empty set, which means it does not designate a system,
the attempt to determine what a is (relevance) from not-a(irrelevance) is analogous to attempting
to determine what something is from nothing.
Hitchcock also suggests following the legal distinction between relevance and materiality,
where only the latter varies in degree. He concludes:
It would then be a misnomer to speak of one thing as being more or less relevant than another;
rather we should speak of one thing as being more or less significant, important, substantial, or
weighty than the other. In the case of arguments, such differences would be differences in degree
of support, not in degree of relevance..(253.2)
Hitchcock does not provide legal definitions for either term and it is questionable that the
distinction in law is made as he suggests. I have provided two brief accounts of these concepts but
I should warn that the use of ‘fact’ is not consistent with Bunge’s conception and how I have
defined it. For us, a fact is an occurrence of objective existence. It includes things, properties of
things, and states o f things. Facts are distinguished from factual statements, which are conceptual
objects that have fundamentally different properties.
Martin (2002) defines ‘relevance’ as the “relationship between two facts that renders one
probable from the existence of the other, either taken by itself or in connection with other facts.”
She explains that relevance is the central principle that determines admissibility of evidence, which
can be further limited by particular exclusionary rules. If not, all facts that have logical relevance
to a fact in issue may be proved even though they are not an issue themselves. Martin discusses
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materiality within the context of a Statement of Case, which is a formal written statement in a civil
action served by each party on the other. It contains the allegations of fact that the party proposes
to prove at trial, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved. It can also contain the
remedy that the party claims in the action. Such statements must contain only material facts, which
are those facts essential to the party's claim or defence, and not the subordinate facts that are the
means o f proving them. Similarly, the definition of ‘relevant’ in Hill and Hill (2002) is “having
some reasonable connection with, and in regard to evidence in trial, having some value or tendency
to prove a matter o f fact significant to the case.” Their definition of ‘material’ is “relevant and
significant”. Further, they explain that ‘material evidence’ is used to distinguish significant claims
from totally irrelevant and trivial claims. So, in both cases, ‘relevance’ and ‘materiality’ are not
distinct in terms of connection and significance but between connections o f any significance and
connections highly significant; i.e., the terms are used to distinguish between levels of significance.
Nonetheless, Hitchcock’s proposal merits consideration because we can develop conceptions in
many different ways. However, his solution attempts just to follow a different convention and,
without further research or analysis, we would not have any understanding why we would want to
do so. Further, the problem arises between ‘relevance’ and ‘relation’ and whether ‘relevance’ ought
to include all relations, which would include any fact-fact relation so that the flow of water in a
creek would be relevant to a bubble floating on it.
Hitchcock’s second possible solution to the issue of degree is:
“...to reject the inference that contradictories of relations that do not come in degrees also do not
come in degrees. Uselessness and unhelpfiilness, for example, are not matters of degree, but one
thing may be more useful or more helpful than another”. (253.2)
By reference to ‘contradictories of relations’, he means that relevance and irrelevance, as relations,
are contradictories. Again, it is important to note the direction of inference, which requires
untangling the first sentence of the quotation. As Hitchcock states, our option is to reject the claim
that relevance does not come in degrees because irrelevance does not come in degrees. In positive
terms, we have the option to claim that relevance varies in degree even though irrelevance does not
vary in degree. Hitchcock provides the apparently analogous examples o f uselessness and
unhelpfulness and claims that they do not come in degrees, whereas usefulness and helpfulness do
come in degrees. The implication from these examples is that, even though we maintain that
irrelevance does not come in degree, relevance could/must be like usefulness and helpfulness and
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come in degrees. I suggest that the account is problematic in two respects.
First, identifying irrelevance as a relation is problematic. As I’ve shown in my analysis of
dictionary definitions and examples of relevance and by using the conceptual framework identified
in the introduction, ‘irrelevance’ is used in a sentence on a page as a relational term. It indicates a
relation between relata terms of the sentence. Conceptually, it indicates a relation in our minds
between conceptual relata. However, in both cases, irrelevance, which means not relevant,
indicates that no relation occurs between referents. To note, understanding irrelevance requires
understanding relevance because ‘irrelevance’ is defined by way of relevance, which means that
relevance is logically prior to irrelevance. Similarly, ‘relevance’ is used in a sentence and the
concept of relevance is used in our minds to indicate a relation between relata terms and concepts,
respectively. The term and concept indicate that a relation occurs between referents. A statement
is used to represent referents. A relational statement is used to represent the state of a referent
system. When relevance is conceived as a relation o f significance, a relevance statement is used to
represent the state o f a referent system, where at least one o f the relata is an object significance in
itself (primarily significant) or is significant to an object of significance (secondarily significant).
An irrelevance statement is used to assert that no such system as asserted occurs; i.e., no relation
occurs between referents o f the relata terms/concepts. To conclude, the use o f the concept of
irrelevance in an assertion about the state o f the relata referents does not identify a relation between
referents. Hence, irrelevance cannot be identified as a relation, which is indicated by the terms ‘notrelevance’ or ‘not-relation’.
Second, the suggestion that relevance might be like usefulness or helpfulness, which vary
in degree (253.3), is also problematic. Hitchcock provides no analysis of the relations between
relevance, usefulness, and helpfulness, which is needed particularly because he defines relevance
by way of helpfulness. Also, both usefulness and helpfulness might be kinds of pragmatic
relevance. For example, the statement ‘My computer is relevant to writing my thesis’ is based on
the fact that it is helpful or useful to that activity. As outlined in Chapter 4, relevance is a non
specific relational term that includes specific relations o f significance. So, it functions to indicate
them. Hitchcock also claims that uselessness and unhelpfulness do not vary in degree. But there are
senses of these terms that clearly indicate that they do vary in degree. For example, OED defines
‘useless’ as “ineffectual”, which refers to things that are “weak or tame in effect”. ‘Unhelpful’ is
defined as “unable to help; not rendering help”, where ‘help’ is defined as “to make (an action,

112

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

process, condition, etc.) more effectual”. So, unhelpfiilness can mean less effectual. For example,
someone, who is using a wheel barrow with a soft tire to haul a heavy load and has reached his
destination, could claim that the wheel barrow was useless or unhelpful. The expression does not
mean that the wheel barrow was of no assistance but rather it made the task more difficult than it
could have been. Soften the tire and the wheel barrow would become even more useless. Three
main points emerge from this discussion. Hitchcock provides us only with possibilities for
addressing the issue o f degree o f relevance. However, the possibilities are problematic. The
solution is to develop a theory o f relevance based on systematically examined concepts and their
referents as well as precise definitions.

6.2.4 Sperber and Wilson’s Account of Degree of Relevance
Dan Sperber and Dierdra Wilson (1995) have sought to understand relevance as it applies
to or arises within cognitive and communication events. Within this perspective, their notion of
relevance is used to explain human psychology and behavior. They argue that, within
communication and cognitive events, contextual cognitive effects (such as, implications,
contradictions, and strengthening) are necessary conditions of relevance and that, other things
being equal, the greater the contextual effects, the greater the relevance (119. 2). In other words, if
I observe a person or someone points out that person to me and it leads me to make a great number
of implications relative to other items in my field of view, the person is the most relevant item in
that view. As such, they conceive of relevance as both connection and significance and hold that
relevance varies in degree.

6.2.5 Summary and Conclusion
If we accept that relevance includes both the notions of connection and significance, we do
not have trouble accounting for the claim that relevance varies in degree because significance
clearly does. Aside from the examples that I and others have brought forward to confirm the claim
and the definition and use of ‘relevance’ in law, at least according to Hill and Hill (2002) and
Martin (2002), many other examples can be examined. For example, in constructing mathematical
models (logically ordered conceptual representations) of physical or biological systems, sensitivity
analyses can be done to determine which variables have the greatest influence on a predicted
outcome. In environmental impact assessment, the relevance of an ecological change is determined

113

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

by its connection to an anthropogenic factor as well as its significance. In resource management, a
similar situation arises in isolating critical features of, for example, an animal’s habitat that merit
management considerations. In economics, the law o f diminishing returns refers to the diminishing
amount o f extra output when extra units o f varying input (labour) are added successively to a fixed
amount of another input (land), which means that, o f all that is connected to a particular act, all is
not of equal value.
Conceiving relevance as a relation of significance does not obscure as Hitchcock suggests
but allows us to distinguish between fundamentally different types o f relations. If a connection
between two objects is one o f significance, then accounting for strength and sufficiency is possible.
Specifically, within the context o f argument, strength is a measure of the significance of a premise
or premise set. In terms of sufficiency, all necessary conditions must be expressed to establish a
conclusion fully. When premises are insufficient to establish a conclusion, the strength o f an
argument can be determined by comparing what is required to what is expressed. Given that
premises can vary in significance, the strength o f an argument is not necessarily a function o f just
the number of premises expressed. O f course, to assess strength adequately, we need to know the
relation between expressed and required premises. For example, if we have relative frequency data,
we have an objective measure of strength. Without knowing the significance o f expressed premises
compared to that required to establish a conclusion, we are left assessing strength intuitively, which
would be like attempting to calculate a fraction without the denominator. In such a case, strength is
indeterminate and we are prompted to do more research, despite those who lament about or are
dissatisfied with having to find necessary and sufficient conditions. The relations between
relevance, strength, and sufficiency can be illustrated by way of a braided wire (Fig. 9).
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Figure 9. Braided Wire Metaphor.
(i) Deductive Argument.
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(ii) Non-Deductive Argument, (a) Epistemic Situation 1: Known Requirements.
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(b) Epistemic Situation 2: Unknown Requirements.
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7.0 A Partial and Provisional General Theory of Relevance
Previous sections of my thesis contain detailed analyses and evaluations o f relevance
statements and definitions/positions on relevance. These analyses and evaluations provide the link
between problem and solution in that they are the implementation of an approach. Such analyses
essentially disassemble wholes into pieces and such evaluations determine which pieces to keep.
These pieces are parts of the overall solution, which is a general theory o f relevance. As a general
theory, it focuses on the generic concept of relevance and concerns all types o f relevance relations
and expressions of them. Such a general theory is multi-disciplinary in both approach and content.
In this section, I assemble the pieces that are scattered throughout previous sections. This
synthesis essentially provides a summary and conclusion. In presenting it, I have not included
examples or literature citations contained in previous sections because I want to provide a concise
summary of essential elements and avoid unnecessary duplication. Besides, the account I present
here provides only a partial and provisional theory of relevance. It is partial because it represents
only a small fraction o f the literature that pertains to relevance and is only a fraction o f the work
that I have completed or see could be completed. Also, our knowledge and understanding from
various disciplines (e.g., logic, psychology, information science) that have a bearing on a theory of
relevance is always advancing. Such advances could inspire new insights or necessitate revisions to
my analyses and evaluations, which is why I have separated them from the following synthesis.
The account is provisional because it is partial. Accordingly, I see it to be like a technological
prototype subject to further development and refinement.

7.1 The Problem of and Approach to Relevance
Problem-solving. Problem assessment is crucial to any research project because the nature
of the problem determines the approach to it. Yet, some researchers launch into a proposed solution
without first conducting a problem assessment. Problem assessment ought to occur prominently at
the outset of a project as well as throughout a project because it is continuous with problem
solving. Knowing that one has found an adequate solutions to problems, like determining what
relevance is/means and how relevance judgements are or ought to be made, is not a straightforward
matter as is determining a solution to a mechanical problem where immediate and adequate tests
are available. However, the problem of relevance has logical and practical dimensions and any
proposed solution can be tested by its coherence, factual correctness, and how fruitful it is in
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permitting greater understanding, applying to other problems, and developing further solutions.
Such considerations ought to be made throughout a project.
Nature o f the Relevance Problem. The problem of relevance is multidimensional in three
main respects. First, it is a multi-disciplinary problem. As a problem named ‘relevance’, it occurs
in a wide range of disciplines; such as, psychology, philosophy, information science, and law. But
the problem of relevance is not necessarily restricted to disciplines that name a problem
‘relevance’. So, the extent of the relevance problem is not revealed by those who name it, as the
example from Aristotle’s Rhetoric indicates. Determining its extent is one task in developing a
general theory of relevance.
Second, the relevance problem is often expressed by the question, ‘What is relevance?’
This question breaks down to a semantic question concerning the meaning o f ‘relevance’ and a
factual question concerning the occurrence o f relevance. Asking what ‘relevance’ means is a
contemporary-historical question. It is a contemporary question because our starting point is an
existing term that has meaning associated with it rather than either a new term that must be
assigned meaning or an existing term that is to be assigned a revised meaning. It is an historical
question because the process o f concept formation and naming has already occurred and the term
and its meaning have been maintained in English for hundreds of years. Thus, answering the
question requires determining what meaning has been assigned to ‘relevance’ and maintained for it.
The meaning of ‘relevance’ is expressed both by its usage and the articulation o f its sense
in definitions that either attempt to represent or revise usage. As discussed below, relevance has
been used and defined largely and essentially as a relation of significance rather than any relation
whatsoever. This means that relevance relations are constructed through acts rather than generated
by conditions. As such, the occurrence of relevance is a functional problem for all organisms in
that relations must be established through constructive acts, cognitive or otherwise, to meet the
various problems that living in a contingent world imposes. Even the simplest organism must
determine, through physical mechanisms, which chemicals to assimilate or avoid and how to
assemble chemicals in ways that permit growth, maintenance, and reproduction.
Relevance is also a cognitive problem. For humans, it is both a research problem and an
enduring difficulty. It is a research problem for those who are attempting to discover, describe,
classify, or otherwise elucidate the various types and characteristics o f relevance relations. For
example, psychologists experiment with physical stimulus-response or model stimulus-
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cognitive/communicative effects to elucidate the mechanisms by which such events occur and
explain them within a theoretical context such as evolution or behavioural ecology. Similarly,
rhetoricians attempt to formulate principles of effective and appropriate communication/
persuasion, which is a relevance relation between a speaker and an audience. The psychological
work is descriptive/theoretic, whereas the rhetorical work is normative.
As an enduring difficulty, relevance is considered to be an unsolved problem because
people consider proposed solutions to be inadequate. Accordingly, we must ask why problems
remain unsolved or why proposed solutions continue to be inadequate. This brings into
consideration obstacles that occur throughout the problem-solving process, where ‘obstacle’ is a
third sense o f problem. Researchers within particular disciplines, like information science and
informal logic, suggest that the unsolved problems concern both semantics and methodology. That
is, it involves defining ‘relevance’ and/or understanding its meaning and determining how to model
relevance relations and evaluate relevance claims or presuppositions. The semantic problem is
prior to the methodological problem because the collection o f relations to be included under the
term ‘relevance’ must be identified first. Only then can instances be identified as relevance
relations and methodological accounts concerning them be developed.
Problems with Dictionary Definitions. Any theory of relevance must be placed within the
context of the opportunities and problems that dictionaries provide. The advantage o f dictionaries
is that definitions are based on inventories of usage and some dictionaries publish instances of
usage. Thus, dictionary definitions provide an essential data base to answer the question, ‘What is
relevance?’ Further, terms used in a definition are almost always defined elsewhere in the
dictionary. So, a rigorous semantic analysis can be completed. However, dictionaries are
problematic in several respects. First, numerous dictionaries exist and definitions o f ‘relevance’
vary considerably. Second, dictionaries provide unsystematic, imprecise, and highly abstract
definitions of ‘relevance’. Although the definitions indicate roughly how to use the term, which
might suffice for ordinary use, they are o f little value in contexts such as theory development,
reasoning, and argument evaluation, where systematic definitions, concreteness, and precision are
required. To overcome these problems an analysis and description of relevance statements are
needed. Such an analysis would yield a more precise delimitation of the kinds o f relations and
relata subsumed by ‘relevance’. Also needed is a shift in focus away from the sense of a single
term. For example, Merriam-Webster defines ‘relevance’ as a relation without clarifying the
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relations between these two terms/concepts. Such a definition gives rise to counter-intuitive
expressions such as ‘8 is relevant to 2' because, by definition, 8 stands in a quantitative relation to
2. Other dictionaries define relevance by way of either synonymous terms (e.g., pertinence or
bearing), which produces a circularity, or closely related terms (e.g., applicable), which
necessitates determining senses that pertain to relevance. Because of these problems, dictionary
definitions can lead to semantic instability because people must give the term a definite sense when
precision is required. Doing so has produced many stipulated definitions o f ‘relevance’, as we see
in information science and logic. Third, despite the scientific orientation of lexicography, most
dictionaries do not indicate how they arrive at their definitions. Hence, we have no way of
determining whether their definitions correctly represent usage. Fourth, lexicographers’ emphasis
can be largely on sense, not referents. Emphasizing the latter would reveal the need to develop
systematic definitions based on essential conditions rather than express a sense sufficient to make a
term intelligible. That is, we should follow Samuel Johnson (1827) says: "I am not so lost in
lexicography as to forget that words are the daughters o f earth...” Fifth, despite lexicographers’
definitions being a description of usage, construction of meaning through initial use or definition is
prescriptive and our use of dictionaries takes their definitions to be prescriptive. Being descriptive
(interpretive/constructive), lexicographers are not usually the prime generators of meaning. Rather,
those who originally attribute meaning to a term are. Dictionaries play an important role in
accepting established meaning and sustaining its use, as do other language users. Sixth,
lexicographers are selective in what usage is included; hence, which definitions make it into the
dictionary. This is particularly evident in definitions of types of relevance, which misrepresents
their great variety. Reporting only a few types suggests an inadequate approach to inventory,
description, and classification, which might be a function of working with an imprecise generic
definition o f ‘relevance’.
The Problems with Stipulative Definitions. Stipulation facilitates reasoning and
communication when a vague or ambiguous term is given a definite or more specific sense. So, the
significance of stipulation is unquestionable. However, no stipulation occurs in isolation. Without
situating a stipulation within its greater terminological and conceptual context, confusion can
result. Such is the case with ‘relevance’ for which many definitions have been advanced in
disciplines like information science and logic. More importantly, though, stipulation is an
inappropriate means to answer the question, ‘What is relevance?’ As a semantic problem, the
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question demarcates a point of time prior to asking the question. So, previous definitions and usage
are required to answer it. In contrast, a stipulated definition demarcates a period o f time beginning
with and extending beyond the act of stipulation. Such a definition is peculiar if its use is limited to
the person stipulating it. Whether an peculiar definition comes into broader use is a function of its
communication, acceptance, and stability of continued use.
Problems with Word History. Given that the semantic context of a term is historical, our
understanding o f current meaning/usage is a function o f both its prior definition and usage.
However, neither a term nor its meaning always remain stable. First, most dictionaries attempt to
capture a history o f meaning that focuses on what is continuous with our current usage, although
OED provides a greater historical context and includes many obsolete terms and senses. Even with
an emphasis on current meaning and despite how hard lexicographers try, dictionaries are always
some time behind the present because dictionaries are so labourious and time-consuming to
produce. However, with online publication of dictionaries, the turn-around time can be shortened,
as has occurred with OED (OED 2005). Second, etymological research attempts to trace the
evolution of terms and senses through ancestral languages. Our knowledge here is limited by the
extent and availability of research on particular terms/meanings of interest. Further, without
accessing latest research, any etymological report can provide a misleading or incorrect context
within which an explication o f ‘relevance’ is attempted.
The Semantic Problem: Problems with Inventory. Addressing the semantic problem
involves two general tasks: (i) identifying the basic concept of relevance and providing a generic
definition to represent it and (ii) identifying and defining types of relevance relations or judgments.
Each task presupposes an adequate inventoiy, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation o f initial
usage and/or definitions. Although such an inventory involves difficult sampling issues (e.g.,
adequacy of size, representativeness), it is relatively straightforward when we are interested only in
a term. However, when we are interested in the basic concept, we have to take into consideration
that it can be designated by synonymous terms and expressions. An initial problem, as Plato
mentions, is that of identifying such an instance when the essential conditions o f a concept have not
yet been determined. Without the clear delimitation that essential conditions provide, we cannot
determine whether an adequate or representative sample o f terms/expressions that designate the
basic concept has been collected. Nor can we determine whether the definition accurately
represents usage. To resolve this problem we need to discover what meaning has been associated
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with the term ‘relevance’, reduce expressions containing the term to the basic concept, and then
identify instances of the basic concept as designated by synonymous terms and expressions.
The Semantic Problem: Problems with Terminology and Variable Expressions. Symbols
are representational devices that provide a potentially unlimited flexibility in use. Such flexibility,
when unregulated, as it largely is in natural language, can lead to a great variety of terms and
expressions (statements and definitions). Such has been the case with ‘relevance’. Through at least
25 centuries o f language use, a complex terminological and conceptual ‘heap’, as Aristotle would
describe it, has resulted in the form of various definitions, natural expressions, and attempted
elucidations of relevance. When asking what relevance is, we find ourselves, as Hobbes aptly
notes, like birds fluttering at a window attempting but unable to return to the outside after having
come in through a circuitous route that started with the chimney and passed through several rooms.
An important task, then, is to sort this heap of terms and associated definitions. Because
terms and concepts are representational devices, considering them in relation to their referent
systems is necessary to arrange them systematically, even if a conventional classification system is
developed from a particular perspective or a for particular purpose other than representing natural
kinds. Ultimately, the referent systems can be either conceptual/representational or factual/nonrepresentational. The former are pre-established and the latter are pre-existing. In either case, any
approach must be scientific. Conflicting approaches include stipulation and intuitionism.
Stipulation cannot answer semantic questions that concern either current or past meaning because
it creates a new or future oriented semantic frame. Intuitionism fails to provide analyses and
explanations/explications. Accordingly, I have not selected them for my study. The source of
information is also crucial to answering the relevance question. Inadequate, problematic, or
conflicting information sources include contrived examples developed to illustrate or prove a point.
In summary, what is needed to answer the relevance question is a scientific philosophical
approach that involves (i) an adequate inventory of terms, natural expressions, and definitions; (ii)
a sufficient understanding o f language to permit accurate interpretation; (iii) a systematic analysis
of the inventory to reduce the complex collection of terms and associated meanings to their basic
concepts, (iv) a detailed analysis o f referent systems; (v) a synthesis that arranges the terms and
basic concepts systematically; and (vi) a broader conceptual system that adequately represents
corresponding factual systems and within which the synthesis can be situated.
Problems with Examples Used to Illustrate Relevance. Two kinds of examples can be
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used to illustrate the notion of relevance. One is actual use of the concept as designated by
‘relevance’, ‘relevant’, or a synonymous term or expression. Conformity to previous usage and the
extent to which a particular sense has been used must be taken into consideration when providing a
semantic account o f relevance. The other kind o f example is one that is constructed. Although
constructed examples cannot answer the historical semantic question, they can conform to and
elucidate a previous definition/use or new stipulation, although the latter may or may not conform
to the semantic convention previously established. For example, stipulating that relevance is a
relation does not correspond to previous usage o f the concept as a relation o f significance.
Consequently, the example, ‘Science is relevant to reality’, conforms to the stipulation but not
previous usage. In contrast, the constructed example ‘The dynamics of predator prey relations are
relevant to population ecology’ conforms to the notion of relevance as a relation o f significance.
However, any constructed example runs the risk of being contrived or simplistic. The problem with
them is that they can be insufficiently analysed and outlined, which means the elements and their
relations are not sufficiently identified or detailed. This inadequacy could result from a lack of
familiarity with or attention to referent systems. Accordingly, such examples provide only an
appearance of conformity to a definition. If the example is not sufficiently detailed, it will not serve
a theory well, and might even corrupt it.

7.2 Analysis and Evaluation of Relevance Statements
Starting Point - The Semiotic System. From an analytical/evaluative perspective, the first
point of contact is with an expression of relevance, which is a linguistic system that occurs within a
greater semiotic system. The linguistic system is limited to symbolic representational devices,
whereas the semiotic system also includes humans and the environment within which humans exist
and communicate through language. Specifically, the point of contact is with a linguistic system
that contains the term ‘relevance’, its relatives, or some other expression that designates the same
concept. We encounter such a system through hearing or reading terms that are organized into
different levels o f integration; such as, sentences and paragraphs. Upon such an encounter and to
understand the symbols, we must interpret the meaning of the linguistic system, which takes into
account origin, convention, peculiarity, referent systems, and our respective knowledge. To
elaborate, the linguistic system originates through a constructive cognitive process, which is a
subsystem o f a greater biological process as well as the greater ecological system within which
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both are situated. AH have historical dimensions that bear upon current states and all must be
understood to develop a complete theory o f relevance. Concept formation can conform to previous
convention or establish new meaning, which might or might not be accepted or continue within a
system o f language users. As symbols, terms and expression must be considered within the context
of their referents. After all, the intent is to use a physical object as a representational device.
Reduction o f Expressions and Modelling o f Systems. Relevance statements, as relational
statements, are term and concept systems. Both terms and concepts have a representational
function and different statements can represent the same conceptual system. Accordingly,
definitions o f ‘relevance’ terms and various expressions must be reduced to their basic concepts
and propositions. Then, a conceptual model must be constructed by considering the system of
referents to which the basic concept or proposition corresponds. The direction o f reference is
opposite to the direction of evidence. In other words, the conceptual system is constructed to
represent the referent system and the referent system determines the conceptual system. The
determination is not causal. Rather, it is evidential, which brings into play the causal mechanism of
cognitive acts. Analogies of the referent-representation association include original and copy,
painting and print, performance and recording, landscape and photograph, touch and sensation,
sensation and nerve impulse, pre-synapse and post synapse, nerve impulse and percept, and percept
and concept. When the model o f the conceptual system is tested to ensure it correctly represents its
referents, the model can be applied normatively to evaluate the original definition or relevance
statement. Such representation differs from the construction o f goals, design/creation o f artefacts,
and the modelling of artefactual systems (e.g., political states, laws, or corporations), which are
based on conceptions of future states and are similar to predictions except that they are acted upon
to realize them. Such relevance relations are classified by Bunge as pragmatic. Analysing and
modelling them has been outside the scope of this study.
Terminological/Conceptual Context o f a Relevance Statement. A relevance statement is
abstracted from a greater and more complex context o f other terms and concepts, which represent
either ideas or facts and these are situated within their respective hierarchic systems. A relevance
statement must be situated accordingly. Otherwise, the abstracted statement could be misleading.
First, if the statement is expressed within an ordinary context of language use and no author is
readily available to clarify meaning, dictionaries are required to situate the statement within its
semantic context because dictionaries are constructed to represent meanings o f terms as shared by
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a community o f language users. That is, they attempt to represent a social convention concerning
meaning. Further, a principal means of learning meaning is ultimately through a dictionary, given
the degree to which they are used in teaching. By saying ‘a principal means’, I do not imply that
they are the only or even the most important means o f acquiring language. By saying ‘ultimately’, I
do not imply that dictionaries are of immediate or direct importance to particular individuals such
as pre-school children. However, they can indirectly influence such a child through their parents
who have used dictionaries themselves or were taught through the use o f dictionaries, particularly
those parents o f a different native tongue who have used dictionaries to learn English. How
important dictionaries are in acquiring language is a factual matter to be confirmed through
quantitative research.
Unfortunately, dictionaries can be o f limited immediate help because definitions can be
vague and/or unsystematic, which generates the need for further analysis to render a precise
interpretation o f the statement, assuming that the speaker/writer is not present to clarify intended
meaning. Further, if a speaker/writer alters the meaning o f a term through use or stipulation, the
accompanying text must be consulted along with dictionary definitions o f terms used in this greater
context o f text. In any case, the task is to determine what the speaker/writer means not what the
listener/reader thinks or supposes the speaker/writer means or wants the statement to mean.
Second, in specialized contexts like particular academic disciplines, a mix o f specialized and
ordinary definitions are used. Similar concerns result.

7 3 The Meaning and Occurrence of Relevance
In this section I assemble various substantive elements that have emerged from the
analyses and evaluations presented in previous chapters. I also elaborate on these elements.
First Sense o f Relevance: Connection. All relevance statements are composed o f at least
one relational term and two relata terms. Together, these terms are used to express an n-ary
relation between referents o f the relata terms. Delimiting or discovering the breadth o f relations to
which relevance refers is required to understand the notion of relevance, identify instances of
relevance relations, communicate and reason effectively, and develop a theory o f relevance. If
relevance is conceived to be synonymous with relation, then ‘connection’ would be its only general
sense. Any further specification o f terms would identify a greater class within which relation and
relevance would be included, the same class as relation and relevance, subclasses that identify
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types o f connections or objects, and/or the necessary or predominant characteristics o f systems to
which relational statements refer. In contrast, if relevance is conceived to be a relation o f
significance, then ‘connection’ would be the primary sense of relevance because it is logically prior
to significance; i.e., significance presupposes a connection between at least two objects. Under this
conception, a definition o f ‘relevance’ would employ ‘relation’ to identify the class within which
relevance is included and other terms would be used to identify the same class as relevance,
subclasses, and/or necessary or predominant characteristics o f referent systems.
Second Sense o f Relevance: Significance. As outlined in Chapter 4, the history o f using
relevance indicates that it has been conceived largely as a relation of significance. Even if relevance
were to be conceived largely or merely as ‘connection’ and function as a synonym o f relation,
distinguishing between relations o f significance and non-significance would be desirable. First, a
fundamental difference occurs between objects o f significance and non-significance and the nature
of their relations. Second, employing the notion o f significance creates a conceptual link between
objects that might otherwise be considered disparate, as discussed below. Such a link, permits
greater integration of knowledge and understanding, or, as Heraclitus [5th C. BCE] said, unity in
the face o f diversity.
Significance arises with the emergence o f life. Even simple organisms like bacteria are
beings o f significance because they must act to acquire nutrients, avoid harms, and reproduce. Not
merely events, these acts demonstrate importance to the bacteria. Otherwise, they would not act the
way they do or exist as they are. Further, such acts are selective in that they are species-specific or
individual-specific determinations of what to do (e.g., acquire nutrients for growth or maintenance)
and such determinations are a function o f the bacterium’s genetic constitution. Being selective,
such acts are relevance determinations. These are similar to a human who is aware o f a
physiological problem like hunger, encounters a cognitive problem like the question ‘What should I
eat?’, and assesses various options to determine what to eat. This assessment involves a succession
of relevance frames; such as, edibility, nutritional quality, availability, preference, and dietary
requirements/restrictions due to infirmity. Ultimately, however, a genetically determined
physiologic change gives rise to a relevant act o f consumption to satisfy the need generated by that
change. The difference between these two examples of relevance determinations is that one is noncognitive and the other is (partly) cognitive.
Relevance relations, as relations of significance, are separate and distinct from abiotic
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relations because abiotic entities do not have internal mechanisms to direct their development and
maintain their structure. Certainly, a water molecule has a propensity to bind with other water
molecules and crystals develop under particular conditions. However, such growth is a function of
the properties o f water that change as environment changes. Unlike an organism, the water
molecule has no control mechanism to maintain that structure despite vaiying external conditions.
Proposed Terminology cmd Classification. Developing a classification system and a set of
terms applicable to various disciplines would be helpful in developing a general theory o f relevance
as well as elucidating types o f relevance relations. First, developing a generic conception o f
relevance requires cross-disciplinary inventory and analysis of both statements and specific
definitions. Second, elucidating each type o f relevance presupposes an adequate understanding and
conceptualization of the generic concept o f relevance. A single framework would allow unified
research, consistent communication, and exchange o f findings among researchers from various
disciplines. Developing the framework is as important as defining the unit o f space designated by
‘metre’, which allows measurement regardless o f discipline, or defining the pitch o f sound as
designated by the note ‘A ’, which allows various musical instruments to be constructed or tuned so
that musicians can play harmoniously.
Constructing a classification system and related nomenclature rests on the objects to be
included in that system, which is why discovering the basic concept o f relevance is so important.
That is, without a definite delimitation, a representative sample of objects to be included in a
conception could not be taken. As such, a representative description and classification could not be
completed. Within the context of relevance as a relation of significance and the statements analysed
in previous sections, I have adapted Bunge’s (1974, 1996, 1997, 1998a/b, 2003) philosophic
system and developed a preliminary classification system and nomenclature for relevance (Table
28). What is important at this time is not the name o f a category but the differentiae that
distinguish categories. The names could change after considering other possibilities that might
better reflect the differentiae. The following provides a brief overview. For detail, see Table 27.
Relation is the basic categoiy. Relevance is distinguished from relations o f nonsignificance, where significance is a function of biotic acts o f construction. I have tentatively called
these acts ‘relevance determinations’ and divided them into cognitive and non-cognitive acts and
named them ‘relevance judgments’ and ‘relevance acts’, respectively. A great number o f relevance
acts are undertaken by organisms and, at this time, I have not attempted to inventory, describe, or
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classify them. However, I have divided relevance judgments into those that are made through
conscious deliberation and those that are intuited. I have named them, ‘relevance deliberations’ and
‘relevance intuitions’, respectively. I have distinguished several types o f relevance relations based
on whether or not relata include representational objects.
General Function o f the Concept o f Relevance. Depending on the purpose and object of
its application, the concept o f relevance is used either descriptively or normatively. It is used
descriptively when someone constructs a relevance statement to represent a referent system.
Specifically, ‘ x is relevant to y ’ is constructed to represent a referent system that includes x, y and
a general or particular association between them. An example of a descriptive relevance statement
is, ‘Penicillin is relevant to the treatment of infectious agents.’ Such a statement might or might not
be an accurate representation o f the referent system, which is the object of a descriptive relevance
statement. In contrast, when relevance is used normatively, the object o f such a statement is
another relevance statement. Considering the example, whether or not penicillin is effective against
all infectious agents of all organisms or whether it is tolerated by the patient is an issue to decide.
The role o f relevance in this application is to express an evaluation of that statement in terms of its
accuracy in representing its referent system. To summarize, a model of the referent system is
employed in the processes through which descriptive and normative statements are constructed but
the purpose of making a descriptive statement and the object of that statement differ from the
purpose and object of a normative statement.
In both descriptive and normative applications, relevance provides a non-specific
indication of a relation between at least two objects. Accordingly, a relevance statement can
generate a ‘why’ question. Or, such a question can be anticipated in constructing the statement. In
either case, a more specific relational term can be used or more information can be provided to
show that the asserted relation occurs between referents. For example, despite positivist claims,
Bunge (1996, 1999) maintains that a scientifically based philosophy is relevant to sociology. Both
books explain why by identifying specific connections between the two disciplines. So, a relevance
statement to be a well-formed must contain two parts: (i) the relevance claim and (ii) justification
for that claim, which ultimately involves confirmation that referents are associated as asserted.
The non-specificity of relevance is not necessarily an impediment to reasoning or
communication. In fact, it can work as effectively and efficiently as an enthymeme, provided that
referent systems are well known (e.g., state o f hunger, tastes, food availability). In such cases,
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referent systems are assumed or held in the background until a questionable relevance relation is
asserted, (e.g., when hungry, someone offers food that is disliked).
Being non-specific, the descriptive use of relevance designates a broad class that includes
all constructed (factual or conceptual) relations determined by objects o f significance. The
normative use of relevance subsumes all criteria related to the evaluation o f statements that purport
to represent relations of significance. Normative criteria are derived from the frame o f constructed
relations because a particular statement purports to represent either an existing factual or
established conceptual system. Correspondence is a matter o f either factual or formal truth. In
either case, a systematic approach that recognizes various levels o f integration is required to
understand and model relevance relations, whether they are factual, terminological, or conceptual,
and to evaluate relevance claims.
Function o f the Term ‘Relevance The term ‘relevance’, in either its noun or noun
adjective function, refers or applies to (i) a generic concept of relevance, as expressed by
‘Relevance =df a relation o f significance’; (ii) types of relevance determinations (acts or
judgments), as expressed by the name ‘pragmatic relevance’; (iii) a conceptual system expressed
by a statement and composed o f an n-ary relation, as expressed by ‘Relevance concerns statements
of the form x is related toy, where the relation is one o f significance’; (iv) a particular relation of
significance, as expressed by ‘Your answer is of relevance to my question’; (v) a referent biotic
system, as expressed by ‘Relevance is a function of an organism’s act of construction’; or (v) a
theory o f any or all of the above, as expressed by ‘In psychology, Relevance Theory concerns the
maximization o f contextual effects’.
Function o f the Term ‘Relevant’. The term ‘relevant’ is classified as an adjective, which is
misleading if taken to signal reference to a property o f the first relatum (e.g., a premise) or its
referent. However, ‘relevant’ has a dual role as a grammatical connector and an indicator o f a
relation. That is, ‘relevant’ is used grammatically to indicate a connection between linguistic
objects and conceptually to indicate a general or unspecified connector/connection between
conceptual objects and their referents. Its role as an adjective, then, is to describe an aspect o f the
referent system; i.e., the connection between referents.
Relation versus Relevance Theory. A theory of relevance ought to be constructed from
within a theory of relations, which means that it must be developed from a theory of systems.
However, not all types o f relations, relational theories, or systems are appropriate to a theory of
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Table 27. Preliminary Classification and Terminology for Relevance.
A. Statics
1. Relation: Connection between two objects.
2a. fnamej: A relation o f non-significance, where that relation is generated through an abiotic event
2b. Relevance: A relation o f significance, where that relation is constructed by a biotic agent. Includes all types of
relevance ( T-Relevance)
3a. [Non-Representational] Relevance: A constructed relation between a non-representational object of
significance and any other such object, where the relation is one way and its direction is to an object of
significance; i.e., NR(x) *-> NR(y), where F(y) is an object o f significance.
3b. Representational Relevance: A constructed relation between any object and a representational object;
i.e., x *-> Rp(y)
4a. Sensory Relevance: A constructed relation between any factual object and a sensory representation of
it; i.e. F(x) m-> Rp(y).
4b. Perceptual Relevance: A constructed relation between any factual object and a perceptual
representation o f it, which involves sensory relations; i.e. F(x) a->Rpfy).
4c. Memory Relevance: A constructed relation between any representational object and a stored
representation o f it and involves perceptual, sensory, and other mental object relations; i.e., Rp(x) R'->

Rpfy).
4d. Imagination Relevance: A constructed relation between any representational object and a previously
stored representation o f it; which involves perceptual, sensory, and other mental object relations; i.e., R p ( x )

m-> Rpfy).
4e. Conceptual Relevance: A constructed relation between concepts; i.e., R p ( x ) m - > R p f y ) .
4f. Symbolic Relevance: A constructed relation between a factual (term) or conceptual object and a
factual or representational object, which can involve sensory/perceptual relations and/or other mental
object relations; i.e., F(x) or Rp(x) m->Rpfy) or Ffy), where the second term is derivatively o f significance.
4g. Evidential Relevance: A constructed relation between a factual object and ultimately a conceptual
object (datum or linguistically represented experience) that stands in relation to a hypothesis, where datum
and hypothesis are co-referential; i.e., F(x) R'-> Rpfy)m-> Rp(z).
4h. Pragmatic Relevance: A constructed relation between a factual object such as an action or
consequence and a representational object such as a goal; i.e. F(x) m-> Rpfy). Or, a constructed relation
between a conceptual object and an action or consequence of an object of significance; i.e. Rp(x) *-> Ffy).

B. Dynamics
1. Relevance Determination: (i) A cognitive or non-cognitive act of constructing a relation between an object of
significance and at least one other object or (ii) a cognitively or non-cognitively determined construction involving a
relation between an object of significance and at least one other object.
2(0 Relevance Act: A non-cognitive act of constructing a relation between an object of significance and at least
one other object or (ii) non-cognitively determined construction involving a relation between an object of
significance and at least one other object.
2(H) Relevance Judgment: A cognitive act of constructing a relation between an object of significance and at
least one other object or a cognitively determined construction involving a relation between an object of
significance and at least one other object.
a. Deliberative Judgment: A judgment represented by language arrived at through a process of reasoning of
which the agent is aware because language used to reason makes reasoning evident to the agent.
b. Intuited Judgment: A judgment represented by language arrived at through a process of reasoning of
which the agent is not aware.
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relevance when conceived as a relation of significance. Nonetheless, where the nature o f the theory
or problem o f construction or evaluation concerns connection, then overlap might occur between
the two theories and exploration of both types of relations might help elucidate each other.
Relevance versus Determination. A relevance statement specifies a direction of relation,
which is from the first relatum to the second relatum. The direction of determination is opposite.
Both directions occur in the particular referent system and each is abstracted from it. Thus,
relevance is conceptually distinct from determination. However, both are needed in a well-formed
relevance statement where the relevance statement identifies the relation o f significance and the
determination statement provides the justification for it.
Evaluation o f Relevance Statements. Evaluating a relevance statement depends on the
referential and evidential relations established by the statement. A relevance statement refers to a
more specific relational statement that, in turn, refers to a corresponding factual or conceptual
system. The direction o f evidence/determination is in the opposite direction. Models of a particular
referent system or, when possible, a type of system must be constructed and these have a normative
function when applied to a statement that is supposed to represent the referent system. If any of
objects or relations of the system are not known, readily apparent, or clearly identified and the
speaker/writer is not available to elaborate on them, the relevance relation is indeterminate and an
evaluative judgment must be suspended.
Theory o f Relevance and Argument. An argument is a type of relevance statement of the
form 'x is relevant to y ’, where jc and y designate sentences or propositions and the type of relation
is inferential. In other words, ‘argument’ names a term/concept system composed of at least two
statements united by a relevance relation. Saying that one statement supports or entails another
statement identifies a specific relational term (‘supports’ or ‘entails’) subsumed under relevance.
Similarly, terms like ‘premise’ and ‘conclusion’ or indicators thereof are dual notions united by an
implicit relevance relation. Further, ‘argument’ identifies a category of relational statements that
can be constructed about any matter, which means their referents can be any conceptual and/or
factual system. As such, the evaluation of an argument is determined by the referent systems to
which it is supposed to correspond. That is, arguments, as representational devices of a particular
relational form, refer to and are determined by their referent systems. When an argument is factual,
both pre-established conceptual systems and pre-existing or predicted factual systems must be
taken into consideration. Specifically, both formal and factual truth apply to the construction and
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evaluation of arguments. Hence, a theory o f relevance includes a theory o f argument. Developing
the latter is similar to the former except that instances o f arguments must be identified, described,
and classified rather than any relational statement.
Relations between Relevance, Strength, and Sufficiency. Given that significance
presupposes a connection between two objects, where one is an object o f significance, the concept
of significance differs from relevance only in emphasis. A person might be inclined to emphasise
the primary sense of relevance as a connection between two objects and de-emphasise the
secondary sense o f significance as a particular kind o f connection between two objects. Such
differences in emphasis can serve a useful purpose in that they permit focus on one sense or the
other, providing that such emphasis does not lead to denying or forgetting the other essential sense.
Even so, an immediate problem arises when asserting that relevance varies in degree, if that
variance is a function of a connection. As we know, a connection between two physical objects can
be variable. For example, two boards can be in contact with each other to varying degrees
depending on their overlap. However, whether such is the case with objects o f a relevance relation
is an issue yet to be settled. In contrast, no such issue arises with significance, which clearly varies
in degree. For example, oxygen is much more important to me than cream puffs are. Accordingly,
given a relevance relation between jc and y, where the number of x’s is greater than one ( x„ M-> y;
n > 1), each x can be o f greater or lesser significance and, hence, the relevance of an x to y can
vary in degree. Further, the strength o f a set o fx ’s is a function of its significance to y relative to
the complete set o fx ’s required to establish y. In other words, like relative frequency, the strength
of an x must be determined by comparing it to other x’s as a whole, where the requirements of the
whole are determined by y. For example, if y is a human being and the specific object of
significance is its survival, the needs of the human create a frame o f relevance and it functions to
determine what resources (x) are relevant or connected and significant to the satisfaction o f those
needs. Those resources, like cream puffs and oxygen, can be quantified and their relative
magnitudes determined or otherwise ranked if non-quantifiable. Such measures or ranks represent
degree o f significance or strength as determined by or from the object of significance (y). Without
such a comparison, attributing strength would be intuitive, which means the attribution o f strength
would be a guess, even if dressed up to look otherwise or made authoritatively.
To generalize, I suggest that when significance varies, relevance varies, which indicates an
equivalence relation between the two. Significance presupposes connection and the significance of
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an x is relative to other jc’ s as determined by y or the second term of a relevance statement. Further,
significance determines strength and overall strength is a function of the significance/strength of
individual elements composing the set of jc’ s . Finally, significance and strength are ultimately a
function of the object o f significance, which is y.

7.4 Conclusion o f this Inquiry
After an initial review of a wide range of the literature on relevance, I concluded that a systematic
inquiry into the problem of relevance was needed. In this thesis, I have presented results o f that
inquiry, which is based on a sample of problem statements, discovery o f further problems,
identification of the nature of the problems investigated, determination o f a suitable framework
within which to conduct the study, determination of an approach, and consideration o f appropriate
information sources. The latter includes relevance statements, dictionary definitions, and accounts
of relevance published in the academic literature. Based on analyses and evaluations o f relevance
statements and dictionary definitions, I suggest that relevance has been conceived largely as a
relation of significance. However, relevance does not have to be conceived as such. Further, it is
not conceived that way by theorists who define it merely as a relation. Our choice is to determine
which conception best suits our epistemic needs.
In either case of conceiving relevance as any relation or a relation o f significance, relations
of significance must be distinguished from relations of non-significance and respective theories
must be developed for each type of relation. They must be distinguished because the two types of
relations are fundamentally different. Analogously, the blood system and the lymphatic system are
both circulatory systems. Hence, they share common properties. However, they must be
distinguished because they are fundamentally different in terms o f their composition and specific
function. The notion o f significance is an important one to recognize in developing a theoiy of
relevance because it characterizes what we paradigmatically mean by relevance and it can be
extended to other cases, thereby providing a conceptual connection among them. For example,
when I say that the sentience of an organism is relevant to the development of an ethical theory, I
assert that such a state is of significance to an epistemic problem of a human being, who is an
object o f significance in its own right. Other organisms are also objects of significance in their own
right, by virtue of their interaction with other objects through acts o f consumption, reproduction,
maintenance, and defence. Hence, a comprehensive, general theory of relevance must take such

132

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

relations into consideration and significance can provide a foundational theme.
Relevance statements are linguistic objects that are representational devices. They function
to represent a relation that, under one conception, involves an object of significance. As such, a
relevance statement is a symbolic representation of a referent system. Hence, referents o f a
relevance statement must be taken into consideration to construct or evaluate such a statement. A
comprehensive, systematic approach to modelling referent systems is crucial to constructing or
evaluating a relevance statement, defining relevance precisely, and developing a general theory of
relevance. The general theory that I have provided is partial because it includes only a small
sample of statements, definitions, and published accounts. It is provisional in the sense that it is
based only on a small sample. Different information can lead to the need to refine or revise the
account I have provided. I suggest that researchers continue this effort.

133

permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Appendix 1. Definitions of Old Scots Terms Organized by Term and Chronology

D efinition

T erm

D ate

Relev, v l

1375

1. tr. T o rescue (a person) from trouble, difficulty or danger, to bring o r give aid to by one’s action or
activity.
(In early use, chiefly with reference to help given in battle. Also, to com e to the relief o f (a
besieged garrison). A lso flg. in this sense. Also, once, with a non-m aterial thing as object. Also
absol)

1375

2

L. relevare
to raise
again,
assist.

.

b. To assist o r furnish (with provisions, arm s, etc.). Also, w ithout const.

1375
1508

3.

c. T o be relewit o f (an enem y), to be freed o f him; to get rid of.

1578
4.

a. To free (person/com m unity) from , o f a legal (freq., financial) obligation; to give legal relief; to
reim burse

1574

b. W ith th e am ount due (as a fine, debt, etc.) as object: To pay off, repay.

1521

c. T o free from a charge or duty.

1616

d. To free (land) from (of) a financial burden.

1540

5.

1644

c. To free (a pledge) from pawn.
d. ? To replace one dish by another. Cf. 18th c. Eng., in this sense (1741).

1698
6

1400

a. T o set free (a person, also a bird o r ship) (from , out of, furth of, o f bondage or captivity).
Chiefly Sc.
b. To set free from a charge o r duty (? by supplying a substitute or replacem ent).

<1644

.

7.

To m ak (a need, weakness, etc.) less harm ful or oppressive; to relieve o r mitigate.
a. T o exalt or elevate (a person o r thing); to raise in rank, standing or condition.

1540

b. To restore (a structure or its parts).

1420

c. T o lift, raise up, (? or restore) to (till, in) a better condition.
8

1475

Releve, v2

a. T o free (a person, com m unity, etc.) from , fra, o f (a cause of) m ental pressure or distress, or
physical pain o r discomfort; also w ith som e remedy, etc.
b. To free from (fra) a punishm ent o r penalty; to let off.

<1615

1497

a. T o assist (a person) by donation, o r provision o f w hat is necessary; to succour one in poverty
o r need.

1533

.

a. To recover o r regain (heritable) land.
b. To advance, or return, to battle, c. To advance or charge (on an enemy).
To refer or remit.
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Definition

T erm

Date

Relation, n

C1390

L. relation-,
f. relat-, p.p.
stem o f referre
to refer

1425

b. In legal contexts: A statem ent by a w itness o f the circum stances know n to him .

1661

c. To m ake relation (to, o f a m atter), to m ake reference or allusion.

1425
<1638

1657
?
1666

Relative, adj

1.a. T he action o f giving an account o r narration; recital, report. A lso personified.

2. A particular relation, narration, report, o r statement; a (or one’s) account.
3.a A relationship, correspondence o r connection, b. Betw een (betuixt) things, o r o f one thing to
(unto) another.
b. O f a person to a place or office.
c. Betw een (betuix) persons, o r o f one person to another, specif, d. Kinship.
e. coll. sing, and pi. (O ne’s) kindred, relations.

1531

l.a . Relating (to a m atter or, in gram m ar, to an antecedent term), b. n. A relative word.

1631

l.a . tr. To recount; give an account o f facts or circum stances know n to one before an official
examiner.

F. relatif
(13C.)
L. relaSv-

Relate, v
L. relat-,p.p.
stem o f referre
Refer v

1657

b. intr. To be o f concern to; to affect.
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T erm

Etym ology

Relevand, adj
Relevant, adj

1516
Med. L. relevans in relevantes (Tegitimi,
validi, probantes’, 1481 in D u Cange)
articuli, f. L. relevare Relev(e v .l

Relevantly, adv

Irrelevant, adj

OF. irrelevant in sam e sense. N o t in Eng.
use till 1786 (DOST).

Irrelevant, n
Irrelevande, n.

Apparently not English before 1800.

Irrelevance, n
Relevancy, n

Relevance, n

Only Sc., f. Relevant adj., with nominal
ending conformed to L. type -antia

D efinition

D ate

1518

I"
R e la tu m

R e la tio n al
T e rm

2—
R e la tu m

Relevant, adj.
pertinent
com petent
sufficient

Legally pertinent, competent, or sufficient; relevant.

1536

In conform ity with correct legal procedures, rules, etc.;
with pertinence; relevantly.

1558

Said o f allegations or pleadings in a law-suit: N o t
bearing on or supporting the case advanced, not
pertinent or applicable, inadmissible.

1559

Irrelevance, irrelevancie.

1558

W ant o f pertinence, impropriety. (Said o f legal
pleadings.)

1561

Irrelevancie.

1575

1. a. The quality or fact o f being relevant, in the sense
o f Relevant adj.

1661

b. A n objection to an action or defence on the
grounds o f legal incompetence.

1661

Relevancy.

Source: D OST

136

conform ity

legal
procedures
legal rule

allegations
pleadings

bearing
supporting
pertinent
applicable

case

pleadings

pertinence
propriety

action
defence

com petence
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Appendix 2. Identification of Relata in OED Quotations.
Relevant 1. a. Bearing upon, connected with, pertinent to, the matter in hand.
Q uotation

D ate/S ource
1560 R O L L A N D C rt.V en u sI.4 9 8

I sail the schaw ane answer releuant.

1646 CHAS. I Lett, to A. Henderson (1649) 55

To determ ine our differences, or, a t least, to m ake our Probations and Argum ents
R elevant

1646 R. BAILLIE Anabaptism (1647) 143

It is very relevant i f it w ere true.

1707 J. FRAZER Disc. Second Sight 15

It seem s truly to be founded on relevant grounds.

1782 T. POW NALL Study Antiq. 140

A positive regulation respecting marriage, relevant to a like regulation o f the institution
o f die theocracy.

1827 H. STEUART Planter's G. (1828) 78

I f w e either adm it those objections as relevant, o r obviate them as unfounded.

1851 GLADSTONE Glean. (1879) VI. xxiii. 15

The advantage m ost relevant o f all to the present purpose.

1875 JO W ETT Plato (ed. 2) IV. 4

M any things in a controversy m ight seem relevant, if w e knew to w hat they were
intended to refer.

1948 D. CECIL Two Quiet Lives II. 140

To learn everything that could possibly be thought relevant to the su b ject

1969 Harper's Mag. Nov. 86

Either w e can com m it ourselves to changing the institutions o f our society that need to
be changed, to m ake them to use a term which I hate ‘relevant’..or w e can sit back and
toy to defend them.

1970 N.Y. Times 1 July 44

M useum s should have a m ore involved or relevant public role.

1976 Listener 20 M ay 627/3

The ultimate sin o f the broadcaster is to keep o ff die air, because o f his political or
social prejudices, subjects which are relevant and significant.

1978 S. BRADEN Artists & People p. xvii,

What actually m akes a w ork o f art relevant to people? It has been said that relevance is
achieved when artists m eet the real observations o f their public.

137

1“ R e la tu m

V* R e la tu m

answ er

<question>

probations argum ents

<issue, decisions-

<claim >

<conclusion>

grounds <prem ises>

<conclusion>

positive m arriage
regulation

regulation o f a theocratic
inst’n

objections
<prem ises>

<conclusion>

advantage
(favoring circum stance)

unspecified purpose

<claim s>

issue
<conc!usion>

<knowledge>

subject

social institutions initial vs later state

<social ideals/norm s>

m useum s

public role

socio-political subjects

public broadcasting
<public attention>

w ork o f art

real audience
observations
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Relevancy 1. The quality or fact of being relevant: a. in Law, esp. Sc. Law.

1561 Reg. Privy Council Scot. 1 .173

O f the law it is requirit to the relevancie thairof that ather o f the partis..be relevant in the
self, utherwyise the haill to be nocht relevant

2** R e la tu m

1* R e la tu m

Q uotation*

D ate/S ource

<evidence>
<allegations>

legal actions o r circum stances
<principles>

[To be relevant the law requires that either o f the parties be relevant to the legal actions or
circumstances; otherwise, a victory will n ot be relevant.]
1575-6 Ibid. D. 487

The relivancy o f die said allegeance.

allegeance

1693 STAIR Instit. IV. xxxix. § 12 (ed. 2)
665 a **

The m eaning o f Relevancy (which is m ore accustom ed with us, than else~where) im ports
die Justice o f the point, that is alledged hi be Relevant.

point

legal principle

1715 BURNET Own Tim e VIL (1734)
11.521

T hen the M atter o f the Charge, w hich is there called the Relevancy o f the Libel, w as to be
argued by Lawyers.

libel

charge

1786 BURKE Art. agst. W. Hastings
W ks. 1842 H. 107/1

The competence, o r credibility, or relevancy o f any o f the said affidavits, or other
attestations.

affidavits
attestations

<issue/decision>

1818 SCOTT H it. Midi, xxii,

The presiding Judge next directed the counsel to plead to the relevancy.

<alleged evidence>

<issue/decision>

1838 W. BELL Diet. Law Scot. 844

T he relevancy o f the libel is the justice and sufficiency o f the matters therein stated to
warrant a decree in die terms asked.

libel, case

decree

1883 Law Rep. 11 Q.B. Div. 594

H e failed to satisfy me that in a case in w hich this strict relevancy could not be proved the
advocate would not be protected.

object o f a case

object o f a case

<case>

<protection o f a n advocate>

* Definitions from DOST: (i) Requirit: requires; (ii) Ather: either; (iii) Partis: One entitled to a part or share (of something); (iv) In the self, in itself intrinsically; generated from or having its source in the thing referred to; also, specif., of
legal actions or circumstances, requiring no further action; (v) Hail: The winning of a goal in a ball-game, (vi) Allegeance: 1. An allegation or assertion. 2. spec. An allegation o f right or title advanced in a court o f law, or one implying a
charge or accusation against a person. 3. Alleging; citation (DOST), (vii) Libel, n: 1. A formal declaration or missive; 2. a. A leaflet or pamphlet posted up or circulated, assailing nr defaming th e character n f a pwsAn n r remaining sm rriln m
or treasonable matter, b. A scurrilous, defamatory or treasonable publication; 3. The formal statement of die grounds on which a civil or criminal prosecution is made; a legal indictment, (viii) Libel, v: la. To state as grounds for a
prosecution or legal action; to specify in a libel; b. intr. To draw up a libel against a particular person, to cite (the person) as defender, c. absol. To take legal action, d. tr. To state the case against (a person), to pursue at law on certain
specified grounds. 2. gen. To specify in writing concerning (of) a person. Charge: 5. An injunction, command, or order; a legal summons. 6. An imputation or accusation against a person
** STAIR, Sir James Dahymple, 1st Viscount. The institutions of the law of Scotland 1681 (also 1693).
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Relevant: 2. Sc. Law. Legally pertinent or sufficient
1" R e la tu m

Q uotation

D ate/S ource

V* R e la tu m

1561

[see RELEVANCY]

1644 M axwell Prerog. K ings 107

I f they can m ake no relevant endictment. .against them.

endictm ent
(record, accusation)

persons <acts>

1723 in Maclaurin Argt. & Decis. Cases
(1 7 7 4 )70

[They] find the libel relevant to infer the pains o f law.

libel

legal action/retribution

1753 Stewart's Trial 149

[They] rem it the pannel, w ith the libel as found relevant, to foe knowledge o f an assize.

libel

<legal judgm ent >

1818 SCOTT Hrt. Midi, xxii,

The defence, that foe panel had comm unicated her situation to ha- sister, w as a relevant
defence.

defense

<legaljudgm ent>

fraud, force, fear

<legal> actions

1838 W. BELL Diet. Law Scot. 273

The exception o f fraud, o r force and fear, is not relevant against all actions.

Definitions from DOST: Action: 1. A legal process or suit against a person or persons; a ground for legal action; a claim at law. b A charge against a person; a civil or criminal offence.
one's 'cause',

2. A matter concerning a person or his interests;

b. A (good or bad) cause, c. A cause, ground, or reason to do something. 3. An act or deed. (The legal sense is earlier, and in Sc. more usual, than the general). Pains of Law: is not defined in SND, OED, and nothing is

retrieved from a search through onelook.com, a multidictionary search engine. A google search, however, turns up 67 pages with the phrase and most are from the UK, particularly Scotland. Usage o f the term during in the 1700-1800 or
concerning that time period indicates that the term means either that the court can proceed to try a case after a preliminary hearing or that punishment is appropriate after conclusion of a trial.

Relevantly
D ate/S ource

1* R e la tu m

Q u o tatio n

2** R e la tu m

1561 Reg. Privy Council Scot. 1. 180

In respect o f foe libell relevantlie libellit aganis foe said Thom as Kennedy.

libel

<acts o£> Thom as
Kennedy

1883 Law Rep. 11 Q.B. Div. 601

Parties and witnesses who m ake statements without malice and relevantly.

statements

<issue/decision>
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Irrelevancy
Q u o tatio n

1" R elatu m

1592 Sc. A cts Jas. VI (1597) § 151

Seeing that diverse exceptiones and objectiones risis vpon criminal] iibelles. be alleged
irrelevancie thereof.

exceptions/objections o f crim inal libels

1802-12 BENTHAM Ration. Judic. Evid.
(1827) IV. 576

In the following m odes o f collection..the plague o f irrelevancy is in a m anner unknown.

collection m ode

1833 LAMB Elia, Pop. Fallacies ix,

The utter and inextricable irrelevancy o f die second [m ember o f the question].

m em ber o f a question

1876 M OZLEY Univ. Serm. i. (1877) 7

To use the weapons o f one o f these societies against a sin or error in the other society, i
a total irrelevancy and misapplication.

a kind o f w eapon from one society
<regulation and/or act>

D ate/S ource

140

2 " R e la tu m
<issue/decision>

sin o r error in
another society
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Relevance: R elevancy; p ertinency to im p o rta n t c u rre n t issues (a s ed u catio n to o n e's la te r ca re e r, etc.); social o r v o catio n al relevancy.
D ate/S o arce

Q uotation

1" R e la tu m

2** R e la tu m
<issue/decision>

1733 INNES View Laws Scot. 11

The Relevance being determined,, .the Probation proceeds in die next Place.

probation

1865 LECKY Ration. (1878) II. 98

The main principle upon which the relevance o f this species o f narrative depends.

species o f narrative

1890 Spectator 19 Apr. 536/2

W hat relevance had such a feet to die duty o f the hour?

feet

duty o f the hour

1949 Poetry (Chicago) Feb. 299

Tate holds that the poem is autonom ous, and that the only relevance die subject-ideas
have is to each other within the formal m eaning o f the work itself.

subject ideas o f a poem

subject- ideas o f a poem

1955 Bull. Atom ic Sci. Apr. 126/1

Relevance is another one o f these non-assessable quantities which circum stances
require to be assessed.

1970 Time 30 Nov. 40

The impetus cam e largely from student demands for ‘relevance’, especially for the
overdue adm ission o f m ote minority-group students. Activism has also done m uch to
curb die old absurdities o f trivial research and needless PH.D.s.

1. adm ission o f m inority
students
2. R esearch PhD s

2. <Genuine problem s>

1975 Language for Life (Dept. Educ. & Sci.) ix.
129

W e have heard the case for ‘relevance’ carried to die point o f excluding fentasy o r any
stories with settings o r characters unfamiliar to the pupils from their first-hand
experience

fentasy or stories with
settings o r characters not
experienced first hand by
students

<early child education>

1975 Tim es 12 Feb. 11/7 Hal [sc. a novel]

while laudable in its social intentions is litde m ore than a piecing together o f stock
responses to die current dem and for ‘relevance’.

stock expressions

<social benefits

1977 Chem. in Brit. Mar. 105/3

It may seem anom alous in these days o f ‘relevance’ philosophy in tertiary education
that the average student o f chemistry gets litde inkling from his teachers., o f die vast
practical im portance o f disperse systems in industry.

disperse system s in industry

chem istry education

1978 N ew Scientist 21 S ep t 850/2

‘Relevance’ in research im plies both social efficacy and psychic com m itm ent by the
research worker.

scientific research

social efficacy

1.7?

researcher’s psychic
com m itm ent
Definitions:

o f the hour : A. enjoying the highest degree o f relevance, im portance, or popularity at the current m om ent o r particular tim e (Encarta) B. A definite tim e in general; an appointed tim e; an

occasion, spec, o f the hour: o f die present hour, o f the very time that is now with us; as in ‘the question o f the hour’ (OED)
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Relevant 3. R elieving; rem edial. Obs. rare .
Q u o tatio n

D ate/S ource
1730 BAILEY (folio)

Relevant, relieving.

1762 ASTON in Burke's Corr. (1844) I. 38

T hey ever pursued vindictive rather than relevant measures.

2"d R e la tu m

1*‘ R e la tu m

measures

<legal rem edy>

Irrelevant: N o t relev an t o r p ertin en t to th e case; n o t to th e p u rp o se; th a t does n o t ap p ly ; said orig. o f evidence o r arg u m en ts.
D ate/Source

Q u o tatio n

2“l R e la tu m

1“ R e la tu m

1786 BURKE W. Hastings Wks. XL 455

All or m ost o f which [depositions] were o f an irregular and irrelevant nature, and not fit or
decent to be taken by a British magistrate.

dispositions

<issue/decision>

1789 BELSHAM Ess. II. xl. 505

They are m anifestly irrevalent, and totally foreign to the..argument.

<premises>

argum ent

1799 M RS. J. W EST Tale o f Times I. 152

The above observation..is..irrelevant to the case before us.

observation

case

1823 LAMB Elia Ser. II. Poor Relation,

A Poor Relation..is the m ost irrelevant thing in nature.

poor relation

< other person related.>

1838 TUIRLWALL Greece xxxii. IV. 239

H e enters into a history o f his early life, which..is wholly irrelevant to the proper question.

personal early history

question

1877 E .R .C O N D E R B a s. Faith ii. 79

N o accumulation o f facts can establish an irrelevant conclusion.

factual statements

conclusion

1883 Law Rep. 11 Queen's Bench Div. 595

The words complained of. .were irrelevant to the proceedings before the police court.

words

proceedings
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Relevancy 1. T he q u ality o r fact o f being relev an t b. G en eral Use
1“ R e la tu m

Q notation

D ate/S ource

2"d R e la tu m
<question>

answ er

1826 Sheridaniana 49

His answer..would thus com e with m ore relevancy and effect.

1839 HALLAM Hist. Lit. II. vii. §3 note

It is o f no relevancy to the history o f literature.

1878 SIM PSON Sch. Shaks. I. 95

H is Irish enterprise had lost its appositeness and relevancy.

a person’s Irish enterprise

1961 Jm l. Physical Chem. LXV 317/1

W e are reporting these investigations, .because o f their relevancy to problem s o f the study o f
apparently simple exchange reactions o f chlorine.

report o f investigations

1980 Times Lit. Suppl. 30 M ay 609/2

A tendency to confuse relevancy w ith recency. *

history o f literature

study/problem o f
sim ple exchange
reactions o f C l

* This is not a relevance assertion. Rather, it is rem arks on a condition that may be associated with a relevance statement. T he claim is either that recency itself is insufficient to dem onstrate relevance o r the
concepts ‘relevancy’ and ‘recency’ are disjoint.

Irrelevantly adv., in a n irre le v a n t m a n n e r, n ot to th e p urpose.
D ate/S ource

Q notation

1" R e la tu m

1818 in TODD. 1821 LAMB Elia Ser. I.

All Fools' Day, It will com e in m ost irrelevantly and impertinently seasonable to the tim e o f day.

All F ool’s D ay

1894 Chicago Advance 18 Jan.

‘I suppose Mr. M orrison has returned’, she remarked, rather irrelevantly, as it seem ed to Maud.

rem ark

2“* R e la tu m
tim e o f day

Irrelevance: T h e fact o r qu ality of being irre le v a n t, w a n t o f p ertin en ce; w ith a n a n d pL a n irre le v a n t re m a rk , circu m stan ce, etc.
D ate/S ource

Q notation

1847 L. HUNT Men, W omen, & B. ID. xii.

All her wit is healthy; all its images entire and applicable throughout not palsy-stricken with irrelevance.

1" R e la tu m
w it <facial expression>

357
1872 W . MINTO Eng. Prose Lit. I. i. 64

A second irrelevance foisted in upon the back o f the first.

1873 ‘F. TRAFFORD’ (M rs. Riddell) Earl's

‘I am going away’, began Grace with apparent irrelevance.

Prom. n. 123

143
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Relevant l b . C o rre sp o n d e n t o r pro p o rtio n al to som ething.
1* R elatu m

Q u o tatio n

D ate/Son rce

2— R e la tu m

1868 ROGERS Pol. Econ. viii. (1876)76

Population and the supply o f food m ust be exactly relevant.

population

food supply

Ibid. xiv. 191

The v a lu e J s absolutely relevant to the dem and for them .

value o f an unspecified item

dem and

Irrelievable N o t relievable, th a t cannot be relieved.
D ate/S ource
1670 H. STUBBE Plus Ultra 67

1797 F. HARGRAVE Juridical Argts. I.
16
1849 KINGSLEY Misc., N. Devon II. 266,

T* R e la tu m

Q uotation
V iolent im pressions..upon the m em branes o f the Stomach, w hich may
introduce an irrelievable distem per in..that part.

G ross as w e m ust confess foe case to be, it is irrelievable.

I never think, on principle, o f things so painful, and yet so irrelievable.

144

1. som ething that can cause violent
impressions.
2. State o f stom ach mem branes
(distem per) at tim e t.
2. State o f case a t tim e

t.

State o f filings (in pain or generating
feelings o f pain) at tim e t.

V* R e la tu m
1. Stom ach m em branes
2. State o f stom ach m em branes
(distem per) at tim e H-l.
2. State o f case at tim e H-l.

State o f filings (in pain o r generating
feelings o f pain) a t tim e t+1.
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